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Welcome Remarks

Gianni De Gennaro, Chairman Center for American Studies

First of all I would like to thank all of you for being here this morning. I am delighted to give a warm welcome to all the speakers that are participating in the Forum, many of them have travelled a long distance to give their contribution today, coming from US, Russia, Europe and this year also from China.

The Transatlantic Forum on Russia, now in its fourth edition, is an annual event that has become a tradition of the Center for American Studies. This conference is an occasion to discuss yearly the state of the art of transatlantic relations with Russia in the light of most recent circumstances occurring in politics, economy and security.

This year we created an outstanding synergy with our friends of Aspen Institute Italia. We have worked closely together to offer fresh insights into issues that are crucial for global politics.

Indeed, I am proud to note that this year the Forum was made possible thanks to the patronage of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that recognized the relevance of this conference for our institutions and policy-makers.

Every year we try to keep this debate alive. Every year the developments in transatlantic relations and Russia renew our interest and need for understanding. Each year, the interactions between US, Europe and the Russian Federation within the international arena have been evolving in a way that keeps the Forum timely and topical.

That is why today we decided to address, for instance, the geopolitics of the Eastern and Southern Flanks, considering the escalation of tensions in the Middle East. This scenario begs some questions: How the US and Russia will direct their external action in the near future? What will be the role of a changing Europe in the affected areas?

Today is also crucial to grasp a new concept of security, since we assist to an epochal evolution of warfare in the face of hybrid threats and fast technological progress.

This year we have expanded our focus, including China in our conversation. Commerce, foreign investments and finance are facing dramatic changes and we need to manage them.

These are just some of the issues that impinge on transatlantic relations with Russia. Almost thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, these relations continue to be extraordinarily important for global stability and for the progress of our countries.

Two weeks ago, world leaders got together in New York to discuss climate change, probably the greatest challenge of our time. The Climate Summit made clear once again that in order to face
effectively big threats, we need a shared effort by all global powers, achieved with dialogue and awareness. That is why today we are here trying to give our contribution in order to find a mutual understanding of the common good, looking at it from different perspectives.

It is my great pleasure now to leave the floor to Giulio Tremonti, Chairman of Aspen Institute Italia, and then to Ambassador Lewis Eisenberg. Please, let me take the chance to thank once again our friends from the US Embassy for the long-standing support to our initiatives.
Welcome Remarks

Giulio Tremonti, Chairman, Aspen Institute Italia

«What is past is prologue». Così è in Shakespeare, La Tempesta, Atto Secondo. Così è inciso sul timpano dei “National Archives”, a Washington. «Past is prologue» vuol dire che per intendere lo spirito del tempo presente, e per traguardare il futuro, non si può ignorare il passato. Oggi vediamo che le relazioni tra Europa e Stati Uniti, da una parte, e Russia, dall’altra, sono oggettivamente critiche, parte del nuovo global disorder. Appena poco tempo fa non era così, anzi era l’opposto. Ricordo bene, nel 2001, l’ingresso della Russia nel G7, che per conseguenza diventò G8, e a seguire Pratica di mare. Poi qualcosa è cambiato, cambiato non certo in positivo e di certo dal lato della Russia. È emerso, da questa parte, mi pare, un certo grado di opportunismo revanscista: con la crisi siriana, con la competizione in Medio Oriente, con la tentata destabilizzazione dei Balcani, con la crisi georgiana, con l’Ucraina, con il tentativo di intrusione nei nostri sistemi democratici. E oggi pare divisiva la proiezione religiosa iper-ortodossa del governo russo o la sua revisione critica del “capitalismo”. Ma, come premesso, non si può guardare solo al tempo presente, ignorando il passato. Il tempo nel quale la Russia è stata vicina all’Occidente o sua alleata è un tempo più lungo di quello in cui Russia ed Occidente sono stati divisi. Le nostre radici affondano in una storia comune: dai secoli più bui, per arrivare alla luce dei lumi, fino alla modernità contemporanea, dall’architettura alla musica, dalla letteratura alla matematica. Un tempo si diceva che «la Russia confina con chi vuole». Oggi non è così, per quanto concerne la Russia contemporanea. Piuttosto, pare che questa formula sia più applicabile al caso della Cina! È per questo che vedo un comune interesse transatlantico, europeo e russo. L’Europa può mediare. Vedo che l’iniziativa oggi viene presa dalla Francia. Questo non è male, ma credo che la Francia debba essere molto aiutata da tutti noi! C’è un detto che viene dal tempo della guerra fredda. Allora si diceva: «a Mosca nessuno sa cosa sta succedendo, ma tutti lo capiscono», mentre a Roma si diceva: «tutti sanno cosa succede, ma nessuno lo capisce». Io credo che questo seminario serva a tutti per capire di più.
Welcome Remarks

American Perspectives on Russia and its Role in Europe

Lewis M. Eisenberg, Ambassador of the United States of America in Italy

First of all, my sincere thanks to Gianni De Gennaro, President of the Centro Studi Americani (the Center for American Studies), and to Giulio Tremonti, Chairman of the Aspen Institute Italia, for inviting me to participate once again in the Transatlantic Forum on Russia. Thanks also to Director Carlotta Ventura, her staff, and others for organizing this forum. Thanks to all of you for your work and to all present -speakers and audience members- for joining in today’s discussions.

Those of us working in government, as I do as the United States Ambassador to Italy, rely upon the expertise and insights of those outside of government. Listening to, and engaging with, those outside of government is the best way to determine how to address the great challenges we face -to debate the issues and recommend the best way forward. The United States and Italy are partners and allies with political, economic, and cultural ties strengthened over generations of cooperation. In 2019 we continue our work of promoting prosperity, security, and peace. And as we pursue those goals, China and Russia are among the mutual challenges we face.

Today, though, I’d like to focus on the economic aspects of our relations with Russia, and of how we see Russia’s role in Europe. I’ll especially highlight Russia’s role in Europe’s energy sector.

First, I want to emphasize that the United States takes a realistic view of Russia. We recognize that Russia is an influential player on the world stage, a political and military power, and an economic power in some areas. We observe its capacity to form strategic partnerships with rising powers like China and reckless regimes like Iran and Syria.

Our view is that we should cooperate with Russia where it is in our interest and the interest of our allies that we do so. And where we cannot cooperate, we should not.

Russia’s record over the past several years is not a good one. We cannot turn a blind eye to Russia’s violations of borders -most recently, its land grabs in Crimea and its violent and destabilizing actions in eastern Ukraine. As Secretary Pompeo has said, Crimea is Ukraine.

The United States will maintain respective sanctions against Russia until the Russian government returns control of Crimea to Ukraine and fully implements the Minsk agreements. In that vein, we support continued EU sanctions in response to Russia’s actions in Crimea.

We also cannot ignore Russia’s interference in democratic elections; its robust disinformation operations and efforts to sow divisions within democratic societies; its targeted attacks on
Russians living in Europe (and perhaps elsewhere, too); and its lack of cooperation regarding the shootdown of a passenger aircraft over Ukraine. That’s only a partial list of Russia’s disruptive actions, actions that undermine security and prosperity.

One of the levers of Russia’s influence in Europe is its energy resources, especially its natural gas resources. There’s nothing wrong with Russia having those resources -we’ve had an energy revolution in the United States and are proud to compete in selling our gas to world markets- but Russia and Gazprom have shown a willingness to use natural gas and pipelines for political coercion.

In 2006, 2009, and 2014, Russia cut off gas shipments to Ukraine, which in turn threatened gas supplies to people in Central Europe and beyond. In 2009 the cutoff took place during a particularly cold winter, and several people died while governments scrambled to respond. These cutoffs demonstrate that Russia, for all its energy wealth and its role in supplying over 35 percent of the natural gas consumed in Europe, is not a reliable supplier.

The European Union and many of its member states have drawn the right lessons from these experiences, recognizing the strategic importance of diversifying their energy supplies, including by country of origin and delivery routes, as well as by fuel types.

This is why the Trans Adriatic Pipeline, or TAP, is such a strategically important pipeline, and why it is important that it proceed to completion on schedule in 2020. It will open up a significant new supply route for natural gas to Europe, including to Italy -gas from Azerbaijan, non-Russian gas.

Italy rightly is looking to expand its sources of gas, including from the Eastern Mediterranean. Further expansion of Italy’s LNG import capacity and of imports from the United States also would serve Italy’s goal of ensuring adequate energy supplies in the decades to come.

And, of course, Italy should work to develop its own energy resources, including oil and gas and renewables.

Why is the United States concerned about the energy security of its allies? It’s because we see energy security as critical to a nation’s economic and political security. Countries that are energy insecure are vulnerable and often less able to be strong allies in confronting global challenges.

Accordingly, the United States policy in Europe has been to encourage energy diversification and the establishment of more electricity and pipeline interconnections, and more LNG import infrastructure and better use of existing LNG import infrastructure.

In tandem, we have opposed Russian gas export pipelines, such as Nord Stream 2 or TurkStream 2 that run counter to energy diversification efforts and that, in fact, are designed to preserve or
expand European countries’ strong reliance on Russian energy and serve Russia’s malign agenda with respect to Ukraine.

These pipelines are designed to allow Russia to drastically reduce or eliminate gas shipments through Ukraine. They are primarily diversionary pipelines, rather than pipelines designed to bring new gas to Europe. They will simply reroute the flow of gas to avoid Ukraine.

Together, Nord Stream 2 and TurkStream 2 can hurt Ukraine in two ways: (1) by depriving it of billions of dollars a year in transit fees; and (2) by removing a disincentive to further Russian aggression in Ukraine. As it stands now, Russia needs the Ukrainian pipeline system to meet some of its gas supply commitments in Europe. It is not in Russia’s interest to impede its own gas exports.

If Russia and Gazprom were normal market competitors, the situation in Europe might be different. But energy has been one of the tools Russia has used as a weapon. And Italy and other European countries should not lose sight of that reality. They should continue to pursue energy diversification and avoid projects that reinforce excessive reliance on Russia.

The bottom line is that any country doing business with Russia needs to do so with eyes wide open, and beware of relying too heavily on Russia. Because reliance on Russia usually comes with strings attached.

That said, to reiterate my earlier point, we, members of the great transatlantic alliance, can and should look for areas where we can work with Russia. And we should be prepared to take a firm stand against Russia and its malign actions when we cannot.

Thank you.
**Keynote Speech**

**Un nuovo Occidente[^1]**

**Giuliano Amato**, Judge of the Constitutional Court of Italy

**Marta Dassù**, Senior Director European Affairs, The Aspen Institute and Vice President, Center for American Studies

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**Marta Dassù.** È sintomatico che ci si chieda, ormai da diversi anni e apertamente, che ne sarà dell’Occidente. A trent’anni dalla caduta del muro di Berlino è bene ricordare le aspettative di allora: la tesi prevalente nel 1989 era che l’Occidente si sarebbe ampliato, allargato. Cosa che è avvenuta in Europa con l’allargamento dell’Unione Europea: il famoso allargamento del 2004. Ma la realtà è che poi le cose si sono fermate, e l’Occidente non si è rafforzato. Da questo punto di vista la data veramente importante è il 2008: il grande shock finanziario che in fondo fa cambiare un po’ tutto, incluse le prospettive dei rapporti fra Stati Uniti ed Europa. Oggi le democrazie occidentali sembrano particolarmente fragili, per le ragioni spiegate in questo numero di Aspenia. Mentre le autocrazie sembrano rivivere dei sogni imperiali: la Russia nel vicino estero, Erdogan con i suoi progetti neo-ottomani e la Cina ripropendosi come grande potenza globale.

La domanda a cui dobbiamo rispondere è se si tratti di una crisi contingente, legata a fattori temporanei, oppure di una crisi strutturale. Un fattore di cambiamento importante –visto il peso storico esercitato dagli Stati Uniti nella nascita e nello sviluppo dell’Occidente europeo– riguarda l’atteggiamento dell’America di oggi rispetto all’Europa. Per la prima volta nella storia del dopoguerra, un presidente americano non sembra credere in un’Europa forte; la percezione europea è che, per ragioni essenzialmente economiche, Donald Trump sembri anzi puntare su un’Europa debole, o forse su una Germania indebolita. Questa analisi conduce alla conclusione, secondo noi superficiale, che basterà attendere il “dopo Trump” per tornare alla vecchia solidità del rapporto atlantico. In realtà, esiste una corrente molto più profonda della politica estera –e interna– americana, che sta esercitando il suo peso: molti studiosi la definiscono “isolazionista”, termine probabilmente forzato. Il punto vero è che gli Stati Uniti, già con Obama del resto, non intendono più sostenere gli oneri della Pax americana, ritengono che l’Europa debba fare la sua parte (è il ricorrente dibattito sul “burden sharing”) e guardano essenzialmente alla rivalità con la Cina. È necessario capire a fondo l’America di oggi,

[^1]: This article has been previously published in “Aspenia”, No. 87, December 2019
insomma, per cercare di capire che cosa l’America voglia veramente fare del suo alleato storico: l’Europa.

**Giuliano Amato.** Sì, il tema è davvero la perdita, se perdita è, dell’Occidente incarnato dalla relazione transatlantica. Può incidere gravemente e negativamente sulla governabilità di un mondo che per affrontare, sia pure con tutti i tempi necessari, sfide come quelle ambientali, ha bisogno di adottare decisioni concertate. Chi vede nel mondo di oggi un “G Zero” (come Ian Bremmer: un mondo senza guida, in sostanza, con un vuoto evidente di potere), o gli osservatori che parlano di un mondo in disarray e fuori controllo, pensa espressamente che nella situazione di oggi nessun paese o gruppo di paesi abbia la forza di imporre un’agenda e di realizzare la costruzione di beni collettivi per l’umanità. I famosi common goods. Se questa previsione è corretta possiamo soltanto augurare buona fortuna ai nostri figli e nipoti, perché altro non saremmo in grado di offrire.

È inevitabile prendere atto che è venuto meno un pilastro del governo del mondo fino a qualche anno fa, che era appunto la leadership americana. Il punto è che questo pilastro ha potuto essere efficace, dalla metà del secolo scorso in poi, perché aveva attorno un’alleanza non solo militare: quella transatlantica, come perno dell’Occidente.

Sarà pur vero che la relazione transatlantica era figlia della contrapposizione di sistema tra Occidente e Unione Sovietica, ma è un dato di fatto che la leadership americana si è esercitata anche attraverso la relazione transatlantica. Il legame con l’Europa non ha forse di per sé consentito, ma di certo ha reso forte la leadership americana nel mondo.

