

Proceedings of the 17th International Conference of Editors of Diplomatic Documents Rome, 30-31 May 2024




Ministero degli Affari Esteri
e della Cooperazione Internazionale

**Proceedings of the
17th International Conference
of Editors of Diplomatic Documents
Rome, 30-31 May 2024**

Edited by
Francesco Lefebvre D'Ovidio
and Rita Luisa De Palma

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Ministero degli Affari Esteri
e della Cooperazione Internazionale

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PREFACE

The 17th International Conference of Editors of Diplomatic Documents took place in Rome on 30-31 May 2024 at the Ministero degli Affari Esteri e della Cooperazione Internazionale, gathering scholars and professionals from 22 countries to discuss critical topics related to diplomatic document editing and historical research.

The conference opened on the morning of 30 May with a welcome speech by Min. Plen. Alessandro De Pedys, Director General for Public and Cultural Diplomacy. Over the course of two days, participants engaged in insightful discussions across multiple thematic sessions.

The **first session** focused on the complexities of documenting and editing materials related to national minorities, highlighting case studies from Italy, Germany, Poland, Switzerland, and the United States.

The **second session** introduced the joint edition on [*The Dissolution of the USSR as Seen from World Capitals*](#), featuring a keynote speech by Ambassador Umberto Vattani, providing a historical perspective on this pivotal event. At that time, Vattani served as diplomatic adviser to Prime Minister Andreotti, thus becoming a direct witness and key participant in one of the most significant events of the contemporary era. This unique vantage point gave him the opportunity to personally meet Gorbachev in the final days of the dissolution of the USSR.

The **third session** examined the comparative history of Foreign Affairs Departments worldwide, with contributions from Germany, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, and the United Kingdom. Discussions illuminated the evolution and structure of diplomatic institutions across various nations.

The morning of 31 May began with the **ICEDD Bureau and General Assembly meetings**, followed by the **fourth session**, dedicated to updates on diplomatic document publication programs across different countries, with contributions from Australia, Canada, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Türkiye, and the United States.

The **final session** addressed new developments in digital editing, showcasing emerging challenges and advancements in artificial intelligence applications for diplomatic documentation. Experts from Israel, the United

States, and Switzerland presented innovative approaches to digital publishing and AI integration in historical research.

Beyond the formal sessions, the conference offered valuable opportunities for informal exchanges, including a guided tour of the Collezione Farnesina, a conference dinner at Circolo degli Esteri, and a farewell cocktail at Parco dei Principi Hotel, followed by a private visit to Galleria Borghese.

The idea of publishing the proceedings of this conference emerged after the first intense and compelling day of presentations and discussions. Too often, the significant time that elapses between a conference and its publication leads to the notion that recording discussions is futile, given the continuous evolution of knowledge and the accessibility of information online. However, during the ICEDD Bureau meeting on 31 May, we agreed that the significance of the matters discussed and the exceptional opportunity of having oral testimonies of key events made this publication not only worthwhile but essential.

I am pleased that almost all participants were able to submit their contributions, and I extend my sincere thanks to them once again. Their dedication ensures that the insights shared at the conference remain accessible for further study and reflection.

Regarding editorial criteria, we chose to limit changes to the bare minimum, so as to maintain a degree of uniformity while respecting variations in writing style among native English-speaking authors. However, we adapted punctuation and bibliographical references to align with the academic conventions of Italy and other European countries.

I wish to express my deep gratitude to Min. Plen. Alessandro De Pedys, Director General for Public and Cultural Diplomacy, whose invaluable support was instrumental in the success of this initiative. Special thanks go to Ms. Giuliana Del Papa, Minister Plenipotentiary, Head of the Policy Planning, Statistics, and Historical Documentation Unit, for her exceptional coordination, aided by Rita Luisa De Palma, Head of the Section Publication of the Diplomatic Documents, alongside Daniela Rizzotto and Rossella Paci.

I am especially grateful to Rita Luisa De Palma for her invaluable work in collecting the contributions, carefully assembling them, and meticulously overseeing the editorial process. Her dedication and expertise have been essential in ensuring the overall quality and coherence of this publication.

Re-reading these contributions has reinforced my conviction that recording these discussions was the right decision. The richness and depth of analysis presented during the conference deserve to be preserved and explored further. So now, I invite you to immerse yourself in these pages – happy reading!

FRANCESCO LEFEBVRE D'OVIDIO

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAPD	<i>Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland</i>
ADST	Academy for Diplomatic Studies and Training
AI	Artificial Intelligence
BR	Bundesrepublik
CAAA	Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act
CBC	Congressional Black Caucus
CDU	Christlich-Demokratische Union Deutschlands
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
CSCE	Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
CSI	Commonwealth of Independent States
CUF	Companhia União Fabril
DAFP	<i>Documents on Australia Foreign Policy</i>
DA-MOFAJ	Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan
DCER	<i>Documents on Canadian External Relations</i>
DDI	<i>I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani</i>
DDR	Deutsche Demokratische Republik
DDS	<i>Diplomatic Documents of Switzerland</i>
DFA	Department of Foreign Affairs
DJFP	<i>Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy</i>
EC	European Community
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EDC	European Defence Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
EPC	European Political Community
FCDO	Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FDFA	Federal Departement of Foreign Affairs
FPD	Freie Demokratische Partei
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
FRUS	<i>Foreign Relations of the United States</i>
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GCHQ	Government Communications Headquarters (UK)
GDR	German Democratic Republic
HTLM	HyperText Markup Language
ICEDD	International Committee of Editors of Diplomatic Documents
ISA	Israel State Archives
ISPI	Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale
LLMs	Large Language Models

List of Abbreviations

LR I	Legationsrat (I. Klasse)
Memcon	Memorandum of Conversation
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MGIMO	Moskovskij gosudarstvennyj institut meždunarodnych otnošenij MID Rossijskoj Federacii (Moscow State Institute of International Relations)
MI5	Military Intelligence, Section 5
MI6	Military Intelligence, Section 6
ML	Machine Learning
NA	National Archives of Ireland, Dublin
Narkomindel (NKID)	Narodnyi Komissariat Inostrannykh Del (People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NKVD	Narodnyy komissariat vnutrennikh del (People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs)
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
OCR	Optical Character Recognition
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OECE	Organisation Européenne de Coopération Économique
OH	Office of the Historian (USA)
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PA/AA	Political Archive of the Foreign Office
PDF	Portable Document Format
PNG	Papua New Guinea
RAG	Retrieval Augmented Generation
RSFSR	Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic
RSI	Repubblica Sociale Italiana
SED	Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands
SR	Sozialistische Republik
TEI	Text Encoding Initiative
UNTC	United Nations Trusteeship Council
US	United States
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VLR	Vortragender Legationsrat
XML	Extensible Markup Language

CONFERENCE PROGRAMME

Thursday, 30th May

- 09.00 – 09.30 Arrival and registration at the Ministero degli Affari Esteri e della Cooperazione Internazionale, Sala Conferenze Internazionali, Piazzale della Farnesina, 1
- 09.00 – 09.45 Welcome Coffee
- 09.45 – 10.00 Opening and welcome by Min. Plen. Alessandro De Pedys, Director General - Public and Cultural Diplomacy
- 10.00 – 12.00 Session 1: National Minorities: Documentary Evidence and Problems Related to Editing Documents on Minority Issues
Chair: Antonio Varsori
- Francesco Lefebvre D'Ovidio (Italy): *German-speaking Minority in South Tyrol/Alto Adige: Problems in the editing of diplomatic documents on internal legislation for autonomous administration*
 - Tim Geiger (Germany): *Buying Freedom. The FRG and the German Minority in Romania 1969-1989*
 - Piotr Długołęcki (Poland): *Confronting the Holocaust. Documents on the Polish Government-in-Exile's Policy Concerning Jews 1939-1945*
 - Thomas Bürgisser (Switzerland): *The Question of National Minorities in the Case of Multicultural Switzerland*
 - Kathryn David (USA): *Black Activism and U.S. Foreign Policy on South Africa, 1989-1992*
- 12.00 – 13.00 Session 2: Presentation of the joint edition on «The Sissolution of the USSR as Seen from World Capitals» – Francesco Lefebvre D'Ovidio
- Keynote speech by Ambassador Umberto Vattani, *The Dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*
- 13.00 – 14.00 Light lunch
- 14.00 – 15.30 Session 3/1: The Comparative History of Foreign Affairs Departments in the World
Chair: Ilse Dorothee Pautsch
- Carola Tischler (Germany): *The People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the USSR (1917-1939): Structural Changes of the Soviet Foreign Policy Agency*
 - Francesco Lefebvre/Antonio Varsori (Italy): *The Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs: a 300-year history, 1717-2017*
 - Michael Kennedy (Ireland): *«The Department is the apple of your eye, bone of your bone, flesh of your flesh»: how Joseph Walshe's world view shaped the creation of Ireland's Department of External Affairs*
- 15.30 – 16.00 Coffee break and family picture
- 16.00 – 17.00 Session 3/2: The Comparative History of Foreign Affairs Departments in the World
Chair: Sacha Zala
- Helena Pinto Janeiro (Portugal): *The Diplomats of the Carnation Revolution: Portuguese Women in Foreign Affairs*