Ho vissuto personalmente la stagione in cui l’insofferenza per la Pax americana portava anche intellettuali di prestigio – penso a Michael Walzer – a negare l’evidenza. Anche se era corretto dire, comparando in chiave storica Pax romana e Pax americana, che le capacità che avevano i romani di tenere il mondo comunque in pace sotto la loro egemonia era assolutamente superiore a quella degli americani nel xx secolo.

Detto questo, mi è tuttavia sempre sembrato che (sia pure nello spazio di decenni e non di secoli) la Pax americana fosse una realtà sperimentata e funzionante; ove fosse finita, si sarebbe creato un vero problema. Come poi è effettivamente accaduto. E il problema che abbiamo, non a caso, è duplice: perché, come ho appena sostenuto, leadership americana e relazione transatlantica hanno funzionato insieme. E oggi sono entrambe in crisi, a conferma della loro correlazione.

Sono d’accordo che la crisi finanziaria del 2008 abbia avuto un’incidenza rilevante; ma in quel momento eravamo già sullo scivolo, perché la realtà è che non abbiamo saputo leggere il mondo che usciva dalla caduta del muro di Berlino e dalla fine del comunismo. E quindi non siamo
riusciti a “reimpostarci” in funzione di questa nuova realtà: il mondo post guerra fredda non avrebbe visto l’espansione a macchia d’olio delle democrazie liberali e dei mercati; all’opposto, si sarebbero aperti nuovi focolai di conflitti. Un mondo di divergenze e differenze, quindi, non più componibili nei due grandi blocchi. Tutto ciò avrebbe richiesto una capacità di reazione che non abbiamo saputo esercitare. Perlomeno: non abbiamo capito, e reagito, in tempo utile.

Tra i pochi leader ad aver compreso come si sarebbe dovuto affrontare un contesto inedito citerei Javier Solana, che –da segretario generale della NATO prima e poi come Alto Rappresentante per la Politica estera europea– propone un’organizzazione per la sicurezza europea che riuscisse a inglobare la Russia: una delle condizioni che ci avrebbero permesso di fronteggiare questo mondo così diverso. Ma le cose sono andate in senso diverso, creando le premesse per ciò che è accaduto dopo, fino alla crisi ucraina.

È un mondo che definirei “multi-angolare”. In una prima fase c’è stata l’opportunità di far valere interessi, ragioni e anche visioni dell’Occidente, con una Russia disponibile allora ad aggregarsi: ma questo non è stato fatto. E il mondo è diventato sempre più difficile.

Intanto, l’America cambiava atteggiamento, certo ben prima che arrivasse alla Casa Bianca Donald Trump: già Barack Obama, dal discorso all’Università del Cairo nel giugno 2009, aveva detto in modo chiaro che gli Stati Uniti, comunque, non avrebbero più impegnato se stessi militarmente nel mondo, come avevano fatto sino ad allora. E questo avrebbe comportato un maggior grado di autonomia nella gestione delle crisi regionali. Atteggiamento che ha poi portato quasi naturalmente l’amministrazione Obama al passaggio che possiamo considerare il vero segnale della fine del ruolo americano per come lo conoscevamo, cioè la posizione di Washington sulla Siria.

Capisco la reazione alle Primavere arabe: tutti abbiamo creduto che fosse sempre primavera, anche quando erano solo un paio di giornate di sole e non molto di più. E Dio salvi la Tunisia! Ma è sulla crisi in Siria che ci fu un’autentica decisione di star fuori, lasciando il paese al suo destino se non del tutto a sé stesso –perché di fatto si è facilitato il ruolo più incisivo di altri. Il dato che abbiamo di fronte allora è diverso da quello dell’indebolimento delle democrazie liberali, ma che finisce per convergere con esso. Questo nostro indebolimento di ruolo, che è anzi tuttutto una scelta degli Stati Uniti, si è accompagnato a un appannamento della relazione transatlantica nella sua dimensione di alleanza transatlantica. Il che, a sua volta e inevitabilmente, ha prodotto un effetto sul tasso di governo del mondo: e un effetto a cascata a danno dell’Occidente, con l’indebolimento delle democrazie.

**Dassù.** *Abbiamo certamente compiuto, e tu lo sottolinei, degli errori nella gestione del rapporto con la Russia. La realtà, io credo, è che abbiamo dato due letture molto diverse del 1989.*
Per l’Occidente, l’89 segnava la vittoria della guerra fredda; e quindi potevamo cogliere i frutti, anche a spese della Russia, che quella guerra l’aveva persa. Keynes non sarebbe stato d’accordo: basterebbe rileggere il suo famoso libro sulle “conseguenze economiche della pace”, applicato al Trattato di Versailles, per capire che una pace punitiva avrebbe alla fine ricreato un nemico, o almeno un rivale.

La Russia, all’opposto, si aspettava di ottenere delle compensazioni (e non solo economiche) per l’atteggiamento pacifico che aveva tenuto di fronte al dissolvimento del Patto di Varsavia; e certo non si aspettava l’allargamento progressivo della NATO verso Est. Non a caso, Putin definisce ormai la fine dell’Urss come «la principale catastrofe geopolitica del xx secolo».

Io non credo, però, che la Russia sia ancora al centro delle preoccupazioni americane. Da Obama in poi – e Obama ha probabilmente compiuto a sua volta un errore definendo in modo un po’ sprezzante la Russia come un attore solo regionale– la percezione americana è che la vera rivalità sistemica sia con la Cina. La Cina come grande potenza competitrice rivale, in un mondo che viene ormai letto nell’ottica di un ritorno alla “great power competition”. Nella visione di Trump della “great power competition”, economia e sicurezza vengono messe insieme in modo contrattualistico. Questo vale per gli avversari ma anche per gli alleati, determinando un cambiamento avvertibile nel modo di gestire la relazione transatlantica. La convinzione della Casa Bianca, resa del resto più che esplicita, è che l’America continua a sostenere i costi della sicurezza collettiva, attraverso la NATO, ma in cambio ottiene poco, in particolare da un paese come la Germania, che ha peraltro un surplus commerciale notevole verso gli Stati Uniti. Questa lettura finisce per riguardare anche l’Italia, che in realtà fa parte economicamente del “sistema tedesco”: la seconda manifattura d’Europa avrebbe grossi problemi se i dazi si trasformassero in una leva permanente del riequilibrio auspicato da Washington. Il tema del rapporto fra economia e sicurezza diventa insomma cruciale: è legato alla gestione del rapporto con la Cina ma si scarica anche con l’Europa. Ed è diventato comune dire che è già in corso una specie di nuova guerra fredda con la Cina, soprattutto una guerra fredda tecnologica: il caso Huawei è emblematico.

Quanto è appropriata questa definizione della Cina come nuovo sistema antagonistico, e controparte di una nuova guerra fredda: non è un po’ forzato? In questo numero di Aspenia, Cliff Kupchan parla di “guerra tiepida” (Cool War) sottolineando le differenze rispetto alla vecchia competizione USA-URSS.

Amato. Storicamente la guerra fredda è stata proprio una guerra tra sistemi contrapposti. In gioco era un quesito fondamentale: se le società funzionano meglio attraverso economie di mercato o attraverso economie pianificate centralmente. Come sappiamo, i paesi che
incarnavano questi due diversi sistemi, politici ed economici, erano anche militarmente contrapposti. Ed era ben presente l’idea che la prevalenza dell’uno sull’altro potesse anche avvenire per via militare -anche se non c’è dubbio che l’America di Reagan, anche grazie alla corsa al riarmo, abbia piegato l’Unione Sovietica anizutto sul piano economico.

Il limite era stabilito dall’equilibrio del terrore, come lo si chiamava allora, costruito proprio per evitare, attraverso il meccanismo della dissuasione nucleare, che si verificasse uno scontro militare convenzionale. Di conseguenza, il confronto si è mantenuto -almeno in Europa- su un terreno relativamente pacifico: la posta in gioco era stabilire chi avesse il sistema migliore. Ed è proprio così che la guerra fredda è finita, tra l’altro. Negli anni Ottanta, il grande scontro sui missili di teatro in Europa (lo spiegamento degli SS-20 sovietici prima e poi la sacrosanta reazione europea) dimostrò la tenuta della dissuasione nucleare. Ma preparò l’implosione dell’Urss. L’Unione Sovietica si è sgretolata perché era economicamente troppo debole per reggere il passo, tra le esigenze civili e militari imposte dalla competizione con l’Occidente.

**Dassù.** E la Russia è ancora debole oggi: come si legge in questo numero, il paradosso è che debolezza interna e revanscismo esterno si combinano. La percezione è di avere di fronte, grazie alle indubbie capacità tattiche di Vladimir Putin, una grande potenza. La realtà è diversa: le basi interne della potenza russa sono fragili. Come possiamo valutare lo strano mix di forza e vulnerabilità che emerge dall’immagine della Russia sullo scacchiere internazionale?

**Amato.** Possiamo dire anzitutto che la Russia di oggi paga ancora le conseguenze del sistema sovietico. Il che non è poi così strano. A trent’anni dalla caduta del Muro di Berlino, si può per esempio notare che la riunificazione tedesca dell’ottobre 1990 ha in qualche modo incorporato una parte delle inefficienze economiche comuniste nell’Europa occidentale. I Länder della Germania Est ci ricordano tuttora, in effetti, che il divario era enorme e difficile da colmare. La riunificazione tedesca è avvenuta in modo rapido, anche se molto costoso; ma la Germania Est sconta ancora dei ritardi, che poi si traducono in frustrazione politica e infine nell’ascesa di un partito come Alternativ für Deutschland, la cui forza comparativa è radicata soprattutto a Est.

**Dassù.** La tua tesi, quindi, è che la storia della guerra fredda passata non offre chiavi di lettura utili, se non per differenza, per interpretare la presunta o temuta “nuova guerra fredda” tra Stati Uniti e Cina. E quindi parliamo delle differenze. E valutiamo a che punto siamo: è già arrivata la fase del gioco a somma zero, o siamo ancora in una fase preliminare, ibrida e incerta?

**Amato.** Tra Stati Uniti e Cina non c’è quasi nulla dello scontro frontale che fu tipico dell’antagonismo USA-URSS. La Cina, certo, tende ad armarsi, ma è estraneo alla Cina il
pensiero di una contrapposizione diretta. Per ora non ce ne è stato neppure bisogno, perché il modello cinese è risultato unico ed efficiente, con la sua mistura tra capitalismo di Stato, capitalismo privato, autoritarismo di partito, libertà di zone franche: insomma, chi inventò Frankenstein è un dilettante rispetto a chi è riuscito a costruire questo impasto, a cui nessuno di noi avrebbe dato credenziali di funzionamento. Eppure funziona. Certo, ci sono campanelli di allarme, dalle proteste di Hong Kong alle grandi differenze regionali interne: ma non sono tali da scalfire il sistema. E ciò che colpisce noi occidentali è ad esempio la capacità di risparmio enorme, perché fissata in via autoritativa; di tutto il reddito che viene prodotto in Cina, le autorità stabiliscono quanta parte va al consumo, quanta viene investita, ecc. Questo meccanismo genera un potenziale molto superiore a quello che abbiamo noi, e la cosa è preoccupante perché il dominio del futuro passa a questo punto attraverso l’economia. 

Dassù. E passa attraverso la tecnologia: altro terreno sul quale il modello cinese sembra davvero efficace.

Amato. Gli Stati Uniti hanno ancora l’orgoglio del paese leader, anche se ne hanno dismesso largamente le funzioni, e percepiscono che questo loro tratto fisionomico è oggi messo in discussione dalla Repubblica popolare cinese attraverso la leadership sul piano dell’innovazione tecnologica e di tutti gli usi conseguenti. Dobbiamo chiederci allora quale sarà in futuro il rapporto tra due forme di capitalismo. C’è un capitalismo che non ha mai fatto a meno della mano pubblica come quello americano (che alla mano pubblica deve tre quarti della sua ricerca innovativa) ma che per il resto è stato un capitalismo di mercato; e c’è un modello cinese che dovremmo definire un comunismo di mercato, o un mercato comunista -gli ossimori di questo Frankenstein cinese. Si tratta di una partita molto più aperta e molto più giocabile di quanto non fosse quella della guerra fredda, che con la sua immediata implicazione militare poneva dei vincoli e dei limiti allo scontro.

Dassù. Intanto c’è però già una forte competizione militare di tipo regionale, nel Mar Cinese meridionale: qui indubbiamente Pechino sta dotandosi di capacità navali che non ha mai avuto, provocando grande preoccupazione tra gli alleati storici dell’America. In quell’area si potrebbe verificare il classico incidente militare, anche senza il tipo di confronto diretto e a tutto campo che caratterizzava la guerra fredda. Se spostiamo lo sguardo oltre la dimensione regionale asiatica, il nuovo quadro strategico -il nuovo bipolarismo, se vogliamo, Cina-Stati Uniti- rischia di schiacciare l’Europa. Gli europei si trovano di fronte a delle scelte, come per le reti digitali 5G di nuova generazione, che la mettono in difficoltà. In una situazione di disordine globale, con gerarchie poco chiare, è legittimo chiedersi se l’Europa riuscirà a esistere o no come vero soggetto geopolitico. Se avesse la propria sovranità...
tecnologica sarebbe fondamentalmente meglio, ma ciò richiede consistenti investimenti e non solo una decisione di principio. E ci vogliono investimenti, più ampiamente, nelle capacità indispensabili per essere una potenza a tutto spettro. Ursula von der Leyen, presentando il suo programma, ha parlato, appunto, di una «Commissione geopolitica: un’espressione abbastanza impegnativa per un soggetto come l’Unione Europea.

Amato. Il settore nel quale processo di integrazione è stato più debole e privo di efficacia è il ruolo internazionale dell’Europa: la single voice che, in realtà, non c’è mai stata. Terreno sul quale abbiamo regolarmente sbattuto contro la forza dei singoli paesi, soprattutto con seggio permanente alle Nazioni Unite e con capacità nucleare, e contro l’egemonia riluttante della Germania. Sono stati questi i fattori che hanno reso plurime le politiche estere europee; ed è così che, ultima in ordine di tempo, Federica Mogherini si è trovata ad assolvere a un compito assolutamente impossibile, cioè quello di essere rappresentante nel mondo di una politica estera che non c’era. Appunto plurima, non componibile, a stento coordinabile.


Ora, dobbiamo essere onesti nel dire che, in assenza di una posizione americana forte, è ancora più difficile che noi riusciamo a unificare i nostri orientamenti di politica estera. Noi europei continuiamo ad avere bisogno di una posizione americana forte, magari da correggere, ma questo è un punto di riferimento per noi essenziale. Il venir meno di un ruolo costruttivo di Washington ha indebolito anche quel poco che era la politica estera comune. E Brexit non aiuta di certo. Paradossalmente, tuttavia, è possibile che l’America ci dia oggi una mano grazie alla posizione, che in Trump è veramente netta, secondo cui gli USA non vogliono più spendere denaro per la difesa dell’Europa; con il messaggio chiarissimo che dovranno d’ora in poi difendersi da soli. L’idea della difesa comune era stata, a suo tempo, ostacolata dagli Stati Uniti perché pensavano che gli europei avrebbero potuto utilizzarla al di fuori della NATO e a
prescindere dagli impegni comuni in ambito NATO. Era questa l’obiezione: «Ma poi voi che ne fate della difesa comune?». L’osservazione mi è stata fatta più volte, e la mia risposta è sempre stata che per chi ritiene l’alleanza transatlantica un elemento essenziale della nostra politica internazionale, la difesa comune è solo una semplificazione. Si tratta cioè di inserire nella NATO, già integrata militarmente, una componente integrata anche politicamente, che quindi semplifica, non distolge e non crea nuove divergenze. Oggi questa obiezione non c’è più da parte americana. Se allora avremo sufficiente intelligenza da ritenere che è nel nostro interesse mantenere viva la relazione transatlantica, e in quella cornice costruiremo la difesa comune europea, avremo un grande stimolo per andare oltre rispetto alla pluralità delle politiche estere. E questa sarà anche la base per sviluppare una convergenza in politica estera.

Dassù. Per sintetizzare il ragionamento che abbiamo fatto, l’alleanza transatlantica è stata trainata a lungo dalla leadership americana; dopo il 1989 non siamo riusciti a gestire un mondo che cambiava in fretta. Ora è l’Europa a doversi preoccupare di salvare l’alleanza transatlantica perché in realtà l’aiuta a essere più coesa –invece di dividerla. È dall’Europa che dovrebbe dunque partire questo impulso a tenere in vita un Occidente che, in un mondo mal governato e “pieno di vuoti”, ci interessa in modo esistenziale. Quindi, un futuro per l’Occidente ci sarà se anche l’Europa farà –meglio e con più energia– la sua parte. Ma è davvero immaginabile un nuovo slancio transatlantico fino a quando preverrà a Washington una linea “America first”?

Secondo parecchi europei, significa in realtà “America only”.

Amato. Certamente l’approccio “America first” è difficilmente compatibile con scelte politiche collettive, per esempio in materia di climate change. Eppure, vedo un barlume di speranza: a Trump del cambiamento climatico sembra importare meno che niente. Vede il problema in chiave elettorale, essendosi accorto che i suoi elettori delle campagne del Midwest sono particolarmente irritati con quelli che percepiscono come i radical chic democratici che parlano sempre di cambiamento climatico e sostenibilità. La mia sensazione è insomma che il presidente critichi le politiche sul clima senza particolare trasporto; una volta rieletto, e non avendo più il problema prioritario del rapporto con gli elettori, potrebbe anche, con lo stesso cinico disinteresse, sostenere politiche ambientali che nel paese per la verità sono ormai maggioritarie in gran parte degli stati americani -e nel mondo delle imprese. Staremo a vedere, ma non è certo il caso di cedere a un pessimismo totale. Così come l’America resta l’alleato indispensabile per l’Europa, l’Europa resta un alleato decisivo per gli Stati Uniti: la loro forza comparativa nel mondo, rispetto alla Cina, consiste proprio nella forza storica delle alleanze. Gli Stati Uniti la riscopriranno anche perché ne avranno bisogno.
First Session

U.S., Europe and Russia: Discussing Hotspots

1.1 Andrei Kortunov, Director General, Russian International Affairs Council

Today, many in the European Union are convinced that Russia is highly interested in the failure of the “European project.” Such suspicions concerning Russia’s preferences have some grounds. Russian politicians and diplomats, officials and analysts often say things that leave the impression that Moscow would prefer to deal with a European Union that is weak, unstable and torn apart by internal problems. Indeed, separatist movements inside the European Union, from Scotland to Catalonia, receive favorable coverage in the Russian media. Leaders of European nationalists and Eurosceptics are welcome in Moscow. The latest exacerbation of migrant problems or another terrorist attack in a European capital are presented as the beginning of the end for European civilization.

Of course, the European Union is not the United States. The main guns of Russia’s propaganda arsenal have for many years been pointed at Washington and not Brussels. The United States is considered to be Russia’s only worthy global antagonist. For many reasons, the European Union does not fit this role. And still, the desire to live side by side with a weak European Union that is in a state of permanent crisis has certain logic to it. And there is certain logic to the reasoning of those who believe that a consolidated, dynamically developing, and stable European Union is more in line with Russia’s true interests.

Let us try to compare the reasoning of those who support and those who are against a strong Europe and provide the reader with the opportunity to assess the strengths and weaknesses of each position.

First, the numerous misfortunes and disasters that have befallen Brussels of late are another vivid confirmation of Moscow being on the right side of history. In other words, they confirm the ideas of the current political situation that presently dominate Russia’s political discourse. The European Union today is a clear illustration of the crisis of globalization and apparent helplessness of political liberalism, a stark example of the global rise of nationalism and proponents of traditional values. But it is not merely a picture and an example. The European Union’s misfortunes and disasters are a guarantee of the new world order not being made from Brussels’ sewing patterns. Therefore, Moscow does not need to try the European dinner jacket that has been tailored for somebody else and restricts its movements.
Second, against the background of Europe’s “Great Troubles”, Russia’s stability clearly looks better, even if it is encumbered with elements of stagnation that are becoming more and more prominent. Maybe for the first time in the last two decades, the situation in Russia looks more stable and predictable than it does in Europe. Depicting the horrors of daily life in Europe (migrants, terrorists, street clashes, same-sex marriages, all-powerful European bureaucrats, the crisis of the euro, the unclear future), Russian propaganda successfully deconstructs the previously exceptionally attractive “European myth” that has existed for a long time in the national public consciousness. The traditional rhetorical question of «Do you want Russia to be like Ukraine?» has found an extension in the rhetorical question of «Do you want Russia to be like Europe?».

Third, the practical experience of Russia’s European policy of the last 25 years contradicts the idea of a strong European Union. Moscow has always found it easier to negotiate with individual European partners, particularly with the leading representatives of the “old Europe” (Berlin, Paris, Rome, Madrid) than with Brussels as the lowest common denominator of individual EU members’ diverse interests. Moscow mostly perceives the “Brussels superstructure” on top of national states not as another opportunity, but as another encumbrance. To be fair, it should be said that Moscow’s key European partners contributed to the emergence of this notion. For a long time, they have unfailingly preferred to discuss promising areas in cooperation with Moscow (economy and energy in particular) at a bilateral level, while leaving the most difficult and unpleasant issues (such as human rights) for Brussels.

Fourth, Moscow supports “non-systemic” European opposition, various populists, nationalists and Eurosceptics because, unlike the bulk of European political establishment, they are ready to conduct a dialogue with Moscow without any preliminary conditions and requirements. Moreover, many European populists and nationalists proclaim principled dissent from the current EU policy on Russia, express their solidarity with, or at least understanding of, those actions of the Kremlin that the European Union condemns and declare their intent to push for the lifting of the EU’s anti-Russian sanctions. Why shouldn’t Moscow bet on those who are ready for a dialogue here and now, and not in some indefinite future?

However, Russian proponents of a stronger Europe have a very different logic to make their point.

First, only a strong and consolidated European Union is capable of making a significant contribution to the shaping of a truly polycentric (multipolar) world, a very popular topic in Moscow. A weak and disjointed Europe incapable of reaching a consensus within its own borders will always remain an object for Washington to exert pressure on, manipulate in various
ways and even flat-out blackmail. It is the EU’s weakness that stands in the way of Brussels successfully counteracting the new sanctions that the Trump administration is imposing on Iran, or unanimously condemning the decision to move the U.S. embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Only a weak European Union will face the need to de facto join the unilateral anti-Russian sanctions imposed by the United States. A strong and successfully developing European Union is, in addition to everything else, a reliable and promising market for Russian goods, services and investments (it also means that, among other things, from the point of view of Russia’s economic interests, Brexit is far from being a godsend).

Second, even with Russia’s turn to the East, we should not forget that Europe remains Russia’s priority socioeconomic laboratory. In its social and demographic structure and its level of education and urbanization, Russia still remains closer to the EU countries than to any other region of the world. It is in the EU where most economic and social practices, the models of corporate and municipal governance, as well as technical standards and procedures are developed. They then are adapted by Russia to fit its own conditions. The development of institutes and mechanisms for the Eurasian Economic Union is also based primarily on the European Union’s rich and fruitful experience of institutionalization. Moscow, therefore, should be interested in the European laboratory expanding its work instead of winding it down. It should be interested in the developing of new practices, standards and models that can then be localized and reproduced in Russia.

Third, we should not lose sight of the fact that any international organization, including the European Union, is only as effective or as ineffective as its principal members want it to be. Therefore, placing Brussels in opposition to the capitals of the leading EU countries is quite unjustified. Remove the Brussels bureaucracy and it will be the bureaucrats in Berlin, Paris and Rome who have to deal with all the unpleasant aspects in Russia–Europe relations. It should be added that for Berlin, for instance, continued European integration is a top foreign policy priority. There is no simpler way of ruining relations with Germany than demonstrating the desire to undermine European unity or just raise the suspicions of the German people that such a desire does, indeed, exist.

Fourth, it should also be recognized that all those Eurosceptics, European right-wing populists and nationalists are highly unreliable partners. Some of them -Polish leader Jarosław Kaczyński, for example- combine a pointed dislike of Brussels with open hostility towards Moscow. Others, who position themselves as loyal friends to Moscow, in fact use their bold statements of friendship with Russia to bargain with Brussels on other issues that are of greater importance for them. Let us recall that in the four years that have passed since the European
Union first imposed sanctions on Russia, not one European populist that has come to power has ever officially raised the question of lifting them. There are reasons to believe they will not do so in future either, at least for as long as there is no preliminary agreement achieved on the matter with Berlin, Brussels and the other EU political heavyweights. The list of arguments of the opponents and proponents of a strong European Union can be easily continued. However, even without a more or less complete and systemic exposition of these arguments, the conclusion would suggest that it is still difficult to establish a constructive dialogue on this topic, which is important for Russia. One party emphasizes fundamental values, while the other talks about specific economic interests. One focuses on the geopolitical picture of the world, while the other is more focused on its social dimension. Some participants in the discussion operate with primarily positive and negative emotions generated by past experiences, while others attempt to distance themselves from these experiences as they think of the future. In any case, these difficulties are no reason to abandon discussions.
As regard to the question about «a possible reset in the relations among the U.S. and Russia», I would say it’s possible, but I think it is actually quite a difficult proposition for a number of reasons. Being an American in Brussels represents an interesting window on the debate. Clearly, Trump administration has taken a different track on many things. So, the issue about a “reset” applies clearly in U.S. – Russia relations or in U.S. – China relations, but it is equally applied in Brussels to talk about U.S.-EU relations. The real question is: can American foreign policy be reset? The short answer is «yes» but the problem is that, in the meantime, a lot has happened and you have to reset not just American policies but also policies in many places and part of this of course has nothing to do with a centrally-directed foreign policy. There are things happening in the international scene that are gradually becoming structural. According to me, a strong Europe is in the interest of the USA and I think the American strategic class supports the idea that a strong, active, capable Europe is in the American interests. But I very much feel that nationalism and the identity politics are proving to be extremely corrosive and are making the “reset” very difficult.

With respect to the centrality of Russia in the American thinking today, if we look out at the disorder in the international system, we will realize that very little of this is about Russia or Russia-U.S. relations. I’ve worked for many years at the RAND Corporation and I have to say that, in the past, the Soviet Union and the USA talked to each other all the time, they disagreed profoundly sometimes but they had a good understanding of what the other wanted. That’s not true anymore. They don’t frankly know what the other wants. At the same time, in a more proximate sense, in places like the Balkans, the Black Sea, the Baltic or Eastern Mediterranean, very risky things are happening and we are not doing enough to reduce those risks.

Beyond that, I think that China is the real issue in Washington today. It represents the extremely consequential long-term challenge for the U.S. and I’m afraid that we are not connecting the dots between the trade war’s side of this and the strategic stability’s side, since I believe they could be intimately linked. The net result is that there are a lot of new risks and that we are not doing a very good job in managing them.

I think to an extent the previous administration, the Obama administration, saw the Russian activism in Syria above all as being an important driver of policy. I don’t really think that is true today. I mean, yes, it is seen as something of a disturbing trend from an American point of view, but not the core issue when it comes to US policy on Syria or other things. I think what is really defining today is the whole series of regional relationships that have deteriorated:
Turkey is one, Saudi Arabia is another, and the increasing confrontation with Iran which is extremely dangerous; actually I think for everyone. These are the things driving a more cautious American policy. With regard to Turkey I think there is a tremendous concern about where Ankara is going with the purchase of the Russian S-400 air defense system. This is not a popular thing in Washington or in NATO, obviously. Does it signal a kind of long term shift in Turkey’s orientation? Probably not. You asked earlier, Marta, whether we could speak about who lost a series of countries, but who lost Turkey in particular. In my view, Turkey lost Turkey, if you want to put it that way. There is a widespread view in the American strategic establishment that Turkey has “gone off the rails.” But what is driving this? I don’t think it is a long term re-orientation. I think it is simply as elsewhere, a kind of triumph of the nationalist approach in a very dangerous neighborhood.
I think that we are far from rebuilding a normal relationship with Russia, unfortunately, but it is certainly true that we are at a turning point. The lack of trust between the Western world and Russia is maybe even worse than it was in the Cold War. We should ask ourselves who lost Russia, why the magic moment of a possible approximation between the West and Russia was lost. Obviously, the story did not end and we were bound to see new developments, which came into force but not in the sense we hoped for.