- Richard Smith (UK): *The Unwritten History of the British Foreign Office*
- 17:00 – 18:00 Collezione Farnesina Guided Tour
18:00 – 18:30 Transfers to the dinner venue
18:30 – 21:30 Conference Dinner at Circolo degli Esteri, Lungotevere dell'Acqua Acetosa, 42
21:30 Transfers to the taxi stand in Piazzale della Farnesina (next to the Ministry)

Friday, 31st May

- 09:00 – 10:00 ICEDD Bureau meeting (For ICEDD Bureau members only)
10:00 – 10:30 ICEDD General Assembly (For ICEDD members only)
10:30 – 10:45 Welcome Coffee
10:45 – 13:40 Session 4: Questionnaire Updates and Presentation of Country Programmes
Chair: Richard Smith
- Jillian Beard (Australia): *Documents on Australian Foreign Policy: an Indo-Pacific focus*
 - Brendan Kelly (Canada): *The Past, Present, and Future of the Documents on Canadian External Relations Series*
 - Giuliana Del Papa (Italy): *Public Diplomacy and the Publication of the Italian Documents*
 - Miruko Atsuta (Japan): *Japanese Diplomatic Documents and Publications: Relations with Italy and Vatican*
 - Cees Heere (Netherlands): *Listening to the Past. Observations from the Dutch Diplomatic Oral History Project*
 - Piotr Długolecki (Poland): *30 volumes of the PDD series - plans and challenges*
 - Sabriye Kısa (Türkiye): *Thematic and chronological editions of Turkish Diplomatic Archives*
 - Kathleen Rasmussen (USA): *Taking Back Control: Recent Innovations in FRUS Production*
- 13:40 – 14:40 Light Lunch
14:40 – 16:10 Session 5: New Developments in the Field of Digital Editing
Chair: Piotr Długolecki
- Louise Fischer/Michal Saft (Israel): *The Challenges in Long Term Management of Digital Publications*
 - Joseph C. Wicentowski (USA): *FRUS AI – Exploring applications of “artificial intelligence” for editing and enriching the “Foreign Relations of the United States” series*
 - Sacha Zala (Switzerland): *Punctual as a Swiss watch – Dodis goes AI*
- 16:10 – 16:15 Closing Remarks by Francesco Lefebvre D'Ovidio, President of the Scientific Committee for the Publication of Italian Diplomatic Documents
16:30 – 17:00 Minivan transfer to the farewell cocktail venue
17:00 – 18:30 Farewell Cocktail at Parco dei Principi Hotel, Via Gerolamo Frescobaldi, 5
18:30 – 19:00 Walking through Villa Borghese to the Galleria Borghese
19:00 – 20:00 Private guided tour in Galleria Borghese, Piazzale Scipione Borghese 5

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

AUSTRALIA

- Dr. Jillian Beard, Assistant Director, Historical Publications Section, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

AZERBAIJIAN

- Mr. Bayram Hasanov, Head of Archives Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

BELGIUM

- Prof. Jean-Luc De Paepe, Deputy Secretary General of Union Académique Internationale, Royal Commission for History

CANADA

- Dr. Brendan Kelly, Deputy Director of the Foreign Policy Research and Foresight Division, Head of the Historical Section, Global Affairs Canada

FINLAND

- Mr. Ari Uusikartano, Deputy Director General, Information and Documentation, CIO
- Mr. Jyrki Paloposki, Head of Information Management, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland

FRANCE

- Mr. Nicolas Chibaeff, Directeur des Archives, Centre des Archives diplomatiques, Ministère de l'Europe et des Affaires Étrangères
- Dr. Jean-Philippe Dumas, Chef du pôle Collections, Direction des Archives, Ministère de l'Europe et des Affaires Étrangères

GERMANY - AAPD (Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik)

- Dr. Ilse Dorothee Pautsch, Senior Editor, Head of AAPD (Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik) editing team, Institute for Contemporary History Munich – Berlin
- Dr. Tim Geiger, Editor of AAPD (Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik), Institute for Contemporary History Munich – Berlin
- Dr. Carola Tischler, Historian, Editor of German-Soviet Relations 1933-1941, Institute for Contemporary History Munich – Berlin

GERMANY - Political Archive of the Federal Foreign Office

- Prof. Dr. Elke Freifrau von Boeselager, Director General of the Political Archive and Historical Services, Federal Foreign Office

GREECE

- Mr. Georgios Polydorakis, Expert Minister-Counsellor, Director of the Service of Diplomatic and Historical Archives, Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs

IRELAND

- Dr. Michael Kennedy, Executive Editor, Documents on Irish Foreign Policy

ISRAEL

- Ms. Michal Saft, Head of Publications Department, Israel State Archives
- Dr. Louise Fischer, Senior Editor, Publications Department, Israel State Archives

ITALY

- Mr. Alessandro De Pedys, Minister Plenipotentiary, Director General - Public and Cultural Diplomacy
- Prof. Francesco Lefebvre, President of the Scientific Committee for the Publication of Italian Diplomatic Documents
- Ms. Giuliana Del Papa, Minister Plenipotentiary, Head of the Policy Planning, Statistics and Historical Documentation Unit
- Prof. Antonio Varsori - Prof. Leopoldo Nuti - Prof. Luca Micheletta - Prof. Ilaria Poggiolini - Prof. Massimo Bucarelli, Members of the Scientific Committee for the Publication of Italian Diplomatic Documents
- Ms. Rita Luisa De Palma, Archival Science Specialist, Head of the Section of Publication of Diplomatic Documents

JAPAN

- Ms. Miruko Atsuta, Deputy Director, Editor, Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy, Diplomatic Archives, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan

KOSOVO

- Mr. Bejtullah Destani, Department of Archives, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Diaspora of Kosovo

LATVIA

- Dr. Valdis Rūsiņš, Head of the Foreign Service History and Diplomatic Documents Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

NETHERLANDS

- Dr. Cees Heere, Historical Advisor, Netherland Ministry of Foreign Affairs

POLAND

- Mr. Piotr Długołęcki, Editor-in-Chief, Polish Diplomatic Documents series, Polish Institute of International Affairs

PORTUGAL

- Dr. Helena Pinto Janeiro, Historian, Diplomatic Institute, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Portugal

RUMANIA

- Prof. Univ. Dr. Rudolf M. Dinu, Editor DDR 1st series, Romanian Diplomatic Institute - Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

SWITZERLAND

- Prof. Dr. Sacha Zala, Director Dodis, Institute of the Swiss Academy of Humanities and Social Sciences
- Dr. Thomas Bürgisser, Senior researcher, Dodis, Institute of the Swiss Academy of Humanities and Social Sciences

TÜRKİYE

- Ms. Ayşe Selcan Şanlı, Minister Plenipotentiary, Deputy Director General of Turkish Diplomatic Archives
- Ms. Sabriye Kısa, Attaché, Turkish Diplomatic Archives

UNITED KINGDOM

- Prof. Patrick Salmon, Chief Historian, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office
- Dr. Richard Smith, Principal Historian, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

- Dr. Adam Howard, The Historian, Director, Office of the Historian, Foreign Service Institute, U.S. Department of State
- Dr. Kathleen Britt Rasmussen, General Editor, *Foreign Relations of the United States* series, Office of the Historian, Foreign Service Institute, U.S. Department of State
- Dr. Joseph C. Wicentowski, Digital History Advisor, Office of the Historian, Foreign Service Institute, U.S. Department of State
- Dr. Elizabeth Charles, Historian, Office of the Historian Foreign Service Institute, U.S. Department of State
- Dr. Kathryn David, Historian, Office of the Historian, Foreign Service Institute, U.S. Department of State

OPENING AND WELCOME

Min. Plen. Alessandro De Pedys
Director General Public and Cultural Diplomacy

Opening and Welcome

Good morning, Ladies and Gentlemen, and welcome to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

It is a great pleasure for me to open the 17th International Conference of Editors of Diplomatic Documents, an event that Italy hosts for the second time after 28 years and that gathers in Rome the representatives of 21 different countries.