Russia is perceived in a problematic way by the West. First of all, it is a general mistake when we consider Russia as a monolith. It is not. It is of course much more monolithic than any western country, but it is not one single bloc. Secondly, we did not help that part of Russia which was really open to embrace western values, a part which was honestly engaging in a constructive dialogue with the West and, on the contrary, we strengthened the side of Russia which was, as Giuliano Amato said, «eager to find the new old enemy», allowing it to redefine and justify some policies. I was very struck by what a member of Russian government told me. He said «unfortunately, due to this lack of dialogue and trust in Moscow or in Washington, anyone who is in favor of a dialogue is immediately defined as a traitor, an enemy of the motherland». This kind of approach requires some action from both side who believe in dialogue. Russia is certainly convinced that the unipolar world order is no longer sustainable and, as a consequence, Russians are striving for a multipolar global order or «multi-vectorial new world order», as Yevgeny Primakov defined it. The same approach is shared by countries such as China, India and so on.

Russia feels that it has regained influence worldwide thanks to a very strong realpolitik and in particular to a renewed political, diplomatic and military engagement in Middle East, especially in Syria, restating a kind of right to a sphere of influence on the near abroad. There are some principles that will not be shared by the West and there are some policies that will not be acceptable according to our concept of international law. Because of these elements, those who want to have a dialogue with Russia will find it more difficult. Nevertheless, there are some first “green shoots”. Indeed, we have seen Russia playing a role in Syria. Again, of course we do not share the view on their leniency on Assad’s regime but I also think that G7 was wrong in repeating, like a broken record, «Assad must go» when we were not able to make this happen. Maybe we have a responsibility for part of the tragedy there, because a negotiation without the precondition «Assad must go» might have started and brought some results. This is something where some constructive engagement was possible and this could lead to a new peaceful
environment, a new political atmosphere. There are several elements which all point to a new possible chance or season of dialogue: the progress in Ukraine, the first exchange of prisoners, and the possibility of a new summit.
2.1 Susi Dennison, Director, European Power Program, European Council on Foreign Relations

Thank you very much Marta, for that introduction and for the opportunity to be here and talk to you this morning to and to have benefited from the fascinating discussions. I think the point that I want to focus on with the research we have been doing at the European Council on foreign Relations is this question of: Who wants a stronger Europe? Who wants an EU that is more able to act towards a continental size power on the global stage? We heard a little bit, in comments already this morning, on how that looks on a Russian perspective and how that looks from a US perspective. What we wanted to find out at ECFR was how that looks to Europeans. So what we did was we carried out over the first half of this year a series of surveys with over 60,000 thousand Europeans with Yougov. Asking questions particularly about their views on Europe, the world, and where they wanted to see the EU going within that. I think I want to make five points to you this morning related to the discussions we have been having this morning so far. The first of those, that as Marta alluded to just now, there is a growing or a misunderstood support for the EU strengthening as a global actor. Basically, it is a kind of truism within the EU circles that there is only so far we can go in terms of pushing common, foreign, and security policy forward, because national populations would not actually tolerate it in the end. In the end, what they prefer to see is their governments pursuing a defense of national interest first, rather than developing Europe’s global power and this was the question that we really wanted to test. What was very striking, was to find that actually there is support there for the EU having more impact on the international stage. One of the questions where this is very apparent when we asked, «What would be the biggest losses if the EU collapsed tomorrow?». The chart that you can see shows the biggest answers are very much around the single markets, the ability to: live, eat, work, and travel in other EU member states. But the yellow blocks on this map add the existence of the European superpowers and the counts of the blocks came around second or third place in a number of member states. As you can see, this is not something that is only peculiar to one part of the European Union, the Eastern or Central states or something like that, it is a widespread feeling. When we asked a little bit about what kind of power the European Union should therefore be, it was quite striking to see that there is a desire for an EU that can
chart its own course. That can choose which discussions, which arguments it wants to get involved in and is indeed big enough to choose not to get involved. In both the question about which side should you take in a conflict between the US and Russia, but also between the US and China it was very striking to see there was a strong preference for neither side being taken and for there being space for a European path. *Marta asks, «Why do you think it is striking?» Yes, I do think it is striking and I think there are different ways in which we can talk about how you can read this. On the one hand, it can be seen as a sort of desire for Europe to be non-confrontational, on the other hand, I think it can be seen as a sense that this should be up to us; we should not have to be forced one way or the other. *Marta comments, «yes, which in the case of the confrontation between the US and China is more understandable, in a sense. The US and Russia is the core of the NATO alliance, so it is a bit bizarre I would say. It is the idea of Europe as a big Switzerland, more or less, with the exception of Poland with the relationship with Russia and this is very understandable». In terms of the ways Europeans are thinking about Russia it is indeed striking that Poland stands out as being a country that is more concerned about the Russia relationships than others. One particular area where we do see a more widespread concern about Europe’s ability to handle the way the relationship with Russia is evolving is on the question of information, manipulation within domestic and political systems. Where we can see both a sense that Russian propaganda, Russian influence in the media, that we consume in Europe is perceived to be a problem. In all member states you can see a majority, but also when we asked, «whether or not your country feels well protected to handle that?» there is this strong sense, which is the orange bars here, that we are not. That is something we need to develop in the EU. Just thinking about the Transatlantic relationship within this picture, another point I want to emphasize is: that this is not only a sense that Europe needs to be stronger versus Russia, there is a sense that we can no longer rely on the transatlantic security guarantee without investing in ourselves. This is something which seems to be understood not only at a policy elite level, but also in the population more broadly. When we asked about the extent of trust in the US versus the European Union, you can see a much stronger response in the yellow bars which is in the EU. This is not just a thing about personal trust in leaders, we asked the question about «whether you personally trust Merkel, Putin, or Trump?», this was out of a list about 10 different leaders, including national leaders in each country. The results are slightly awkward, to use more broadly, in the majority of countries there is actually more trust in Putin than Trump in terms of the relationship. But then that feeds into the idea that Europe needs to be stronger all round. One final comment about the sanctions positioned, because there has been some discussion on that this morning. We did ask the specific question about «whether or not
the EU position with regards to maintaining the sanctions, with regard to Russia, was not tough enough balanced or too tough?». There was a fairly clear sense that the majorities felt that either it was not tough enough or it was balanced. Going back to the conversation you had been having earlier on, whether there is a need to balance dialogue with the ongoing implementations of the sanctions. There is clearly strong support in European populations for the second part of that as well.
2.2 Fabrizio Di Michele, Head Russia, Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia Unit, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation

Well, first of all I am not surprised because there are other surveys focusing only on Italy which give more or less the same figures. Public opinion is split between those criticizing sanctions as not strong enough, others saying they are too much and hurting the economy, and there is another big chunk of people on both sides saying more or less that sanctions are fine. There is a point, which I think is a political one that maybe is missing in this analysis. When we talk about sanctions and I can talk about Italy of course more than any other country, people who are against sanctions tend to be those more organized because we are referring to entrepreneurs, companies, geographic areas, regions which have been hurt by sanctions. Maybe in numerical terms there might be an equal split [between those for and those against sanctions], but politically the figure [relating to those against sanctions] is more relevant. These are electoral constituencies, which might explain why sanctions have been such a huge issue, particularly in the past year and a half or so, in Italy. So I think this is a clarification to be made between the numbers and politics.

Then if you allow me, I would like to comment on what Susi herself defined as a quite striking result of this survey: the fact that even in Poland almost half the population would not side with the US in case of conflict. Now, there are many possible explanations for that and, of course, some are contingents. Think about the Trump Administration; a decrease of trust vis-à-vis the US and its narrative and strategy; maybe there is a perception that interests really do not coincide in Europe and the US vis-à-vis Russia.

But I want to focus more on what is pertaining to Russia, that is the lack of perception of Russia as a threat in the EU. This to me was particularly striking. In Italy there are other surveys, one by the Siena University, just a few years ago, whose findings were that only six percent of Italians consider Russia as a threat. The number among governmental and administrative elites was even lower, around two or three percent. I mean there are many reasons to understand that, I mean history and geography are the main reasons, so that’s why, on the other side, we fully understand that the perceptions in Baltic states, Poland, or along the border might be different. But this is a key issue to understand when we want to have a serious discussion about Russia with the EU and the US partners.

Then there is the second aspect, which Susi herself in a way defined as the different approach, the lack of confrontational approach in the EU, which I tend to call the refusal of a zero-sum game. An approach that is more win-win. In this regard we touch upon the key issues that have
already been mentioned in several ways this morning. Are we ready to recognize that Russia has legitimate interests even if we don’t like them or we don’t share them? How far are we willing to go to have a serious dialogue with Russia on these interests? Not for the sake of dialogue, but for the sake of recognizing these interests and assessing what we have done so far. Could we have done it better, could we do things differently? Now to say this is very hard by now and it takes two to tango. Russia is the first one having today a zero-sum approach, not only vis-à-vis NATO which is a kind of natural, but even vis-à-vis the EU; take the western Balkans.

That’s why changing the approach today is very difficult and the only way is to start from the bottom up, with CBMs, as Ambassador Terracciano mentioned before. But we should not forget to go back to the “parmesan” metaphor, hence the need of a serious conversation within Italy, then within the EU, and between the EU and the US on which European security architecture we do want. This is the big question, which is still unanswered, because we are moving along a pattern which is post ‘89, the “liberal model”, which means that NATO will expand as long as anybody asks for it. But in the current world which is very complex, confused and with plenty of threats, we have to ask ourselves if this is the best way to guarantee our own interest, our own security, and even Eastern European countries security. I’d better stop here.
Third Session

The Future of International Conflicts: Cybersecurity, Hybrid Warfare and Technological Threats

3.1 Vincenzo Camporini, Vice President IAI, Former Chief of Defense of Italy

I think that we are facing something which is only new in technology and means but not in principle. It is the continuation of the evolution of the relation between States and human entities. It might be recalled that Karl von Clausewitz said that «war is the continuation of diplomacy». This was true in the 16th, 17th, 18th century but it gradually changed because we are now in a situation where war is performed at the same time as the other means are used. We are facing a situation where military means as well civilian means are used together. There are some very polite ways to say that and the politest one was the “comprehensive approach”, which was the mantra in NATO, some years ago. “Comprehensive approach” means that you have to include all the means you have in order to influence, convince and force your adversary to do the things you want him to do. Nothing new, portrayed in several pieces of art. In the 1984 novel, the use of this information was the basis of the behavior of those who were in charge, the government. This novel was written many decades ago so, again, nothing new.

What is new is the use of technology and the fact that we are facing the introduction of automatic systems. I’m not only talking about the possibility of having drones which carry on their mission without the human intervention or about the robots fighting on the ground. This is something which is developing and I’m afraid that it will pose several ethical problems to our countries, because inevitably we still have to find the conceptual framework of such a development. The automatic systems do work also on the softer side. As regard to the issue of the Avatars and those who respond to them, they were not human but just machines which elaborate responses and gave the impression that there is a wave of consensus on some positions. That consensus does not exist because it is something created artificially without human intervention. This is a novelty which must be faced with sophisticated systems which are totally unprecedented in what is being done by our industries throughout the world. We should go in that direction in order to screen and to find a protection, to have a proper picture of what is going on.

Are we sufficiently equipped for that? The answer is for sure «yes and no». «Yes» because the effort is there and «no» because the threat is evolving. It is, in a way, the modern fight between the bullet and the shield. We have bullets of new nature and shields must adapt. The shields
must be as integrated as possible, otherwise we risk vulnerabilities in areas which will impede our possibilities to continue our efforts. What is being done today in Italy? Let me say that the Italian defense was the first administration trying to implement some of these features. I retired a few years ago so I’m not totally updated on the latest developments but I know the people who work on those issues so I’m confident they are doing the right thing. It is something that must be done together with all the rest of the community. It is an effort of all the nation, something which is absolutely vital because our vulnerabilities may come from anywhere, from the banking systems, from the electrical grids and from anywhere we give for granted as a normal feature of our society but which is controlled today by electronic vulnerable means. Therefore, an effort to control these vulnerabilities is absolutely necessary. There are countries which are able to produce a threat while having sometimes different ethical limits. I do not imply that we are on the right ethical limit but we have some limits which impede or strictly define our capabilities. Cyber-warfare implies the capacity to defend or attack. Within NATO, it is forbidden to talk about attack, due to the fact that NATO can only defend. This is a political decision which has been taken, discussed and sometimes challenged.

Our culture considers the use of cyber weapons as something which is a step toward a dangerous escalation. This is the point. We have been living in a partially peacefully world thanks to the concept of deterrence, which works on the concept of steps. You go in a direction, you meet a step and you have to decide whether to climb the step or not. This has been working beautifully during the Cold War and the steps were never crossed. Now, in the cyber field as well as in the nuclear field, we are transforming these steps in ramps. We may gradually increase the tension to a point where things become uncontrollable, and this could be a real danger also because of the combination of cyber elements with nuclear elements.