First of all, I would like to thank all of you for being here today and for your daily commitment to the publication of diplomatic documents, a long established and cherished tradition here in the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

I take the opportunity to also thank the Italian scientific committee and its President, Professor Francesco Lefebvre d'Ovidio, as well as the colleagues in the Policy Planning Unit and the staff of the diplomatic archives who have worked tirelessly for the success of this Conference. Without them, there would be no conference.

Your presence here testifies the value you attach to the preservation, study and dissemination of these documents, which are essential tools for understanding international dynamics and promoting informed and responsible citizenship.

I particularly appreciate the topic chosen for the collective volume which is being presented today with the contribution of Amb. Umberto Vattani, former diplomatic advisor to the Italian Prime Minister at the beginning of the 90s, whom I am pleased to welcome here today. He is, by the way, my former boss and a close friend. I am sure he will offer interesting insights on the way the crisis was seen and handled at the heart of the Italian Government.

Thanks to the mostly unpublished diplomatic documents made available on the four fateful months between the August 1991 coup d'état and the fall of the USSR in December that same year, we have today new important elements to better understand how our predecessors lived through the compelling events that marked the history of our time.

In this room, I think we are all, or almost all, old enough to remember those days: going frantically through the news, glued to the TV screen – there was no Internet at the time. Remember the emotions we felt: incredulity, anxiety, but also hope, excitement, exhilaration, expectations.

I browsed through the pages of the book and it all came back. It is indeed an interesting reading. What I found fascinating, for example, are the different ways colleagues in different Embassies in Moscow, from different countries, reported and interpreted the events they were witnessing, the different ways they tried to predict the next developments and the fate of the main characters of the drama that was unfolding before their eyes, reaching sometimes radically different conclusions. Looking back, some were right on the spot, others completely off the mark.

It is interesting reading also in the light of the war that has been ravaging a part of Europe for more than two year now, because the roots of what is happening today can be traced back to the events described in those documents.

Transparency in international relations is usually a good thing, not always but usually, but it certainly is a fundamental pillar for building mutual trust between people, even more so in times of rampart disinformation, such as the ones we are living, disinformation that can imply efforts to re-write history. Through the publication of diplomatic documents, not only do we preserve historical memory, but we also make citizens aware of the importance of political and diplomatic decisions that affect their lives. We provide the basis for critical and constructive reflection on the past, always a useful guide to future choices.

Italy is a proud contributor to this global effort. In fact, since the end of World War II, our country has embarked on a path of transparency by publishing a large quantity of diplomatic documents that shed light on the way our foreign policy is conceived and executed.

The book, by the way, is also a tribute we pay to our colleagues who were on the ground at the time, who had, on the one hand, the privilege to witness history in the making, but on the other the crucial task to provide their capitals with sufficient elements to take difficult political decisions. This is true not only for the 1991 crisis but in general terms. Diplomatic work is obscure and often misunderstood but it is sometimes absolutely relevant.

We live in a fast-evolving international environment, marked by competition, fragmentation, uncertainties and tensions. In such a world international cooperation, dialogue and the patient weaving of human bonds

in every professional sphere are more and more necessary. This conference goes precisely in that direction.

You have a rich programme and I think that you will make the most of these two days together to deepen exchanges and knowledge of each other's work and studies. I wish you a very successful conference.

SESSION 1

NATIONAL MINORITIES: DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
AND PROBLEMS RELATED TO EDITING DOCUMENTS
ON MINORITY ISSUES

Chair: Antonio Varsori

Francesco Lefebvre D'Ovidio

President of the Scientific Committee
for the Publication of Italian Diplomatic Documents

**German-speaking Minority in South Tyrol/Alto Adige:
Problems in the editing of diplomatic documents on internal legislation
for autonomous administration**

Abstract: The South Tyrol/Alto Adige issue has been a significant topic in international relations between Italy and Austria. The editing of Italian diplomatic documents on this matter reveals the complexity and length of the negotiations, which spanned from the De Gasperi-Gruber Accord in 1946 to the final resolution in 1992. The negotiations were conducted on two levels: domestically, between the Italian government and the German-speaking minority represented by the Südtiroler Volkspartei, and internationally, between the Italian and Austrian governments. The domestic negotiations included the establishment of the "Commission of 19" and the handling of terrorist attacks in South Tyrol. The international negotiations involved diplomatic exchanges and bilateral meetings, culminating in the Copenhagen meeting in 1969. Despite the lack of a formal agreement, both sides adhered to their commitments, leading to the Austrian government's declaration in 1992 that the Italian commitments had been fulfilled. The editing process of these documents highlighted challenges related to the intersection of domestic and international issues and the technical nature of the negotiations.

Keywords: Italian Diplomatic Documents, South Tyrol/Alto Adige, Minority issues, Italy, Austria, De Gasperi-Gruber Accord, Südtiroler Volkspartei, Commission of 19, Moro-Waldheim Copenhagen meeting

1. The editing of Italian diplomatic documents on the South Tyrol problem

The two-volume set, on the final stage of negotiations, from the opening of the bilateral meetings in mid-1964 to the final meeting between Aldo Moro and Kurt Waldheim in Copenhagen in November 1969 were the first ones to be published. A second two-volume set, on the period from 1960, i.e. from the first Austrian recourse to the United Nations, to the completion of the work of the "Commission of 19", is in an advanced stage of preparation. We will finally publish the first part, from the opening of the issue by the Austrian

Government, with the memorandum dated 8 October 1956, to the Austrian recourse to the UN in 1961.

There are several advantages and disadvantages of moving backwards, from the final stage of the negotiations to the beginning.

The first reason is that, by publishing in the first place the final stage, we have been able to identify the issues that had a primary role in the decisive negotiation phase, and this enabled us to refine the research on the documents of the previous stages that were going to become particularly important afterwards. However, in a few instances, when publishing the volumes of the previous stages, we have also found editorial problems with some of the previously published documents.

2. Main features that give the Alto Adige-South Tyrol issue special importance and interest in the study of international relations

The first feature that emerges from an examination of the Italo-Austrian negotiations on the Alto Adige/South Tyrol problem is the extraordinary length of the negotiation.

The entire scope of the South Tyrol issue, from inception to its complete conclusion, may be summarised as follows:

- 5 September 1946: De Gasperi-Gruber Accord (der Pariser Vertrag)
- 31 January 1948: Approval by the Italian Parliament of the Statute of the Autonomous Region of Alto Adige (South Tyrol)
- On 8 October 1956: Reopening of the South Tyrol problem by the Austrian Government, based on the argument that the institution of the autonomous Region of Trentino Alto Adige does not represent the fulfilment of the “Pariser Vertrag”
- June 1960: Letter from Kreisky to the Secretary-General of the UN in which Austria asks to insert the problem of the “Austrian Minority” in Italy to the General Assembly of the UN for a resolution (i.e. Resolution No. 1497 of 31 October 1960).
- 1 September 1961: Italy appoints the “Commission of the 19”
- 25 May 1964: Meeting between Saragat and Kreisky in Geneva: decision to start the “Expert’s Commission” secret meetings
- 16 December 1964: meeting between Saragat and Kreisky at the Chateaux de la Muette in Paris, during which the Italian Government offers its first official “global proposal” for the settlement of the issue

- December 1964-November 1969: bilateral negotiations to find a solution
- 30 November 1969: Meeting in Copenhagen between Aldo Moro and Kurt Waldheim
- 11 June 1992: Final fulfilment of the 137 undertakings of the “Paket” and release by the Austrian Government of the declaration of fulfilment (“*Quietanza liberatoria*”)

Therefore, it took a total of 46 years, from the Paris Agreement (or 36 years from the official re-opening of the international dispute by the Austrian Government) to the final completion of the Paket and the “release receipt” by Austria: 10 years from the Paris agreement to the reopening of the dispute (1946-1956); 8 years from the reopening to the beginning of bilateral negotiations (1956-1964); 5 years from the beginning of the bilateral negotiations to the agreement at the Copenhagen meeting (1964-1969); 23 years from the Copenhagen Agreement to the final release receipt in 1992 (1969-1992).

3. Two levels of negotiation: domestic level (negotiations with the representatives of the Südtiroler Volkspartei) and international diplomatic level (the Austrian Government)

The second feature that may be highlighted is that the negotiation leading to the solution of the dispute at the final meeting in Copenhagen was conducted on two different levels: on one side, a domestic level, between the Italian Government and the South Tyrolean German-speaking minority, represented by the Südtiroler Volkspartei; on the other side, an international level, between the Italian and the Austrian Government. The domestic level includes the appointment in September 1961, by the Italian Minister of Interior Affairs, of the “Commission of 19” (or “Rossi Commission”), a purely Italian commission of experts, to investigate the issue and propose solutions, and the terrorist attacks in South Tyrol from 1961 to 1968. The international level includes the diplomatic exchanges between the two governments and the bilateral negotiations that took place from December 1964 to November 1969 as well as the Austrian Government’s recourse in 1960 to the General Assembly of the United Nations that led to the Resolution No. 1497 of 1960.

The two levels intersect, because the solutions proposed by the “Commission of 19” were the basis of the subsequent bilateral negotiations that began in late 1964.

The coexistence and intersection of the two levels poses some problems in the editing of the documents, because the Minister of Interiors and the President of the Council of Ministers were competent for the domestic level, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was in charge of the bilateral negotiations and of dealing with the recourse at the United Nations General Assembly. For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs lacked almost completely any information on the proceedings of the “Commission of 19”, until its very last phase. Therefore, the publication of documents from the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not shed much light on the “Commission of 19”, although this was essential to the outcome of the negotiations.

4. Both sides maintain their positions unmodified and no agreement is signed

The third feature of the negotiation is that, strictly speaking, it was not a negotiation and, more importantly, its outcome was not the execution of an international agreement.

Throughout the entire negotiation, from its inception in 1956, Italy maintained that she has duly executed the Pariser Vertrag and therefore there was nothing to negotiate and no modification of the Paris agreement was accepted. Consequently, the Italian Government refused to admit that there were any “negotiations” going on, but referred simply to “contacts” between the Italian and Austrian Governments to discuss the issue of the protection granted by Italy to the linguistic minority and the possible unilateral decision that Italy could decide to introduce some further guarantees, maintaining that the constitutional law instituting the Autonomous Region was an internal issue.

In reality, the Italian Government in the course of the contacts explained which guarantees it was prepared to introduce and on the basis of the reaction of the Austrian as well as of the local German-speaking minority representatives (the Südtiroler Volkspartei) adjusted its initial offers and introduced further ones. However, these offers, although they were the outcome of discussions with both the German-speaking minority representatives and the Austrian Government, were still considered by the Italian Government as unilateral decisions.

Thus, the final “agreement”, from the Italian point of view, was not an agreement, in the sense that it did not modify or supplement the Paris Agreement. At the Copenhagen meeting, in November 1969, the Italian Government simply “informed” the Austrian Government of the list of

measures that it intended unilaterally to put in force by internal legislation (at various levels; constitutional, state law, governmental and administrative regulation), i.e. the 137 “measures” of the so-called Paket, by “reading” the list of measures (actually, the Italian representatives handed over a document, instead of reading it), which however had been previously discussed and modified. On the other side, the Austrian Government unilaterally declared that, in case all the measures indicated were fulfilled, it would at the end issue a declaration of full satisfaction, i.e. the “*quietanza liberatoria*” or “release receipt”, according to which Italy had performed duly its promises.

At the meeting no agreement or document of any sort was signed by the two parties. Both sides kept their word as if they had signed an agreement and the long-debated and acrimonious issue was solved by virtue of a simple meeting and by “shaking hands” between the two Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

Credit for the successful conclusion of these long negotiations must be given on the diplomatic level to Ambassador Gaja and Prof. Mario Toscano on the Italian side; to the Austrian negotiators Ambassador Kirchschräger and Kathrein for the technical part of the negotiations; and, on the political level, to Aldo Moro and Kurt Waldheim, as Ministers of Foreign Affairs, during the final negotiations leading to the Copenhagen meeting.

5. Problems in the editing of documents on minority issues

The editing of the volumes on the Alto Adige-South Tyrol issue has highlighted some general problems related to the negotiations of minority problems.

The first point is that minority issues, such as the South Tyrol question, involve a domestic policy level, which is dealt with by the Ministry of Interior and/or the head of government, while the international level is handled with by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (thus the “two levels” of the negotiation).

The two levels of the negotiation imply that a significant part of the documents are not related to international relations and are not located in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (i.e., the *Commissione dei Diciannove*). In our volumes, we have included certain documents from other Departments when they reflected on the international negotiations.

The second point is the technical nature of most of the negotiations: The selection of documents must aim to be complete and, at the same time, not too technical, which could imply losing sight of the political problems.

Tim Geiger

Institute for Contemporary History Munich–Berlin

Buying Freedom.

The FRG and the German Minority in Romania after 1945

Abstract: The article deals with the Federal Republic of Germany's ransom payments to Socialist Romania for the release of its German minority from 1969 to 1989.

Keywords: Federal Republic, Romania, German minority, ransom, payments

Scholars who are familiar with Cold War or German History usually know that West Germany bought out political prisoners out of Communist East Germany since 1962. In these “*Freikauf*” operations, the Federal Republic paid ransom for individual liberty – and the GDR leadership at the other side of the iron curtain found it quite convenient to get rid of troubling dissidents and even get paid good *Deutsch-Marks* for that at once¹.

However, that was not Bonn's unique action of “Buying freedom”. Less well known, albeit of a much bigger scale, the *Bundesregierung* did something similar for the German minority in Romania who lived under the rule of Nicolai Ceaușescu, a nasty Stalinist and corrupt dictator.

During the Iranian Hostage crisis in 1979/80, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt told international partners he could understand the dreadful situation of the Carter administration only too well because West Germany, too, has been in charge for hostages – not just for 50 diplomats, but for millions of German country-men under Communist rule: in the GDR, but also in the USSR, Poland and other Warsaw Pact countries².

¹ ELKE-URSEL HAMMER, “*Besondere Bemühungen*” der Bundesregierung, Vol. 1: 1962-1969. *Häftlingsfreikauf, Familienzusammenführung, Agentenaustausch*, Munich, Oldenbourg, 2012 (Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, Sonderedition); JAN PHILIPP WÖLBERN, *Der Häftlingsfreikauf aus der DDR 1962/63-1989. Zwischen Menschenhandel und humanitären Aktionen*, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Rupprecht, 2014 (Analysen und Dokumente: wissenschaftliche Reihe des Bundesbeauftragten für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der Ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, Vol. 38).

² Memorandum of Conversation (Memcon) Chancellor Schmidt to American Secretary of State Vance, 20 February 1980, in: *Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (henceforward AAPD), ed. by TIM GEIGER, AMIT DAS GUPTA and

After World War II and the horrific crimes of Nazi Germany, in 1945 and the following years, roughly 12 million Germans were expelled from countries in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe where their ancestors had lived for ages. However, even thereafter some thousand people of German origin and language still lived in their traditional settlement zones in the USSR, Poland, Hungary – and Romania.

Romania was a special, even exceptional case as a brief glimpse into the chequered trajectory of Romanian history in the 20th century shows. Although Romania was ruled by a German monarch from the Hohenzollern dynasty, it joined the Entente powers in World War I. In 1919, Romania was among the victors. The Paris Peace Treaties doubled its pre-War-Territory – by gaining Bessarabia from Russia and from Hungary big territories in the North and West. There, in Transylvania, German settlers, the “*Siebenbürger Saxonians*”, lived since the 12th Century, and in the Banat area since the 18th century (“*Banater Swabians*”). Thus, Romania had a large German minority since 1919 which was treated reasonably well. In the inter-war period, the country proved to be a corner-stone of the “little Entente”. In 1940, the USSR re-took Bessarabia. Worse, Romania had to accept an “arbitrage decision” by Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy that reordered the northern part of Transylvania back to Hungary. In 1941, Bucharest joined Germany in the aggression against the Soviet Union: Romanian troops were fighting at the side of the *Wehrmacht* (for example by conquering Odessa in 1941). In 1944, however, Romania changed sides, but that was too late. In the infamous percentage deal between Stalin and Churchill, the country was 90% within the Soviet zone of interest. In 1947, Romania became a communist “people’s republic”.