Let me say something about this specific point, a real concern. I am working with a very interesting organization, the European Leadership Network (created by Ivanov, Des Browne), where we analyze the risk connected to the fact that if you intrude the security systems controlling nuclear weapons with a cyber weapon then you run the risk to lose control and to have the big mistake which will be the real danger of our societies. This is something our government should consider in order to, on the one side, make the commander control system resilient to cyber-attacks and to, on the other side, define rules which will be the basis for a reasonable co-existence between systems which may become the elements of a conflict. I do underline this fact because, again, we may face some real risks which we are not prepared to face and a long-term vision is required as a guide for our politicians and for our industrial brain, in order to find the right way to keep the man always in control without much automation.
Thank you for your question, thank you also to the organizers for inviting me here it is an honor to be here. I am going to try not to repeat what has already been said about: hybrids, some of the origins; but focus in on your question about the role in technology and what might be different when we look at and try to understand hybrid tactics today versus say active measures or covert operations during the Cold War period. And I do also have to make one disclaimer I am going to be presenting my own views, certainly not the views of NATO or the NATO Defense College and that way it will probably be much more interesting. I have in my original notes as I was preparing for today that technology, and this is a view that is certainly out there, is one of the enablers that has raised the prominence of this type of tactics in international conflicts today. One of the effects is, as you alluded to, borders do not matter as much as they used to. The credibility of institutions, government institutions, has eroded partially because of this. People are looking to other venues to get their information, sources, and this had all sorts of perhaps unintended societal side effects that I think we are still grappling with. Another thing that I think is very different about the role of technology, and here I am thinking specifically about social media in this equation, is the role of the private sector. In the past and propaganda campaign could be delegated quite centrally and from the top down. Now trying to get coordination between the private sector and the public sector is one of the challenges. Trying to get the private sector to understand interests that go beyond just their immediate commercial interests, trying to align their strategies with public goals is something that is new. The final point that I want to make to this question specifically and perhaps we can talk about some other issues later on. But just to echo I think one of the central questions about the discussions about hybrid and also the discussions of the previous panel is this point of what is the line? At what point will international actors step in to what is essentially a rules and norms vacuum right now and say, «okay, these are going to be the rules of engagement». One of the advantages of living here, in Rome, is that you get to appreciate the “Teatro dell’Opera”. If you have the chance right now, I recently saw Don Giovanni it is a very good production, a bit of an unorthodox ending for those of you who have seen it. But it reminded me, because I had in mind today’s talk, of some of the environment in which hybrid tactics take, where there are no rules and no credible deterrence for actions at least in Don Giovanni’s perspective. Eventually, there is a reckoning at the end and this is where I think the director of this production took some liberties. What remains to be seen is where is the line when we finally start to develop rules and norms about these activities. I think it was alluded to in the last panel, the major actors are going to have to
come to some sort of an agreement about what their rules of engagement will be. It is partially a question of timing, there are so many factors that are at play right now. We have done our own research at the NATO Defense College, on hybrid warfare and the instances and the frequency of these events and our conclusions. I do not want to speak for all the researchers, but there was one paper I will refer to that stated things are probably going to get more chaotic before they get better. Here I think perspective, long term perspective, is useful when you think back to the Cold War. Although there were two superpowers who were adversaries and had very different goals and views, over time they did get to know each other. They got to a point where they were able to understand what the intention of each other’s actions was, understanding “signaling” as game theorists would put it. And I do not think we are at that point yet and I will leave it at that.
3.3 Benjamin Rhode, Research Fellow, International Institute for Strategic Studies

There are many definitions of the concept of “hybrid warfare”, each focusing on related and overlapping issues and themes. Nobody seems to agree exactly on a precise definition, adding to the conceptual vagueness. My institute defines it as «the use of military and non-military tools in an integrated campaign designed to achieve surprise, seize the initiative and gain psychological as well as physical advantages». That is a fairly broad definition.

As we all know, over the past decade there has been a great deal of discussion about Moscow’s use of so-called hybrid warfare, following Russian activity in Estonia, Georgia and Ukraine, in which cyber tools and intense efforts at political subversion were, in the latter two countries, used alongside Russian conventional forces, who in the case of Ukraine were disguised or without their typical identification, and assisted irregular forces.

There has been a discussion, particularly since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, about hybrid warfare as though it were a new phenomenon or especially connected to the Russian way of war - but of course hybrid warfare is not a new phenomenon. And it has been waged by plenty of non-Russian actors.

Consider, for example, the German attack on the Gleiwitz radio station in 1939, by forces dressed in Polish uniforms so as to claim that Polish aggression against Germany justified the attack against Poland. Or the propaganda spread before the annexation of the Sudetenland, claiming that the Germans were being persecuted and needed to be protected. Think again about the Second World War, with the widespread fear about German use of “the fifth column”, which supposedly did not wear uniforms but were acting to serve German interests behind the enemy lines. And of course, there is also a long history of Soviet active measures, essentially political warfare, spanning decades.

The term “hybrid warfare” became more prevalent after 2006, when it was used to describe Hezbollah’s behavior in the conflict against Israel in that year, a blend of conventional warfare (sometimes using quite advanced technology to attack Israeli units), guerrilla warfare and fairly sophisticated information warfare, all at the same time. So this term was applied to Hezbollah before it was applied to Russia. There are substantial conceptual problems, therefore, with identifying hybrid warfare as a particular type of Russian warfare; I find the work of Andrew Monaghan very interesting in this regard. He has warned us, I think correctly, not to overstate the extent to which this is a new type of warfare and not to understate the reality we must observe in Ukraine, where Russian “hybrid” activities were heavily dependent on conventional military force. Without that conventional military force, things would have gone rather
differently. Recent Russian military discussions and procurements tend to focus more on large-scale conventional war than “hybrid war”.

I’m sure that our Russian colleagues could point out many other nations’ use of combined military and non-military means to subvert polities or to achieve their goals. A key point to note is that in recent years, both before and after General Valeriy Gerasimov’s overly-cited 2013 articles on hybrid warfare, much Russian commentary (including some by President Putin himself) has in fact described this type of behavior as what Russia experiences at the hands of its adversaries. So, hybrid warfare is timeless, but its recent use perhaps reveals something about a kind of rather defensive and vulnerable mindset in Russia.

Given that hybrid warfare is a feature of past warfare, there is no reason why we shouldn’t expect to see hybrid warfare continue today and tomorrow. That said, there are particular technological and political-military reasons why it might be especially prominent at the moment.

One is the reality of the cyber domain, which increasingly dominates our civilian and military way of life, and which appears vulnerable to disruption by states who are not necessarily that powerful in conventional military terms but who have an asymmetric advantage in the cyber domain.

It also entails issues relating to attribution, which of course is not impossible but certainly more complicated, and consequently complicates deterrence.

We saw Russia’s cyber activities in Estonia in 2007 and, the following year, the combination of kinetic and cyber activities in Georgia, which was somewhat novel. There is also the fundamental reality that states like Russia and Iran (and, for the time being perhaps, China), are conventionally weaker than their Western adversaries, and that the use of hybrid warfare may allow them to compete with Western states in what some call “the grey zone” between war and peace, which NATO is far less prepared to counter. Russia and others engage in what my Institute has called “tolerance warfare”, to achieve their political goals in a way that may entail the use of some military tools without necessarily crossing the threshold that might provoke a conventional military response.

In regards to the question asked earlier today -«do people sufficiently appreciate this kind of threat?»- I think the answer is «yes and no». On the one hand, almost a new industry has emerged to talk about hybrid war as a new phenomenon that we must counter, and I think people are perhaps starting to pay almost excessive attention to it. But, on the other hand, I think that people are not paying enough attention to the element of hybrid war visible in Russian political subversion of Western states.
Hybrid warfare is a reality and the cyber dimension is an integral part of it. And we if want to project our analysis in the future, the semi-peer challenge as well as the peer one are all including a pervasive cyber element, to the point that cyber is also transforming the concept of EW, which is now evolving the one of CEMA, combining EW, Information Warfare and Cyber. It is also a reality that combat operation involving a cyber dimension are already studied in the warfare colleges as “historic cases”, since they are being recorded at least from the start of the decade. It is also a reality the cyber became a fourth combat operation domain in the US first and then with NATO, with all the implications in terms of defining doctrines, setting capability goals, developing such capabilities and the relevant cyber “warriors”. Already cyber warfare is absorbing tens of billions every year in the Western countries alone. Cyber battlefield are already a reality and cyber warfare will also fought within all the traditional operational domains, as well as in the next one, space, which will be the fifth.

Obviously we are not dealing only with the pure military dimension, cyber is comprehensive. Let’s talk about the Leonardo approach and new strategy, with a focus on the Italian national situation.

There are specific concepts that we are trying and striving to develop within Leonardo’s perimeter, the result of an ongoing effort carried out in the last few years. Indeed, it’s a massive, comprehensive effort and a new approach which are required. We can’t tackle such a challenge in the same way we did in the past, in vertical isolation. Think of a singular cylinder shaped form, which, like the castles and the fortresses of the medieval age, is not connected nor linked with the other cylinders. We are in the river, not on the banks of the river. What we used to do in the electronic domain in the past was just picking out the good and trying to distinguish the good from the bad in the “river”, the flow of data and signals in general. This is, therefore, what was referred to as the electromagnetic spectrum. We are now in a different condition, as the South Korean philosopher Byung-Chul Han said, talking about the digital swarm. We are into the river, no longer outside, so we need to learn how to swim in the river, not being swallowed by bigger fishes. That’s the concept at the basis.

This implies a massive, paramount, financial, instrumental and human resources effort in all the Western nations that we are aware of. The very first thing to do is to develop a strategy which Italy has already adopted: the national cyber strategy is now a national cyber perimeter which is not to be underestimated or undervalued, because it is building the field. You need to build a perimeter since we are a Western based world and the rule of law applies to this world.
So we need to get there nationally, at first. The following step comes after, once you have a clear idea not only of the threat but also of the vulnerabilities which imply a previous effort in order to build up a national resilience. It is not only about the tools to prevent or counter possible interferences and attacks. It’s a matter of cyber and, even before, digital resilience of any given organized society.

This is why, as I was mentioning before, the European countries, as well as the Western world as a whole, are investing so much. It is not only about targeting the cyber threats, it is about building national resilience. That’s what Leonardo is thinking of. And this implies, for instance, a national cloud, not only a government cloud, which needs to be sustainable. This implies significant investments in data centers and the more we get into the digitalized world the more the big connector will be, like it or not, the 5G technology, which is a sort of new spectrum, at the moment. Well, the flow of data will be such that we will need to field secure and reliable platforms and means to manage and to make those data not only secure but also available to the people. A data centre is the second important thing. We need then to develop a national capacity because meanwhile we are fighting, striving and devoting all our efforts in order that Europe may develop not only financing, not only guidelines or ideas but also concrete comprehensive actions in the digital domain, acting as a European Union and possibly working in coordination with NATO as well. NATO which actually leading, having the un-welcomed experience to face very large scale attacks early on against some of its members. Leonardo is a key supplier of the NATO cyber protection system. In the meantime, an overall supranational effort is being developed and the resulting guidelines are becoming rules of engagement, rules to be implemented and, if needed, enforced. In the digital domains, and cyber domains in particular, the key challenge is the enforcement of the rules, unless you move up to a different level of confrontation, whose name is conflict or war.

We need to develop a national capacity and the national capacity is widespread. The idea of building vertical dominions (the military, the law enforcement, even the critical infrastructure of the nation) and not connecting them horizontally is wrong. This is what we think in Leonardo. The cyber threat and the vulnerability that is being exploited by an attacker is something that comes from a point location of a given electrical cabin, that may influence the entire country if not a part of Europe, if the attack is actually carried out. That can easily be a DOS, a denial of service, or an APT, advanced persistent threat, which is something that States test for long and that can change all of a sudden, or a Day Zero Attack, which is the nightmare of all of the defenders and protectors, because the Day Zero Attack can multiply attack forces by a geometrical curve. You may have isolated fortresses placed everywhere, but the overall result
of a Zero Attack will be disruptive anyway. As a consequence, you need to horizontally spread out the defensive capacity, exploiting cutting-edge technology like quantum computing and national cryptographic capacity. That’s where we are heading to, where we are investing into, strategically thinking that this is the right way to support the nation. Being Leonardo, like it or not, means being the national champions of it.
3.5 Dmitry Suslov, Deputy Director, Center for Comprehensive European and International Studies, National Research University, Higher School of Economics

As I said in my book Non-Military Instruments of the Russian Foreign Policy: Regional and Global Mechanisms, we could surely say that today, of course, Russia has a lot of non-military instruments of foreign policy. It is clear if we just look at the idea of a great Eurasia which Russia promotes through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. My book was published in 2012, which is before the period of the US-Russia confrontation, one of the major current determinants of Russian foreign policy and military thinking. General Gerasimov was mentioned regarding his famous 2013 article which, in combination of the Russian action in Ukraine, Crimea and Syria, produced the idea of the hybrid war as a Russian military doctrine. I want to start with another term that General Gerasimov coined in 2018. He used the term “total confrontation”: the inter-state confrontation, including the US-Russia confrontation, has become genuinely total, it now encompasses not just the traditional domains (military, information, economy and politics) but has reached all the other spheres of life such as culture, sport, education. We are in a state of total confrontation and the problem is how do we manage it. Of course, from Moscow perspective, this confrontation involves multiple instruments, it is durable and its purpose is basically the same of the purpose of war, to change the opponents. In Russian minds, the Western and US purpose is a fundamental change of the Russian political regime and a fundamental change of Russian foreign policy. That is the reality that we face. From the Russian perspective, the purpose is a serious change of the US foreign policy, namely the rejection of the global leadership by the US and the acceptance of Russia as a legitimate independent great power with certain repercussions for the recognition of global and regional Russia’s interests. We are in a serious existential confrontation.

I think that there are at least two extremely dangerous problems that arise in terms of the management of this confrontation. The number one problem is that we have an increasingly blurring line between war and peace, because we no longer understand where peace ends and war starts. The threshold for getting to war is becoming increasingly lower whereas the instruments of warfare, the course of the technological developments are becoming more sophisticated. I think that the danger of a Russia-NATO war exists and it is rising. Secondly, the second problem is the blurring line between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons because the non-nuclear capabilities (high precision weapons, cyber weapons, anti-satellite weapons, space based weapons) are acquiring strategic properties and are comparable with the use of nuclear weapons in terms of their disruptive and destructive effects. If the conflict starts, we might lose
control against our will. Our preference is to prevail in the warfare without resorting to the higher levels of escalation but our capabilities to control our systems is getting lower and lower. There is a very high risk of unintended war, as a result of miscalculation in cyberspace, air and water.

There is the risk of escalation of an unintended war to a nuclear level. Concerning Gerasimov’s doctrine, there is nothing new in principle in the very idea of the combination of military and non-military combat and non-combat operations. We practiced that conduct since the time of the cold war, as it is demonstrated by the overwhelming majority of real military and paramilitary operations that were conducted by both sides. I would recall one of the last one operations: the American role during the war in Afghanistan falls completely into the definition of the hybrid warfare. So, Gerasimov basically described the current state of affairs, not necessarily the Russian behavior.

Then, of course Russia will approach every scale of conflict differently and the means that Russia uses will depend on what kind of adversary and operation is dealing with. If the operation is against a more or less backward adversary there will be a major use of more traditional kinetic means. If there is a sophisticated adversary (the US or another strong NATO partner), then a greater emphasis will be put on the non-kinetic use of warfare, primarily information, cyber and space. The kinetic confrontation will be perhaps used as a last resort.

Having said that, there are several features of contemporary warfare which combine both local conflicts and great power conflicts. They are the huge role of information warfare, the huge reliance on space-based reconnaissance systems and communication networks (this is true also regarding Russian military operations in Syria) and the increasing use of unmanned vehicles, avoiding traditional land combats.