In all other countries of the “Eastern bloc” German minorities were collectively expelled as punishment for their collaboration with Nazi Germany. In Romania, however, that was not the case. Only as part of Romania’s reparation guilt some hundred Germans were deported into the USSR for

TIM SZATKOWSKI, Munich, Oldenbourg, 2011, Doc. 55 Footnote 2; Schmidt to British Prime Minister Thatcher in London, 25 February 1980, in Telcom No. 371 Ambassador Ruhfus, London, to Minister Genscher, 25 February 1980, *ibid.*, Doc. 61, p. 348; Memcon Schmidt – Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal of Saudi Arabia, 3 March 1980, in: *ibid.*, Doc. 70, p. 397; Memcon Schmidt – King Khalid of Saudi Arabia, 17 June 1980, *ibid.*, Doc. 176, p. 916; Memcon Schmidt – Member of SED-Politbureau Mittag (GDR), 17 April 1980, in: NAKATH DETLEF, STEPHAN GERD-RÜDIGER (Eds.), *Von Hubertusstock nach Bonn. Eine dokumentierte Geschichte der deutsch-deutschen Beziehungen auf höchster Ebene 1980-1987*, Berlin, Dietz, 1995, Doc. 1, p. 44.

forced labour. After Stalin's death these deported were released to East Germany; from there most moved further into West Germany³.

That's why "family reunion" between the *Rumäniendeutschen* in the FRG and the around 380.000 Germans still living in Romania become an issue for the West German Government.

In the 1950s and 1960s, the famous "Hallstein Doctrine" inhibited that Bonn had diplomatic contacts with countries that recognized East Germany. With the exception of the Soviet Union, Bonn had no diplomatic relations with any Warsaw Pact country.

In the early 1960s, the Federal Government softened this stance by establishing trade representations in Eastern Europe (as prequel to later Embassies), starting 1963 with Hungary, Poland and Romania.

Already at this early stage, Romanian diplomats indicated that Bucharest could ease its restriction on the emigration of Germans if Bonn paid a financial compensation. The memorandum of Karl Carstens (in 1963 Permanent Under-Secretary of State in the Foreign Office) about this blunt offer is printed in the first volume of the edition *Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* when the series started back in 1993⁴. Ever since, each volume of the AAPD contains documents on the issue of the German minority in Romania, year by year until 1990.

Finding documents on the dealing with German minorities abroad within the AAPD edition might sound a bit surprising because within the Federal Government, the issue of German minorities fell within the jurisdiction of the "Ministry of refugees and expellees" or after its dissolution in 1969 of the "Home Office" (*Bundesministerium des Innern*). On the other hand, the whole Government, especially the Chancellors and Foreign Ministers (who used to be the Vice-Chancellor, most of the time as party leaders of the minor coalition partner) felt responsible for the well-being of German minorities. Here the AAPD edition is coming back in because it prints documents from the Federal Chancellery (*Bundeskanzleramt*) and the Foreign Office (*Auswärtige Amt*). Documents on buying-out members of the German minority in Romania

³ ANNEMARIE WEBER (Ed.), *Die Deutschen in Rumänien 1944–1953. Eine Quellensammlung*, Cologne/Weimar/Vienna, Böhlau, 2015; SIMON ACKER, *Die rumäniendeutsche Minderheit im Rahmen der Beziehungen zwischen der BR Deutschland und der SR Rumänien*, in "Südosteuropa-Mitteilungen", 27/3-4 (1987), pp. 229-238.

⁴ Memorandum of Secretary of State Carstens, 28 November 1963, in: AAPD 1963, ed. by MECHTHILD LINDEMANN and ILSE DOROTHEE PAUTSCH, Munich, Oldenbourg, 1994, Doc. 439.

were top secret – and declassification of formerly classified material is also one of AAPD’s core competences⁵.

In 1968, Romania was the only Warsaw Pact country that openly disagreed with the Soviet decision to crush the “Prague spring”. That Bucharest didn’t take part in the invasion of Czechoslovakia earned Ceaușescu for many years the much exaggerated image of a “progressive” Communist leader and potential partner for détente.

One year before, in January 1967, Romania took up diplomatic relations with West Germany⁶. No other Warsaw-Pact country dared to follow before Moscow, in 1970, gave them the go-ahead, after Willy Brandt had signed the Moscow Treaty as first treaty of his *Ostpolitik*. From Bonn’s perspective, Romania once again underpinned its pioneering role when in 1971 Hans-Dietrich Genscher could visit the country as the first Minister of Home Affairs from a non-communist country who was allowed to visit a Socialist country. Genscher’s visit, of course, dealt in its secret part again with issues of the German minority⁷.

Genscher kept his keen interest in the *Rumäniendeutsche* when, in 1974, he changed to the Foreign Ministry (where he remained until 1992). In his memoirs, Genscher bluntly concedes that with regard to the German minority the Federal Government tried to keep Ceaușescu happy although the brutal dictatorial character and criminal megalomania of this self-proclaimed “*conductator*” became evident quite soon⁸. Genscher kept a permanent dialogue with Romania that he visited nearly once a year, speaking not only to the Foreign Minister but regularly with Romania’s strong-man Ceaușescu. In May 1983, Genscher flattered him: “Romania is the socialist country I visit most often”⁹.

⁵ Within the Foreign Office, the Buying-out of Germans from Romania was dealt with by the Law Department (B 86 in the Political Archive of the Foreign Office – henceforward PA/AA), but also by the Eastern Europe desk within the Political Department (B 42).

⁶ Memorandum of LR I Haas, 1 February 1967, in: AAPD 1967, ed. by ILSE DOROTHEE PAUTSCH, JÜRGEN KLÖCKLER, MATTHIAS PETER and HARALD ROSENBACH, Munich, Oldenbourg 1998, Doc. 39.

⁷ Officially, Genscher was invited because of his responsibility for disaster relief after floodings in Romania in 1970, see Memo of VLR Gorenflos, 9 February 1971, PA/AA, B 42/267, and AAPD 1983, Doc. 857 Fn. 19.

⁸ HANS-DIETRICH GENSCHER, *Erinnerungen*, Berlin, Siedler, 1995, p. 254.

⁹ Memcon Genscher-Ceaușescu in Snagov, 31.5.1983, in: AAPD 1983, ed. by TIM GEIGER, MATTHIAS PETER and MECHTHILD LINDEMANN, Munich, Oldenbourg, 2014, Doc. 163, p. 857.

West Germans soon realized that on the Romanian side, it was Ceaușescu himself and the infamous secret service “Securitate” who were in charge of these secret dealings. In 2011, Romanian historians working with *Securitate* files published a 900-pages edition on the sell-out of the German minority, entitled “Operation Regainment”. It tells something about language barriers that less than twelve public libraries in Germany list this edition¹⁰. There also is a small oral history volume from the Special Envoy of the German Home Office, a lawyer and CDU-member of Parliament, Heinz Günter Hüscher, who negotiated the detailed arrangements with the Romanians since 1969¹¹. And of course, there are dozens of documents in the AAPD series.

The first arrangements in 1969 (for one year) and 1970 (for three years) were negotiated discreetly by this special envoy, lawyer Hüscher. Even about his third arrangement in April 1973, the Foreign Office had only a vague idea and never got the exact paper¹². Hüscher’s early arrangements were based on so called “hardship lists” and remained limited to cases of real “family reunion”.

The whole sell-out-operation kept the label “family reunion” even when the degrees of relationship got more and more far-stretched since the mid-1970s. The convention from April 1973 lasted until June 1978 and allowed the legal emigration of up to 40.000 people from the German minority (with an annual quota of 8.000). In exchange, the West German side paid “compensation for Romania’s resulting economic disadvantages”. For each German who got into the Federal Republic Bonn paid a fixed sum of head-money – varying according to the working ability and the qualification of the

¹⁰ FLORICA DOBRE (for Consiliul Național pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securității), *Acțiunea “Recuperarea”. Securitatea și emigrarea germanilor din România (1962-1989)*, Bucharest, Ed. Enciclopedică, 2012.