As regard to great powers conflicts, I think the type of warfare would be determined by our total reliance on information and communication tools, with a possibility of disruption which paralyses countries in both military and non-military means and, secondly, we have to keep in mind nuclear deterrence which raises the costs of traditional war to an unacceptable level. We all try to avoid kinetic war as long as possible and achieve strategic purposes without launching missiles and conducting land operation. The purpose of contemporary warfare is not to eliminate the enemy or his armed forces but to disrupt his economic and political systems, to throw the enemy back to the 20th century from the current century. Indeed, this make information, cyber and space most preferred and major battle fields of war. Here the problem comes again since information warfare, special operations, disruptive use of paramilitary
means, sabotage, economic warfare and even cyber-warfare are the instruments that we both (the West and Russia) use in the times of peace and in the times of war.

It is very unclear and dangerous to start interpreting them as already warfare, not as a training or preparation. Here the cyber is the most dangerous area, cyber is the most preferential method of warfare among the sophisticated adversaries. The first strike that could be launched in a new type of great powers war is not the first strike with the use of nuclear weapons but is instead represented by the deployment of cyber weapons. The first strike would be a strike focused on the great command control centers with the aim of disrupting communication centers, intelligence, access to information, satellite navigation and important national infrastructure such as banks, water supplies, food supplies, transport up to nuclear power plans. Since we consider this as the likely first strike, we have to prepare for that and we both are preparing for that in terms of offensive and defensive means. The West aggressively interfere into the critical systems and network of Russia and Russia is doing just the same with the West. At any moment of time, these covered cyber operations that we both conduct could be considered as the actual beginning of a war.
4.1 Dario Fabbri, Journalist, Scientific Board Member & America Editor, Limes

I will start trying to answer a question that has been asked for many years now: «Why hasn’t the US opened up to Russia yet?». If we look at strategy, the US is strongly advised to do so. In 1972, when certainly the main enemy of the US was the Soviet Union, the Americans went to China to use it against the Soviet Union. In today’s international relations, Washington should just do the same by going to Moscow to use Russia against China. We should also add that, if you look at the last US three presidents, they all agreed that this was the right way to pursue. George W. Bush actually looked Vladimir Putin in the eyes and he saw a man who believed in democracy. Democracy never leads a country and never dictates his foreign policy. When George W. Bush was defining Putin as a person who believed in democracy, he was actually telling the American public that he was a human being, a partner, someone who could be trusted. Obama invented something called “the reset”. He said: «we should not be enemies with Russia, we should set up a new relationship that could help us against China. Russia could be very useful in many scenarios or theaters around the world against China». Nothing came out of it and nothing came out from George W. Bush’s proposals.

Donald Trump paid the most attention to this issue, not only because he has a great esteem for Putin. Someone says he would like to be like Putin or at least he would like to have the same powers as the Russian President. The American President does not have many powers but we like to believe the opposite. More importantly, Trump thinks that Russia does not have to be the enemy, it does not make sense today for the US to look at Russia as the enemy. On the contrary, as I said at the onset, Russia could be used against China but so far this has not happened. Actually, for the past three years, US-Russia relationship has worsened. New rounds of sanctions have been approved and also little weapons have been delivered to Ukraine, something not even Obama had done before. So why hasn’t the US open up to Russia so far? What is the main reason? We have learned, in the past three years, that the US administration, when we talk about foreign policy and even other issues, is not something we should consider as unified. There are many factions involved in elaborating foreign policies and sometime those factions are one against the other. When Trump talks about the “Deep State”, which is nothing more than federal agencies or the security apparatus, he does not believe or at least has not come to the conclusion that opening up to Russia would be useful or entirely useful.
Congressmen and congresswomen are usually more ideological, as they have been educated into thinking that Russia is the enemy, even a useful enemy. But the security apparatus ideology side thinks that opening up to Russia would mean, for the US, to lose Europe.

We believe (I don’t) that this is the Asian century. They are many more than us, they are younger than us, their economy is growing much faster than ours. So, when we look at the world, we tend to see Asia as the center of the world. But if we look at the world today, we see that the US is the only superpower in the world dominating Europe and not dominating Asia. That is something that is very clear to the security apparatus of the US. They think that if you look at Europe, at the technological, cultural and anthropological capabilities of European nations, Europe has no rivalry in the world. There is no way to dominate the world if you do not dominate Europe. Opening up to Russia would undermine this status, would put at risk US domination of Europe.

Let’s not forget that the US fought two world wars against Germany, partly against the Soviet Union, at least through the Cold War, and they think that if they were to leave an open space for Russia, Russia would join Berlin, for example. Eastern Europe, which exists just because the US believed that Russia is the enemy, would no longer trust the US. Eastern European states would just feel crushed between Germany and Russia, and NATO wouldn’t have purpose anymore.

Sometimes we tend to overlook the reason why US has not open up to Russia against China so far. Until the US will not reckon that China is a vital threat, something that obliges them to pursue a new course, to change their stands and to try all the options, they of course will not open up to Russia. They will risk losing Europe only if they feel that their survival as the only superpower is at risk. But so far they do not look at China as a so vital threat to them. So, there is no need, at least until now, to open up to Russia.
If we look at the nature of Chinese rejuvenation, we will see that actually, in spite of propaganda and mass media, this is a normalization process. We have 1.4 billion people and when we started our reform opening process, our GDP per capita was very low, only 150 US dollars. The average global GDP per capita is 12,000 US dollars. After 40 years of reforms, despite the dramatic growth rates, the GDP per capita of China is now 9,000 US dollars. We still have a gap of 3,000 US dollars. Once we close the gap, that will not indicate we are doing extraordinary things. It is just normal and we still have long way. Going back to 300 years ago, we had a population that was roughly 1/3 of the world total population. At the time before industrialization we were producing over 1/3 of the total GDP of the world. Was china then a threat to the world? No. But of course you would say that the industrialization is different.

Will the rise of china be peaceful and win-win? To answer this question, let me firstly focus on the word “peace”. We all know that the opposite of peace is threat, danger. What is the recipe of danger to essential things? Danger comes when you see a widening gap between the rich and the poor or when you see an economy stagnating. Has china made a contribution to alleviate that danger? So far, the answer is yes. For China to be part of the global system there is in some way a normalization wealth. If you take each one as equal, there is a huge cost for world peace if you are neutral, like an E.T. coming from other stars. Are there growing gaps between rich and poor? Yes, that has much to do with the movements of capital. The speed of capital is too rapid than other factors of production. That is the fundamental cost. In any case, China seems to me to make a positive contribution to alleviate a coming threat which is a recipe of a growing gap between the rich and the poor and stagnation. In terms of economic growth, China has been an engine. Think of a scenario when Chinese economy stops. Then the danger will probably translate to physical conflicts.

Has the rise of China been win-win so far? When we look at China in the forest of nations, we see that Chinese trade is balanced between imports and exports. But then if we focus on the bilateral trade relation between China and the USA, we see that there is a trade imbalance and, as a consequence, Americans complain that it is not win-win situation. The fundamental costs of this trade imbalance are mainly two. The first cost has to do with a very profound cultural factor. How to explain that Chinese savings are much higher than those of the US? I don’t know. To fix that, it will take a long time but, for sure, China wants to fix that problem. The second cost has to do with the architecture of the global system after the second world war. The United
States wants to maintain a hegemony and a military superiority in the world but, in order to keep that, that part of its military technology won’t be allowed for exports. If the USA allowed that part of technology to be exported in China, they will reduce the trade imbalance but they won’t do it. If we look at the forest of nations, as regard to trade balance, China is making a positive contribution to the global system.

As regard to the Belt and Road Initiative, China wants to be more integrated with the rest of the world and I think that does not make China guilty of carrying out a new form of colonialism. The Belt and Road Initiative system is an open-competitive system. If countries think that it is not a win-win scenario, they can voice and therefore exit. Countries have their own power to decide which side to join. The alternative will be represented by big states, such as the USA or Japan. It is unrealistic for china to be so one-sided.

Finally, I want to focus on the domestic scenario of China. We initially had to assess our balance between the state and the market. We started our reform opening process from a very state-dominated system. Americans think that the Chinese system is still too state-dominated, but I believe they need to look at that in a dynamic process. We have been moving from a state-dominated system to a market-oriented system. We have set up a very competitive markets for goods and services and the next challenge we have is about setting up competitive markets for resources.

It will take time but the direction seems to continue in that way. My confidence for China is about growth rates over 60% and part of that story has to do with the high debts. With the very high debts’ rise (figures that I read are about 350%), we cannot stay with a static balance between state and market. We have to continue toward a market oriented state and we should strike a balance more in favour of the market than the state. The system will continue to converge towards the markets in the medium and long term.

Dealing with China through an engaged way would be the right thing. If you disengage, you disengage with 1/5 of the world population. This is not imaginable. A good example to think about a good engagement with China is to look at the AIIB, the Asian Infrastructure Investments Bank. Just Look at the deals that the AIIB, a multilateral policy bank, made so far. There is a probability of 1/3 for China to win a deal, 1/3 for a partner country (home country) to win a deal and the probability of 1/3 for a third party to win that deal. That of course is a much better scenario than the exclusive bilateral deals between China and other countries of the world. I would encourage you to think about the kind of engagement you have. In the case of the AIIB, you should figure out new form of engagements with China trying to involve domestic forces.
and external forces. I believe that China is linked with biology. The biology will continue to evolve and we evolve in a way that we’ll contribute to world peace and prosperity.
4.3 Giulia Pompili, Journalist, Il Foglio

I have covered for years the relation between Italy, China and East Asian countries. My newspaper, *Il Foglio*, is one of the newspaper who pays most attention on the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and to the link between Italy and China, on the side-lines of that project. To understand exactly what happened in March 2019, when we finally became the first G7 country to sign the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the Belt and Road Initiative, we have to start talking about 2012, a really important year for East Asian countries. In fact, in that year, Xi Jinping became the Secretary-General of the Chinese Communist Party; Shinzo Abe became Prime Minister of Japan; Kim Jong-Un became the leader of North Korea. The following year, 2013, became crucial since Xi Jinping decided to explain for the first time what the Belt and Road Initiative was. Someone defined it as a new “Marshall Plan” with Chinese characteristics. As we see, it is something very different mainly because the Marshall Plan took place after a war. For Italy, dealing with China is a long time tradition.

We started to join the BRI in 2016 with Matteo Renzi, who was Prime Minister at that time. The very important year is that one, 2016, when our Head of State President Mattarella went to Beijing and signed a lot of agreements with China. Within a few months Gentiloni, the new Italian Prime Minister, went to China, where he met with Xi Jinping and he said that Italy was going to sign the Memorandum of Understanding, as regard to the BRI, in a short time and that Italy would have a great role in the Maritime Belt and Road Project after a lot of high-level talks in 2017. He soon became the first Prime Minister trying to involve Chinese officials in the Trieste and other ports strategical infrastructures in Italy. On March 2018, Italy became the very first G7 country to have a populist government, formed by the League and the Five Stars Movement as a big coalition. Those parties had very expensive projects for Italy but they didn’t know how to cover those costs. Thanks to a personal initiative by government officials, they started to think about China as the ideal partner to cover their costs. Therefore, between 2018 and 2019, we saw a huge activism by the Italian government officials in order to connect Italy to China and we saw a lot of missions led by the Italian Minister of Economic Development Luigi Di Maio trying to establish a link between our country and China with the aim to combine what Italy needed and what China was looking for. After the official visit of President Xi Jinping in Rome, we made the front page of every single newspaper all over the world because the arrival of Xi Jinping in Italy meant that our country would sign the Memorandum of Understanding. It was not only about signing a commercial agreement but it was also about joining a huge political project by China. When we signed that agreement in March 2019, the
Italian government propaganda focused the attention on the commercial significance of that agreement but it was not the real point. After two days Xi Jinping went to France and he met with President Macron and Chancellor Merkel, having more business affairs and less political affairs with them. In particular, Macron was the first leader in Europe to declare that China is a strategical threat for European countries.

It’s strange that, since 2016 and until 2018, Italy had a very coherent politics on China but after 2018 we became partners of China without a real coherent path. I’m saying that because the strategical view of the BRI, for the Chinese side, is a win-win cooperation but for us, without the part of the business, is just a political signing of a strategical big project. We have a lot of examples to criticize this project. We have to take a cue from East Asian countries and understand how they deal with China.

We should look at the Australian politics to understand how much the Belt Road Initiative is not only about business but also about propaganda and sharing values of the Chinese side. Just today, the main news about China is about Houston Rockets, a very famous NBA basket team. The Houston Rockets General Manager tweeted a comment in support of the Hong Kong protests and, as a consequence, triggered a diplomatic conflict with the Chinese central government. At the end, Houston Rockets had to apologize to China only because the General Manager expressed an opinion on Hong Kong and on democratic issues.

When we have to deal with China, we have to put our democratic values before the business affairs. I believe we have three role-models: France, Germany and Israel. They can deal with China on business affairs and they can have friend talks with China while still having a good confrontation also on other values.
4.4 Andrew Spannaus, Journalist and Chairman of the Milan Foreign Press Association

Thank you for the invitation to participate in this important event; it is a pleasure to be here. In the past few years I have been concentrating on the macroeconomic drivers of what I call the “revolt of the voters” across the Western world. This is the approach I want to start with in looking at the U.S.-China relationship.

The role of China has gotten a lot of attention from Donald Trump in particular, as one of the targets of anti-globalization rhetoric, and of an attempted shift in policy with the stated goal of stopping the process of massive outsourcing, bringing manufacturing jobs back to the United States.

The general argument on this point is quite simple: the free-trade model of seeking low wages and lack of regulation has seriously damaged Western economies, hurting the middle class, and contributing significantly to discontent and fear, affecting the identity and sense of belonging of certain segments of society. So it goes beyond just the loss of well-paying, stable jobs, to dovetail with the reaction to immigration, a cultural reaction that is quite evident and often harshly criticized.

The counterargument on jobs, has been that technological innovation is the main driver of job losses, and that in any event the numbers say the U.S. economy is doing well.

Recent research has cleared the air a bit on this front -from David Autor of MIT, and from the Economic Policy Institute, for example- indicating that yes, the United States lost millions of jobs to China, and the process has also driven down wages in the country. By the way, this has disproportionately affected certain areas of the country, which were essential for the election of Donald Trump.

The accompanying political counterargument to this straightforward analysis of the anti-system outbreak, claims that it’s really only about identity in a strict sense, and that racism and reactionary attitudes are the key factor.

This also not too hard to refute, in my view, if we look at the numbers. But most importantly, it's not one or the other; the issues are mixed together, as identity is a broad concept that includes people’s role in the economy, and a country’s role in the world.

I am somewhat suspicious of attempts to rule out the economic factor completely; it seems like an effort to defend a specific position, that of globalization and free trade, with the fear that a new political class may actually seek serious structural changes. And regardless of what economics professors think, the population is certainly convinced such change is needed: from Trump to Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders, a consensus has emerged -among voters, much
less among elites— that the current system damages so-called “normal people”. And despite establishment push-back against this view, if there’s one area where Donald Trump has the support of the majority of institutions in Washington, it’s on China, to the point that he is even being pressured to take a strong position by anti-China legislation in Congress.

Now, is this China’s fault? Has China been taking advantage of us? Well, there are certainly many important issues the U.S. points to as unfair practices, from intellectual property to restrictions and protectionism in the Chinese economy. However, it is a bit dishonest to suggest that the Chinese created this situation themselves, and that we were innocent bystanders. Outsourcing of production was driven by a corporate mindset and economic view in which low costs and lack of regulation were king. Profits soared, and the fact that some of the population was losing out, didn’t seem to matter much.

When I first came to Italy, in the second half of the 1990s, I would speak to various business associations and local political groups about international economic prospects and the geopolitical implications of the economic transformation of the 1990s. There were two main issues: the risk of a catastrophic crash due to the explosion of financial derivatives that had made the speculative component of the system much larger—in nominal terms—than the real economy; and then I often presented a report written by a group in the U.S. on something called the “New Silk Road”. With some detail, I explained how China had recognized that it was time to begin large-scale public investment in infrastructure, a massive program to increase the efficiency of the economy and create modern connections with the West, bringing economic development along the new transport corridors. The point was this: while China was beginning a huge program of infrastructure investment, in the West we were merrily sailing along with the illusion of the Wall Street economy; the idea that financial innovation is the driver for economic growth. This approach was making a lot of money for the upper portion of the population, but leading to the loss of manufacturing, crumbling infrastructure, and the hollowing out of the middle class. The rise of GDP was hiding the rapid post-industrial transformation of our economy. And the challenge was as follows: if we continue down this road, we will lose real power, and China will grow. The smart thing would have been to return to policies based on public investment and the physical economy, and to attempt to engage China, work together on large infrastructure projects. The actual response, from the few people who were paying attention back then, was that this was a threat to the West, we needed to counter the emerging alliance of the Strategic Triangle Russia-China-India, the name given by Yevgeny Primakov. And the corollary was, we would just keep going with our domination of the international
economy through finance and Western institutions, and try to isolate our enemies through strategic tactics. Well, how did that work out?

Fast-forward to today, to the Trump Presidency. We are now suffering the consequences of our past decisions. We indeed have lost economic, and political, power around the world; China has stepped in to fill the void in many cases: Africa and Latin America are two obvious examples. The Belt and Road Initiative -the name given the project by Xi Jinping- is now seen as a threat by many in the West. Yes, numerous European countries seek investment from China. Trade is a reality, so they want to be a part of it, and try to become partners in a global project that they hope can open up great opportunities for their industries. However, if the Silk Road means bringing products to the West that undercut local production, that’s not exactly a winning strategy. The supporters of trade über alles will tell us that trade goes both ways. We just need to do a better job of selling our products to the Chinese. This is certainly an important point; there’s a middle class of hundreds of millions of people. But I think the structure of the global supply chain today is quite problematic: based too much on exploiting low costs wherever we can find them, while sending semi-finished products half-way around the world. This has social, political, and also environmental consequences that we cannot ignore. It is also quite telling that tariffs affecting the auto sector are able to drive a fair amount of the world economy towards recession. This shows an imbalance, a fragility, to be so dependent on trade, and not be able to drive economic growth internally.

The anti-globalization push suggests we need to change this, urging a return of the state, with aspects of protectionism. National sovereignty is not a bad word; we are moving towards a return to politics, rather than only markets, as a driver of economic policy. “Moving toward”, I say; we’re certainly not there yet. But again, the shift is widespread: while Trump pushes what his circle calls economic nationalism, Elizabeth Warren speaks of “economic patriotism”. It’s likely the shift will continue in the United States.

**Trade War-Trade Deal**

Let me address the immediate situation: the trade war, and some details of the economic relationship between the U.S. and China, before concluding. Talks start again in a few days, and there is a desire to reach a deal relatively soon. Both sides recognize the effects being seen on the global economy. There could be a limited deal in the short-term. The sides would freeze new tariffs. China would agree to more agricultural purchases -Trump needs this for internal purposes. Other points that could be addressed are the waiver for Huawei and currency manipulation. It is likely we would not see one big deal, but that some large issues will be kicked down the road, and dealt with in a series of smaller deals. There are some very important
issues that are hard to deal with, seen as red lines by both sides: intellectual property, enforcement and penalties for trade violations, the role and openness of SOEs. I don’t anticipate a resolution; these will fester, and of course it is possible China will succeed in waiting out Trump on some issues, given that he could be gone in a little over a year. The question for me is if such a deal, or deals, represent a significant step towards structural change of the global supply chain. Not much, in my view, at least far from what is needed. I want to use the example of the financial services sector, an area where the U.S. hopes to get into the game. China seems willing to allow limited U.S. firms access, as the Chinese are not very developed in the area. China has made some concessions: removing caps on investment in certain types of banks and insurance companies. Let’s say China continues to open up on this front, makes some more agricultural purchases, and becomes more transparent. Is that enough to change the U.S. economy, or the economies of Europe, to deal with their structural problems? We still have a problem of the structure of the supply chain; a financial, speculative mentality. Improving financial services represents a focus on an area which continues to breed inequality.

Overall, there is a need to focus on reorganizing and encouraging production, improving working conditions and increasing wages. Trump’s deal with Mexico and Canada partially addresses that, but doesn't go nearly far enough, and there are worries that it is unenforceable. Digital (Industry 4.0) provides an opening on this front, as labor costs are no longer as important a factor. But we are mostly seeing production move from China to other, cheaper countries like Vietnam, not back to Ohio, at least not to a significant extent.

Another problem is the skills gap. Around the West manufacturing is growing in some areas - not as much as has been claimed, especially in the U.S. where there is now a “manufacturing recession”- but there is difficulty finding trained workers. There is a discussion on how to ensure proper education, the right type of training. But either way, it costs money. Governments need to provide incentives so that companies can train workers for 1-2 years, and companies need to be able to invest as well, taking a long-term approach. Trump’s tax cuts brought money back, but much went into stock buybacks. A decision to refocus on production is political; you can’t simply ask business leaders to be patriotic. You have to create the conditions; that's the role of politics, the role of governments. To do this, the key is to abandon the short-term view of shareholder value; that idea has political and social consequences, which are before our eyes every day in the West. Such a change requires incentives, and public investment. The area where Trump has not at all done what he promised, is infrastructure. He promised to stop spending trillions on foreign wars, and spend it to rebuild the country -at least 1 trillion on infrastructure- but nothing has been done beyond ordinary admin.
There are real challenges, real issues between the U.S. and China. You can’t have a full-scale Cold War, because we are so intertwined: 70% of shoes sold in the U.S. are from China. 90% of active pharmaceutical principles come from China. The Pentagon is worried this is a national security risk. On the other hand, the Chinese need the finished drugs made in the US. There’s also the issue of rare earth metals: China controls the market, and in May threatened to use them as a weapon in the trade war. So if there’s going to be some sort of de-coupling, it will be soft for now; anything large will take a long time. Yet the Americans are aware that China seeks to be a great power. China hopes the yuan will emerge as a global currency, competing with the dollar. China seeks hegemony in Artificial Intelligence, which has important implications for manufacturing, the shift to a high-technology economy; but also social and political implications.

Along with economic power comes military presence: we see this in the disputes in the South China Sea, and new military bases in other areas of the world. And China is investing heavily in advanced military equipment, such as hypersonic missiles, showcased a few days ago in the parade in Beijing. This creates great risks. Everyone is familiar with the notion of the Thucydides trap -the fear that China will supplant the U.S. making a conflict inevitable. My view is that the short-term issues can clearly be managed, but the larger question of the growth of China’s international projection, the defense of the role of the West, make the stakes much higher than just avoiding a recession due to the auto industry, or buying more soybeans.

We have created a global economy which has serious structural issues, with pervasive political implications. We need to work on reorganizing that structure, with a focus on infrastructure, innovation, production and education, so that the West will not feel it is being overwhelmed by China, but rather we can compete in a healthy way, in a Westphalian world where we respect each other’s sovereignty, and use our values and principles as an asset.
Annex
Summary

- European voters believe that there is a growing case for a more coherent and effective EU foreign policy in a dangerous, competitive world.
- They want to see the European Union come of age as a geopolitical actor and chart its own course.
- But policymakers will have to earn the right to enhance the EU’s foreign policy power, by producing tangible results and heeding the messages voters have sent them.
- Most EU citizens believe that they are living in an EU in which they can no longer rely on the US security guarantee, and that the enlargement process should be halted.
- They believe that it is crucial to address existential challenges – such as climate change and migration – at the European level.
- The new leadership of the EU’s institutions should allow these political impulses to guide their approach to foreign affairs.
European policymaking is forever on the cusp of improvement. Every five years, a newly appointed high representative for foreign affairs and security policy takes over, declaring that coherence is just around the corner. As Javier Solana advised his successor in the role in 2009: “our capacity to address the challenges has evolved over the past five years, and must continue to do so. We must strengthen our own coherence, through better institutional co-ordination and more strategic decision-making.”

A decade later, another Spaniard – Josep Borrell – is set to take up the mantle of high representative. He believes that the situation has become worse. In an exclusive interview with the European Council on Foreign Relations in May this year, Borrell likened the Foreign Affairs Council of the European Union to a “valley of tears” in which foreign ministers lament multiple crises around the world but remain incapable of decisive collective action. They believe that their domestic political constituencies require them to act as states first – and as part of a union only after this. The rise of nationalist and anti-system parties across the Western world in the past decade has reinforced this unspoken perception among EU governments – creating the risk that these governments will never truly fulfil their ambitions to establish a collective EU foreign policy.

Policymakers have endeavoured to work around this systemic handicap by creating a more flexible Europe – one that creates coalitions of willing states that pursue specific policy goals on behalf of the union. To some degree, this has produced results in foreign policy in the past ten years, including on the Kosovo–Serbia agreement and the Iran nuclear deal, as well as in other important areas of security and defence cooperation.
However, this approach has not overcome the fundamental impasse Borrell observed at the Foreign Affairs Council. This is due to the enduring perception that a genuine EU foreign policy would unsettle voters in member states. At the same time, many foreign policy issues have become increasingly politicised across the EU: in the run-up to national elections, many member states have engaged in genuine debates on the bloc’s approach to Russia and the transatlantic relationship.

But is this perception really accurate? The EU’s lack of foreign policy capacity – and, as a consequence, its feeble global standing – appears to largely result from the idea that the European population wants nothing else. Earlier this year, the European Council on Foreign Relations commissioned YouGov to carry out surveys covering more than 60,000 people across Europe. These included finding out their views on the foreign policy challenges the EU faces.

The study reveals a fundamental shift in Europeans’ views of the world. Although there is widespread public support for the idea of the EU becoming a cohesive global actor, there is also a growing divergence between the public and the foreign policy community on several key issues – ranging from trade and the transatlantic relationship to EU enlargement. Given this divergence, there is a risk that European voters could retract the foreign policy mandate they have offered the EU in the choices they made in recent European Parliament and national elections.

Voters want to know that their political leaders remain in control of the European project, and that it serves a clear purpose in crucial policy areas. Voters have not necessarily ruled out greater coordination between member states on EU foreign policy, but they are yet to be convinced of the case for this.
To make the case, European leaders will need to deliver results in foreign policy using existing forms of coordination between member states, and to respect the messages that voters send them. The public want the EU to be a responsible actor in a dangerous world. For them, the bloc should chart its own course between other actors in a highly competitive, multipolar environment, avoiding fights that are not of its making but standing up to other continent-sized powers and tackling crises that affect its interests. They want EU foreign policy to turn on the logic of Europe’s collective interests – not on the logic of European cooperation or integration for its own sake.

Therefore, the EU can only justify enlargement on the basis of the direct benefits it brings to citizens in current EU member states. Similarly, the bloc can only justify investment in EU – rather than NATO – defence capabilities if this demonstrably improves Europeans’ security.

Finally, voters want the EU to heed their fears about climate change and migration as major causes of insecurity – and to create a European-level response to these challenges. These messages should guide the EU leadership’s foreign policy in the next five years.

**Cooperation in a dangerous world**

Europeans feel unsettled. As a recent ECFR paper shows, European leaders need an inclusive, compelling story about the future based on a more emotional understanding of voters. This emotional connection will matter in elections, as European leaders seek to mobilise voters and persuade them to engage in the democratic process.

But it is just as important that the new leaders of the EU’s institutions fulfil their promises. Far from resting on their laurels following the unexpectedly high turnout in the European Parliament election (51 percent), these leaders should remember that, just before the vote took place, three-quarters of Europeans felt that either their national political system, the European political system, or both, were broken. Voters may have provided an open-ended mandate to deliver the “Europe of change” that features in the speeches of political leaders from the Greens to the parties of the newly formed, far-right Identity and Democracy group in the
European Parliament. But, unless Europe creates emotionally resonant policies in the next five years, an electorate convinced that the political system is broken is unlikely to give the EU the benefit of the doubt a second time.

Foreign policy has a major role to play in the appealing vision of the future European leaders must create to reconnect with disenchanted voters. Europeans are living in what they perceive to be a dangerous world: the survey ECFR conducted earlier this year found that the top three emotions they describe as feeling were stress, fear, and optimism. The last of these emotions is crucial: they remain hopeful that Europe can meet their needs.
Along with concerns about the economy and inequality, the stress and fear that Europeans feel have deep roots in their perception of security threats. One-third of EU citizens believe that conflict between member states is possible. And, in every member state except Spain, more than 40 percent of them believe that it is possible that the EU could fall apart in the next 10-20 years. Voters believe that if the EU broke up tomorrow – following the collapse of the single market and the loss of the euro – the biggest loss would be European states’ ability to cooperate on security and defence, and to act as a continent-sized power in contests with global players such as China, Russia, and the United States.
Ursula von der Leyen, the new president of the European Commission, has recognised voters' desire for the EU to become a strong, independent global actor that can set its own agenda: she has called for “a Europe that takes the global lead on the major challenges of our times”. But how exactly do European voters expect it to behave as a global actor? And do they accept that a more cohesive European foreign policy may, at times, mean placing the appearance of European cohesion above national strength on the international stage? ECFR's survey suggests that there are three broad areas of consensus on the kind of EU that they would like to see emerge in international affairs.