¹¹ *Kauf von Freiheit. Dr. Heinz Günther Hüscher im Interview mit Hannelore Baier und Ernst Meinhardt*, Hermannstadt, Honterus, 2013.

¹² Attached Memorandum to Letter of the Head of the Federal Chancellery, Schüler, to Finance Minister Apel, 27 October 1977, in: AAPD 1977, ed. by AMIT DAS GUPTA, TIM GEIGER, MATTHIAS PETER, FABIAN HILFRICH and MECHTHILD LINDEMANN, Munich, Oldenbourg, 2008, Doc. 307, p. 1470 f.; Erwin Wickert (West German Ambassador in Bucharest 1971–1976), *Die glücklichen Augen. Geschichten aus meinem Leben*, Stuttgart/Munich, DVA, 2001, p. 500 f.; Letter from Ambassador Wickert to Head of Minister’s executive management team, Kinkel, 6 October 1975, in: AAPD 1975, ed. by MICHAEL KIENINGER, MECHTHILD LINDEMANN and DANIELA TASCHLER, Munich, Oldenbourg, 2006, Doc. 293.

sold out person. There were five categories:

- Normal or elderly people (older than 62 years male/60 female) 1.800 DM
- Students (beginners) 5.500 DM
- Students (last 2 years of their studies) 7.000 DM
- Academics/people with university degree 11.000 DM
- Craftsman 2.900 DM

In addition to these bounties, Romania was promised to get an interest rate reduction (for rates above 3,5%) for a 200 million DM loan from the semigovernmental bank *Credit Institute for reconstruction*. That meant an additional payment of roughly 11,6 million DM per year – but only, if the quota of emigrants was really reached.

When that quota fell in 1975, Ceaușescu told Genscher: “the question of family reunion is like a river that runs with more water if it rains heavily or loses water if there is drought”¹³. The message was understood in Bonn.

In 1975, the Schmidt Government had given a generous 1 billion Deutsch-Mark-credit to Poland (nick-named “Jumbo-credit”). In return, the Polish Government publicly agreed to solve “humanitarian cases”. In a secret addendum that was outlined as letting go up to 125.00 persons of German origin within the next four years¹⁴.

Romania abhorred this kind of publicity and officially claimed that it preferred that its own German minority should stay in the country – because it feared the economic damage of this loss of human resource and also of prestige if the sell-out of people become public. On the other hand, Ceaușescu’s greed had no limits and he felt Poland and Yugoslavia¹⁵ got more money from Bonn.

To solve things, the *Auswärtige Amt* prepared a new arrangement that should be signed in January 1978 at Chancellor Schmidt’s visit in Romania¹⁶.

¹³ Memcon Genscher – Ceaușescu in Bucharest, 5 December 1975, in: AAPD 1975, Doc. 369, p. 170.

¹⁴ Memorandum of Political Director van Well, 28 July 1975, and of Head of Law Department, Fleischauer, 5 August 1975, Telegram No. 355 of Ministerialdirigent Meyer-Landrut to Embassy in Warsaw, 5 August 1975, all in: AAPD 1975, Docs. 226, 241 and 244.

¹⁵ In December 1974, the FRG gave Yugoslavia a capital assistance of 700 million DM. See Memorandum of Ministerialdirigent Meyer-Landrut, 10 December 1974, in: AAPD 1974, ed. by DANIELA TASCHLER, FABIAN HILFRICH and MICHAEL PLOETZ, Munich, Oldenbourg, 2005, Doc. 363.

¹⁶ Memorandum of Secretary of State van Well, 23 December 1977, in: AAPD 1977, Doc. 376.

In the end, the negotiations were so hard that even the final meeting of Schmidt and Ceaușescu had to be postponed for some additional hours¹⁷. The new convention of January 1978 run for 5 years. The annual quota of emigrants was raised to 11.000 (from 8.000). The hitherto differentiated Per-Head-fees were replaced by a new average flat-rate of 4.000 DM per person. If the arrangement was implemented correctly, an additional quarterly payment of 8 million Deutsch-Mark came on top of it.

Alas, the Romanians soon pressed for more. Thus in March 1981, the per-head-payments were raised to 5.000 DM for an augmented emigration quota of now 13.500 persons per year¹⁸.

In 1982, the government changed in Bonn. Foreign Minister Genscher (from the liberal FDP) stayed in office, but the Christian Democrat Helmut Kohl become Chancellor. Kohl was personally committed to the question of German minorities and gave that issue higher priority than his predecessors¹⁹. Increasingly the Kohl-Genscher Government arranged for a complete sell-out of the remaining German minority in Romania – an idea that had so far always been rejected in the Federal Government. But the political and economic situation of Romania got worse in the 1980s – and the regime’s pressure on its German and Hungarian minorities got harder.

In autumn 1982, Ceaușecu introduced a law demanding from anyone leaving Romania to re-pay all fees for training or studying²⁰. That was just another tool to get more money from West Germany, but also from Israel and the USA. After intense diplomatic tug-of-war²¹, the tuition-repayment-law was neglected. The price was paid in a new convention from May 1983 where the ransom fee for the next five years rose to 7.800 DM per head²².

¹⁷ Memcons Schmidt – Ceausescu in Bucharest, 6 and 7 January 1978, Memcon of Secretary of State van Well, 16 January 1978, in: AAPD 1978, ed. by DANIELA TASCHLER, AMIT DAS GUPTA and MICHAEL MAYER, Munich, Oldenbourg, 2009, Docs. 3, 4 and 11.

¹⁸ Memorandum of Head of Law Department, Fleischhauer, 6 April 1981, in: AAPD 1981, ed. by DANIELA TASCHLER, MATTHIAS PETER and JUDITH MICHEL, Munich, Oldenbourg, 2012, Doc. 101.

¹⁹ *Kauf von Freiheit*, cit., p. 94.

²⁰ Memorandum of Head of Law Department, Bertele, 17 February 1983, in: AAPD 1983, Doc. 52.

²¹ Memcon Genscher – Romanian Foreign Minister Andrei at Tegernsee, 13 April 1983, Telegram No. 347 of Ambassador Jovy, Bucharest, on the visit of Bavarian Prime Minister Strauß in Romania, 24 May 1983, and Memcon Genscher – Ceaușescu in Snagov, 31 May 1983, in: AAPD 1983, Docs. 90, 154 and 163.

²² Moreover, the FRG paid an additional 350 DM “travel expenses” (Talon) for each German emigrating from Romania to West Germany. Romania also got new Hermes bonds (credit guarantees). AAPD 1983, Doc. 154 Fn. 5; *Kauf von Freiheit*, cit., p. 183 f.

In 1984, Ceaușescu and his wife visited Bonn²³. Even years thereafter, Kohl remembered the disgraceful haggling with them over money for people²⁴. From initially 380.000 *Rumäniendeutschen* around 200.000 still lived in Romania, but between 15.000 to 20.000 left each year²⁵. In 1987, Kohl told US Deputy Secretary of State John C. Whitehead that all Germans in Romania wanted to leave; the Federal Government wanted to get all of them out as soon as possible – preferably within three years, even if that meant the worst kind of human trafficking²⁶. The Chancellor repeated this message to Hungarian Prime Minister Grosz with whom Kohl signed the first agreement ever with a Socialist State that made public funding for cultural institutions of the German minority there possible. Both politicians agreed on the dreadful situation for minorities in Romania²⁷.

Bonn's payments of ransom to Bucharest ended in 1989, just a few days before Ceaușescu's bloody end in December. The new Romanian Government allowed free movement of everyone. Only two weeks later, Genscher was in Bucharest again, demanding real democratisation and promising all kind of economic help because that would be the only chance to stop all Germans leaving the country²⁸. In vain: the German Ambassador reported that most Germans in Romania were already sitting on packed suitcases²⁹. His prophecy turned out right, although in 1992 a bilateral Treaty of Partnership and Friendship guaranteed rights of minorities according to CSCE levels.

²³ Memcon Kohl – Ceaușescu, 15 October 1984, in: AAPD 1984, ed. by TIM SZATKOWSKI and DANIELA TASCHLER, Munich, De Gruyter/Oldenbourg 2015, Doc. 279.

²⁴ Memcon Kohl – Bulgarian President Zhelev, 5 September 1991, in: AAPD 1991, ed. by MATTHIAS PETER, CHRISTOPH JOHANNES FRANZEN and TIM SZATKOWSKI, Berlin, De Gruyter, 2022, Doc. 294, p. 1189.

²⁵ Memcon Genscher – Greek Foreign Minister Papoulias, 19 December 1985, in: AAPD 1985, Doc. 350, p. 1855.

²⁶ Memcon Kohl – Whitehead, 10 November 1987, in: AAPD 1987, ed. by TIM SZATKOWSKI, TIM GEIGER und JENS JOST HOFMANN, Berlin, De Gruyter, 2018, Doc. 312, p. 1569.

²⁷ Memcon Kohl – Grosz, 7 October 1987, in: AAPD 1987, Doc. 277, p. 1414. See also Kohl, 6 April 1987, in: GÜNTER BUCHSTAB and HANS-OTTO KLEINMANN (Eds.), *Helmut Kohl: Berichte zur Lage 1982–1989. Der Kanzler und Parteivorsitzende im Bundesvorstand der CDU Deutschlands*, Düsseldorf, Droste, 2014, p. 524.

²⁸ Memcon Genscher – Romanian Prime Minister Roman in Bucharest, 15 January 1990, in: AAPD 1990, ed. by TIM GEIGER, MICHAEL PLOETZ und JENS JOST HOFMANN, Berlin, De Gruyter, 2021, Doc. 9.

²⁹ Telegram No. 100 of Ambassador Terfloth, Bucharest, 18 January 1990, in: AAPD 1990, Doc. 10.

To sum up: Between 1969 and 1989 around 225.000 *Rumäniendeutsche* left Romania for West Germany, amongst them Herta Müller, the winner of the Nobel price for literature in 2009. The operation “Buying freedom” had mixed results for Germany: On the one hand, these emigrants won personal liberty and freedom from repression. On the other hand, the traditional German culture in Romania has died. Many of the century old German villages are depopulated and abandoned. According to a census of 2011, only 40.000 Germans are left in Romania. However, one of them is Klaus Johannis, from 2014 to 2024 President of a democratic Romania that is now part of NATO and the European Union.

Thomas Bürgisser

Senior researcher, Dodis, Institute of the Swiss Academy
of Humanities and Social Sciences

**The Question of National Minorities
in the Case of Multicultural Switzerland**

Abstract: Switzerland has a unique approach to language issues in that the constitution of the Federal State virtually neutralizes them with the principle of territoriality. However, this does not mean that all minority issues have been resolved. This was also demonstrated at a CSCE seminar on national minorities held in Geneva in July 1991. Here it became clear that minority issues in the CSCE member states have completely diverse causes and are viewed and approached in very different ways.

Keywords: Minorities, Switzerland, CSCE

The definition of what constitutes a national minority can vary greatly. In Switzerland, for example, in 2020 62% of citizens said their main language was German, 23% said it was French and 8% said it was Italian³⁰. Nevertheless, French and Italian are not considered minority languages in Switzerland. According to Article 4 of the Federal Constitution, German, French and Italian are all official Swiss National languages with equal rights. That was already the case in the first Federal Constitution of 1848³¹. In 1938, Romansh, which is spoken by a few tens of thousands of people in the canton of Grisons, was also granted a status as national language on a regional level³².

In terms of language, the Federal State is organized according to the principle of territoriality. The 26 subjects of the federation, the cantons, decide on their own official language. Most cantons are monolingual. In Central and Eastern Switzerland, people speak German, in Western Switzerland French, and in the South Italian. The four plurilingual cantons Bern, Fribourg, Grisons and Valais are, according to the Constitution, required to respect the

³⁰ *Sprachenlandschaft in der Schweiz*, ed. by Bundesamt für Statistik, Neuchâtel, 2022, p. 6.

³¹ In the Swiss Constitution of 12 September, 1848, the language question was covered in Article 109, in the revised Constitution of 29 May, 1874, in Article 116.

³² This was approved by a broad majority of the people and the cantons in a referendum on 20 February, 1938.

traditional territorial distribution of languages and take account of indigenous linguistic minorities³³. Consequently, this means, that when a Italian speaker from Grisons moves to the city of Berne, he is considered as a German speaker and cannot make any special claims regarding his linguistic treatment. Switzerland therefore managed to sort of neutralize the language issue by the principle of territoriality.

In fact, one of the places in Switzerland, besides the two bilingual cities of Biel/Bienne and Fribourg/Freiburg, which is truly multilingual, is the National Parliament, the Government and the Federal Administration. Here, people whose mother tongue is German work with those who speak French and Italian. The central state has no common language, but is trilingual. The understanding is that everyone can speak in their own language, but that, consequently, everybody must understand the two other languages. This has very specific implications for our work as editors, too. The research center Diplomatic Documents of Switzerland (Dodis) is itself plurilingual. Our database is maintained in German, French, Italian – the three national languages – and English³⁴. The documents we publish are also written in these four languages, with English gaining ground for international communication the closer we get to the present. All official texts of the Swiss Confederation are published in the three national languages by the state. But also longer internal notes and reports to which various authors contributed are multilingual. Most minutes of meetings, including those of the government and parliamentary commissions, are written in a mixture of national languages. De facto this applies to German and French, Italian tends to be underrepresented.

Every country has national minorities and deals with them in a specific way. Admittedly, the Swiss approach does appear to be somewhat unique.

In 2024, the joint edited volume on the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, was realized, with contributions from several editors of diplomatic documents all around the world³⁵. The edition deals with various exciting questions in the context of a global political turning point. Especially today, many of the questions and problems raised back then appear to be very relevant again for the analysis of world politics. In the context of the fall of the

³³ Article 70, 2 of the Swiss Constitution of 18 April 1999.

³⁴ www.dodis.ch.

³⁵ *The Dissolution of the USSR as Seen from World Capitals*, ed. by FRANCESCO LEFEBVRE D'OVIDIO, Rome, 2024.

Iron Curtain in the early 1990s, the dealing with national minorities increasingly came into the focus of politics, which were then becoming virulent in many countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. It is therefore not surprising that the term minority is mentioned over forty times in our joint volume on the end of the USSR.

It was not only the Soviet empire that disintegrated during this period, leaving behind new nation states in which large minorities from neighboring republics often resided alongside the titular nation. After Nagorno-Karabakh, conflict situations arose for example in Latvia and Estonia, but also in Moldova, Georgia and Tajikistan. The multi-ethnic State of Yugoslavia broke up violently during this period. With the wars in the former Yugoslavia, the concept of ethnicity experienced a renaissance as a catalyst for violent conflicts between population groups. In Czechoslovakia, too, the two titular nations separated in 1992 and Hungary discovered a new role as an advocate for Hungarian minorities in neighboring Romania, Slovakia, Serbia and Ukraine.

However, these emerging problems related to minority issues in Eastern Europe also seemed to open up new possibilities for international conflict resolution. Especially for Swiss diplomacy, a new field of international cooperation seemed to open up: As a multilingual, multiconfessional, strictly federalist state, Switzerland should be able to make a contribution to resolving minority issues in Eastern Europe. "Minority issues are at the heart of the Swiss state", said a note from the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA), the Swiss Foreign Ministry, dating from 1990, "Without minorities, Switzerland would not exist"³⁶.

Swiss diplomacy therefore launched an offensive regarding the treatment of national minorities in the 1990s. Switzerland did this mainly within the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, the CSCE, since 1995 the OSCE. As a non-member of the United Nations at that time, Switzerland was not involved in any multilateral political organizations other than the CSCE and the Council of Europe. On the occasion of the Paris Summit of the CSCE in November 1990, at which the end of the Cold War, so to say, seemed to be sealed, Switzerland successfully suggested hosting a CSCE expert seminar on the question of national minorities in Geneva.

³⁶ Memorandum of the Secretary of State Klaus Jacobi, to the Head of the FDFA, Federal Councillor René Felber, 7 May 1990, [dodis.ch/56674](https://www.dodis.ch/56674).



Opening of the CSCE Meeting of Experts on National Minorities in Geneva by Federal Councillor René Felber on 1st July 1991, dodis.ch/60357 (CH-SNM LM-179444.6)

The expert meeting on minorities took place in Geneva from July 1st to 19th 1991, dramatically just in a moment, when the conflicts in Slovenia and Croatia escalated into open warfare.