**A player big enough to avoid taking sides**

Firstly, voters believe that, if the EU is to navigate the turbulent waters of geopolitical competition, it will need to act independently. The bloc should no longer rely on any one member state or leave itself at the mercy of an outside power. In this sense, voters are perhaps more forward-thinking than the European foreign policy elite, who talk of *l’Europe qui protège* – or say that “the era in which we could fully rely on others is over” – but remain fearful of taking the kinds of decisions that are the logical result of this approach.

Three years into Donald Trump’s tenure as US president, European voters seem ready to face the harsh reality of global politics. ECFR’s survey shows that they no longer believe that the US can serve as the guarantor of their security. (This is despite the fact that, in most member states, large minorities of people believe that their own country has a special bilateral relationship with the US.) Overall, Europeans place more trust in the EU than national governments to protect their interests against other global powers – although, in numerous member states, many voters do not trust either the US or the EU (in Italy, this was the view of 36 percent of people; in the Czech Republic and Greece, it was the view of more than half of them).
However, European voters appear to want the EU to become a strong, independent actor using a non-confrontational strategy. In conflicts between the US and either China or Russia, they have a clear preference for the EU to remain neutral, pursuing a middle way between competing great powers. In all but one member state, most people favour such neutrality in both scenarios. The exception is Poland, where most citizens would want the EU to side with the US in a dispute with Russia. And, even there, 45 percent of people would opt for neutrality.
This suggests that voters want the EU to be strong enough to avoid becoming a mere follower of other powers. In other words, their preference for EU neutrality in geopolitical disputes implies that they would favour the concept of European strategic sovereignty that ECFR's Mark Leonard and Jeremy Shapiro set out in their recent paper “Strategic sovereignty: How the EU can regain the capacity to act”.
Yet, as Leonard and Shapiro argue, one of the key challenges in developing the EU’s role as a foreign policy actor is in overcoming national governments’ tendency to jealously guard their authority in the area.

ECFR’s survey data suggest that this phenomenon stems from national governments’ double misreading of the European electorate. Voters will not only tolerate EU leadership in relations with other major powers (since, as outlined above, voters view the ability to work as a bloc against superpowers such as the US, China, and Russia as one of the greatest potential losses if the EU collapsed) but are relatively comfortable with the idea of the EU protecting their economic interests – as long as it can demonstrate that it is capable of doing so.

The EU’s institutions have begun to refer to China as not only an economic competitor but also a systemic rival. European voters also appear to be wary of the country, with no more than 10 percent of them in any member state suggesting...
that the EU should side with Beijing over Washington in the current Sino-American trade war. But, worryingly, voters are highly sceptical of the EU’s ability to protect their economic interests in trade wars: less than 20 percent of voters in each member state feel that their country’s interests are well protected from aggressive Chinese competitive practices. Nonetheless, they have mixed views on whether the EU or their national government should address this problem. In every member state except Austria, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and Spain, voters generally see national governments as better suited than other authorities to protecting their interests from China.
Similarly, voters in every member state aside from France and Romania saw their national government as better suited than other authorities to representing their country's interests in trade negotiations. Indeed, in ECFR’s survey, this viewpoint was especially prevalent in Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the Netherlands, Slovakia, and Sweden.

Given that trade policy is one of the EU’s responsibilities under its treaties, a key challenge for the new leadership of the bloc’s institutions will be answering voters’ calls for European strategic sovereignty without simply demanding further centralisation of decision-making on foreign policy in Brussels. Leonard’s and Carl Bildt’s recent paper “From Plaything to player: how Europe can stand up for itself in the next five years” sets out a vision for how this could be achieved under existing treaty arrangements. They advocate for the high representative to set the EU’s foreign policy agenda in line with an overarching strategy; a renewal of the relationship between member states and the EU institutions responsible for foreign affairs; and for greater use of core groups of member states to pursue foreign policy goals in certain areas. To make this shift, European leaders will need to develop and communicate a clear narrative on why closer cooperation on foreign policy will create the kind of EU voters want – one that is strong enough to take its own decisions and follow its own path.

The EU will also need to demonstrate that it can produce results on the global stage – an effort that national governments can assist by, where appropriate, sharing credit for successes with the bloc and acknowledging that they would have
failed to achieve voters’ goals without greater cooperation at the European level. The EU-national balancing act that European voters want their leaders to perform on foreign policy will have a significant effect on the major challenges Europe faces. A successful performance of this balancing act could create the basis for greater pooling of diplomatic and military resources in the long term. By achieving results on key foreign policy issues, European leaders can enhance the EU’s credibility as a global actor among both its geopolitical competitors and voters at home – which may, in turn, justify closer coordination on foreign policy between member states.

**A sense of control**

During the 2015-2016 political crisis around migration, the leaders of many EU member states and institutions lost voters’ confidence over their handling of the surge in migrant arrivals. This was only partly due to EU citizens’ panic about how governments could manage the sharp rise in arrivals as austerity rocked Europe, causing public services and welfare systems to crack under intense pressure. For the most part, it resulted from their sense that EU institutions and governments had lost control of the situation. Some countries – particularly Sweden, and to some extent, Germany – believed that the EU was not helping them deal with high per capita levels of immigration. Others – not least Greece and Italy – believed that other member states expected them to play an outsized role in managing migration. In response to these perceptions, national governments increasingly pursued a unilateral approach to migration, gradually abandoning their attempts to forge an EU consensus on the way forward.

The key lesson from this period is that the appearance of control matters a great deal to European voters’ tolerance of policymaking at the EU level. They are far more likely to be willing to centralise decision-making powers if they can see that this will address the pressing challenges of the day. In contrast, they are relatively unlikely to accept centralisation as insurance against future problems – as can be seen in their attitudes towards various areas of foreign policy, shown in ECFR’s survey data.

Russian aggression is one of the highest-profile foreign policy challenges Europe currently faces. This is perhaps truer in Helsinki or Warsaw than it is in Dublin or
Madrid but, nonetheless, developments ranging from Russia’s war on Ukraine to its alleged interference in European elections are never far from the headlines in Europe. In this environment, the EU can only appear to be a mature and independent global actor if it has a clear policy on how to contain this threat and, crucially, convinces voters that everything is under control. Member state governments currently seem to be succeeding on this front: so far, they have been unified in maintaining the sanctions they imposed on Russia following its annexation of Crimea. This approach mirrors public support for a hard line on the country: ECFR’s survey found that, in most member states, more than 50 percent of voters viewed the EU’s policy on Russia as either balanced or not tough enough (the exceptions were Austria, Greece, and Slovakia).

### Member states’ perceptions of EU sanctions on Russia

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<th>Member State</th>
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<th>Balanced</th>
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<td>Poland</td>
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This trend is even clearer among supporters of parties in government, with only those who voted for Slovakia’s SMER-SD suggesting that the sanctions are too tough. Coupled with a widespread sense of vulnerability to Russian interference in European political systems, this suggests there is little domestic pressure on the European Council to lift the sanctions.
Strong support for EU efforts to exercise some control over difficult, unpredictable relationships is also evident in voters’ attitudes towards the Middle East and north Africa. For instance, ECFR's survey shows that, despite significant divisions between European governments on many areas of policy on the region, there is a strong public support for the EU’s efforts to preserve the nuclear deal with Iran.
On both Russia and Iran, public support for the use of sanctions and brokered deals may be rooted in the idea of the EU as an actor that can control a situation. Unfortunately, the results of foreign policy are not always immediately obvious in the short or medium term.

The EU will only be able to enhance its geopolitical power if it develops new ways to change the behaviour of third countries. Yet, as ECFR’s survey data demonstrate, it is unclear whether there is widespread support for doing so. For example, Ulrike Franke's and Tara Varma’s recent paper “Independence play: Europe’s pursuit of strategic autonomy” shows that EU governments are divided on whether and how to pursue such autonomy in security and defence.

This divergence of views can also be seen among voters. ECFR's survey data show that they are split over whether to invest only through the NATO framework or also by strengthening the EU’s capabilities. Among supporters of parties in
government, La République En Marche! voters (in France) have the strongest preference for European investment while Law and Justice party voters (in Poland) have the strongest preference for the NATO framework. This underlines a striking shift in the way that Europeans think about their security – away from a default assumption that they can rely on US capabilities.

Voters’ attitudes towards EU enlargement also reflect their limited tolerance of major foreign policy initiatives that are only likely to pay dividends in the distant future. Until recently, EU policymakers portrayed enlargement as a vital tool for stabilising the EU’s eastern neighbourhood – with the newest member of the EU, Croatia, only joining in 2013. However, as ECFR’s survey shows, Europeans are lukewarm on further enlargement at best. Poland, Romania, and Spain are the only member states in which more than 30 percent of voters believe that more countries in the Western Balkans should join the union in the next 10-20 years. In many member states – particularly net contributors to the EU budget such as Austria, France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands – more than 40 percent of supporters of parties in government oppose enlargement.

Thus, the EU’s accession negotiations are made even more complex by significant domestic opposition to enlargement. European leaders will need a new policy on the Western Balkans that recognises that EU citizens do not see the region as
important to their security. The argument that the EU should make good on its long-term promise to these candidate countries is unlikely to hold much weight with voters. Indeed, the idea of a Europe that is in control of its own destiny – free to make choices that are in its best interests – is central to their support of the bloc’s development as a geopolitical actor.

**European leadership on climate change and migration**

Climate change and migration are two of the key issues on which voters believe there is a clear need for action at the EU level. More than half of EU citizens in the countries ECFR surveyed – aside from the Netherlands – see climate change as a challenge that should take priority over most other topics. In the first half of 2019, there was an increase in the number of people who perceived climate change as important in four of the five biggest member states of a post-Brexit EU (Italy was the exception). And the new European Parliament has a strong mandate for action on climate change: 62 percent of MEPs are from parties that promised greater EU cooperation on the issue, and 56 percent are from parties committed to reducing carbon emissions. As a result, the European Parliament will try to hold other EU institutions to account on climate policy.
Meanwhile, European voters are increasingly convinced that migration policy should include development aid targeted at the problems that cause people in third countries to travel to Europe. A lack of economic prospects in source countries is one of the major drivers of migration to Europe. Although voters most often favour greater efforts to police the EU’s external borders, they see increased economic assistance to developing countries as the second-most important way to discourage migration. An average of 65 percent of people in member states – and no less than 50 percent in any given member state – support the latter approach. While most relevant research suggests that development aid at its current level will do little to reduce migration, this is unlikely to stop European governments from pursuing the approach given that there is strong support for it among voters.

Conflict-related instability is another major driver of migration to Europe. ECFR’s surveys show that Europeans believe their diplomats should pay more attention to this driver as well. For instance, in 12 of the 14 countries ECFR surveyed, a majority of voters believed that the EU should have done more to address the Syria crisis.
If they ignore this call for action on these key issues at the European level, policymakers risk showing that they are out of step with public opinion on the role that foreign policy should play in tackling current challenges. To use the mandate voters have offered them – for empowering the EU as a cohesive geopolitical actor – member states and EU institutions must address the causes of voters’ sense of insecurity.

**Where more Europe is part of the answer**

Since the Lisbon Treaty entered into force in 2009, the EU has pursued initiatives in specific areas of foreign policy, such as security and defence cooperation, to gradually build up the bloc’s geopolitical capabilities. ECFR’s survey data suggest that, at a time of intensifying geopolitical competition, voters increasingly support the EU’s efforts to become a cohesive power. Europeans believe that, in this
competitive world, their interests are largely aligned with one another. Counterintuitively – given its increasingly politically fragmented nature – foreign policy may be one area in which there is a growing sense among voters that action at the EU level is the answer.

But policymakers will have to earn the right to enhance the EU’s foreign policy power. To do so, the European foreign policy community will need to produce tangible results and acknowledge the messages voters have sent them. Given their fears about Europe’s place in the world, voters will not tolerate indifference to their concerns about foreign policy any more than they will in other areas.

Most EU citizens believe that they are living in in an EU in which they can no longer rely on the US security guarantee; they want the EU to halt the enlargement process and take greater collective action to tackle the challenges of a globalised world. Should the new leaders of the EU’s institutions fail to adjust to this reality – choosing to revert to unthinking transatlanticism or a reliance on spreading European values throughout their neighbourhood with the promise of EU membership – they could lose the foreign policy mandate that voters have offered them.

The more confidence Europeans have in the EU as a geopolitical actor, the more likely they are to accept the centralisation of powers. The political environment may currently make it difficult to institute qualified majority voting in many areas of foreign policy, but this could change if the EU demonstrates that it has a growing capacity as a foreign policy actor – and that it is not on the defensive – in the coming years.

The new leadership of the EU’s institutions now needs to take brave decisions and accept – as voters have – that the world has changed. Public opinion is no longer an impediment to the creation of a more coherent and effective European foreign policy (if it ever was). This is not the moment for Europe’s policymakers to fear the will of the people.

Acknowledgements

As with all the reports in the Unlock series that ECFR has published in 2019, the author is greatly indebted to colleagues across the ECFR network for all their input.
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The ‘Unlock’ project

The ‘Unlock Europe’s Majority’ project aims to push back against the rise of anti-Europeanism that threatens to weaken Europe and its influence in the world. Through polling and focus group data in 14 European Union member states with representative sample sizes, ECFR’s analysis aims to unlock the shifting coalitions in Europe that favour a more internationally engaged EU. This shows how different parties and movements can – rather than competing in the nationalist or populist debate – give the pro-European, internationally engaged majority in Europe a new voice. We use this research to engage with pro-European parties, civil society allies, and media outlets on how to frame nationally relevant issues in a way that will reach across constituencies – as well as reach the ears of voters who oppose an inward-looking, nationalist, and illiberal version of Europe.

About the author

Susi Dennison is a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations and director of ECFR’s European Power programme. In this role, she explores issues relating to strategy, cohesion, and politics to achieve a collective EU foreign and security policy. She led ECFR’s European Foreign Policy Scorecard project for five years; since the beginning of this year, she has overseen research for ECFR’s Unlock project.
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- Developing contagious ideas that get people talking. ECFR has brought together a team of distinguished researchers and practitioners from all over Europe to carry out innovative research and policy development projects with a pan-European focus. ECFR produces original research; publishes policy reports; hosts private meetings, public debates, and “friends of ECFR” gatherings in EU capitals; and reaches out to strategic media outlets.

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