The Geneva meeting was an important milestone, in that for the first time there was an open international exchange of ideas on minority issues. It was noted that minority problems had to be seen as being a question of human rights and therefore could not be treated exclusively as a national matter. International demarches in this issue henceforth could not be rejected as interference in domestic affairs. On the other hand, Switzerland was unable to push through its proposals for implementation measures, such as observer missions, to the desired extent, although they were supported by other neutrals and the Eastern European states. In the end, the paradoxical situation arose in which the problem of minorities, conceived as a Eastern and Central European one, was blocked by the hostile attitude of the United States of America, which for their part wanted to prevent interference in their internal affairs with regard to the treatment of the black, Hispanic and indigenous population. The Geneva meeting thus showed how the perception of minority

issues was strongly influenced by the very different views and definitions of the CSCE member states.

We have reproduced these discussions in detail in our Online Edition³⁷. Among the selected documents is a self-critical report by the deputy head of the Swiss delegation. He criticized the attitude of his superiors, who emphasized during the conference that Switzerland had no minorities at all and therefore could not be used as a model for the solution of problems of Eastern European countries. “This view can certainly be defended”, the diplomat concluded. “But if it is repeated frequently, it gives the impression that the issue of minorities is of no concern to Switzerland. Switzerland had long taken a similar stance in other areas, for example: We are in favor of a common Europe, but without us”³⁸.

In fact, there is also big confusion about minorities in Switzerland. This is impressively demonstrated by the issue of foreign workers. The principle of territoriality in the language issue was justified in the 19th century. However, it is based on the assumption of a static society. With the growing mobility within the Swiss state and the migration of hundreds of thousands of workers from abroad, it is reaching its limits. In the year 1970, in the midst of the economic boom, immigration of workers from Italy reached a peak in Switzerland. Half a million Italians lived in Switzerland at that time, often as seasonal workers without permanent residence³⁹. The Italian state urged Switzerland to treat its citizens in Switzerland on an equal footing with Swiss workers in terms of employment and insurance benefits. In 1964, these questions were clarified in a migration agreement between Switzerland and Italy⁴⁰. In addition, Italian workers in Switzerland were allowed to have their children educated in their native language and culture. This led to the absurd situation that Italian-speaking children in German-speaking Switzerland could be educated in Italian, while this was denied to Italian-speaking children of Swiss origin due to the principle of territoriality⁴¹.

³⁷ See the compilation dodis.ch/C1875.

³⁸ Memorandum of the deputy head of the Swiss Delegation at the CSCE expert meeting on minorities in Geneva from 1st to 19 July 1991, Paul Widmer, of 1st November 1991, Diplomatic Documents of Switzerland (DDS) 1991, Doc. 50, dodis.ch/58114.

³⁹ ETIENNE PIGUET, *Einwanderungsland Schweiz. Fünf Jahrzehnte halb geöffnete Grenzen*, Berne, 2006, pp. 50 f.

⁴⁰ MAURO CERUTTI, *La politique migratoire de la Suisse 1945–1970*, in *Histoire de la politique de migration, d’asile et d’intégration en Suisse depuis 1948*, ed. by HANS MAHNIG, Zürich, 2005, pp. 89–134, here pp. 108–125.

⁴¹ As it is pointed out in an internal memorandum of the Federal Department of Home Affairs in September 1969, DDS, Vol. 24, Doc. 166, dodis.ch/32356.

At the same time as the agreement with Italy was being negotiated, labor migration from Spain, Portugal and Yugoslavia to Switzerland began in the 1960s. Later immigrants from Turkey, Arab countries, Russia and Sri Lanka came. Today, foreign residents in Switzerland make up a third of the population. 23 percent of the people in Switzerland have a main language other than one of the national languages. That is the same number as French speakers and many more than Italian speakers, not to mention Romansh speakers⁴². An approximate number of 350.000 Yugoslavs were already living in Switzerland during the Geneva expert meeting on national minorities in 1991⁴³. That was almost 5 percent of the population. Shouldn't they also be viewed as a kind of national minority?

To get to the point: The concept of national minorities is very diffuse and has historically been handled very differently in different countries. The discussions surrounding the CSCE minority meeting in Geneva in 1991 spread the topic out into different facets like a prism. All European states have national minorities, whether they are federalist or strictly centralized. The nationality question in Central and Eastern Europe was long characterized by the Austro-Hungarian, Russian and Ottoman Empires, which collapsed in 1918. Problems that arose at that time and after the Second World War as a result of the new border demarcations remained of secondary importance on the international stage during the Cold War. The communist regimes ignored many issues relating to national minorities. Their history now came back on the surface.

In the context of the CSCE, however, we also have to deal with how the immigration countries USA and Canada, where the minority problems are quite different, and therefore dealt with otherwise. The countries of Western Europe also developed from emigration and immigration countries over the course of the 19th and 20th centuries. And finally, right in the middle, we have this Switzerland, where the minorities are so constitutive that they do not even seem to exist as a problem.

However, this is a rather autistic self-definition. The minority issue may be regulated in a unique way in Switzerland. However, the same applies to the relationship between Walloons and Flemings in Belgium or between English speakers and Quebecers in Canada. The Sorbs in Germany have a different status to the Serbs in Croatia; the South Tyroleans as a population

⁴² Cf. *Sprachenlandschaft in der Schweiz*, cit., pp. 6 and 8.

⁴³ Memorandum of the deputy Coordinator for international refugee policy of the FDFA, Markus-Alexander Antoniotti, of 20 December 1991, dodis.ch/58774.

group in Italy have other rights than the Tamils. There is a difference between being of Breton or Arabic mother tongue in France, or having a Welsh or Caribbean background in Britain. Albanians live in a different situation in Albania than in Kosovo, North Macedonia, or in Greece, Serbia, Germany, Sweden or Switzerland.

I would like to illustrate the confusion surrounding minority issues with one last example. The anecdote is recorded in the latest volume of our edition, the Diplomatic Documents of Switzerland of 1993. In September 1993, Gareth Evans was the first Australian Foreign Minister ever to visit Switzerland. The Swiss Foreign Minister, Federal Councillor Flavio Cotti, received the well-traveled guest for working talks in Bern. The discussions focused on bilateral and multilateral issues, in particular peacekeeping, disarmament and humanitarian aid. But Cotti also took the opportunity to address Evans on the issue of the Aborigines in Australia. It should be noted that Cotti came from the southern border canton of Ticino and was a native Italian speaker.

“As a representative of a minority equivalent to 5% of the Swiss population”, introduced Cotti, “it is very important for him on a cultural level to know the Australian authorities’ policy towards Aborigines.» Perhaps Cotti thought it wise to steer the foreign guest towards the topic by starting from his own situation. Evans, at any rate, seemed rather confused. He had to assume that the topic of Aborigines, which was being discussed in Australia at the time due to new legal measures, had been taken up by Cotti. However, he would probably not have expected this kind of introduction at all.

Evans explained the Australian Government’s policy towards the Aborigines at length, but clearly stated that the problem of the Aborigines was totally different from that of the Ticino minority in Switzerland⁴⁴.

This somewhat Kafkaesque Swiss-Australian dialog on minorities may once again illustrate that comparative minority studies can be a difficult matter.

⁴⁴ Report of the FDFA on the official working visit of Senator Gareth John Evans, Australian Minister of Foreign Affairs, in Switzerland on 22 September, 1993, DDS 1993, Doc. 44, dodis.ch/58080.

Kathryn David

Historian, Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State

Black Activism and U.S. Foreign Policy on South Africa, 1989-1992

Abstract: This paper explores the significance of Black anti-apartheid activists in the United States and their impact on foreign policies towards South Africa during the George H.W. Bush Administration. The history of U.S. foreign relations with South Africa cannot be told without considering the role of Black activists who led a domestic movement to influence foreign policy. This study highlights how the anti-apartheid movement shaped the Bush administration's political decisions, compelling the government to consider the impact of their policies on Black activists.

Keywords: Black anti-apartheid activists, George H.W. Bush administration, Anti-apartheid movement, Nelson Mandela, Congressional Black Caucus, TransAfrica

The topic of today's panel focuses on how to present documentary evidence that reflects the role of national minorities in foreign relations. As the editor for a *Foreign Relations of the United States* (FRUS) volume in progress on U.S. foreign relations with southern Africa during the George H.W. Bush administration, this issue is especially important. What I learned while researching this topic is that the story of U.S. foreign relations with South Africa cannot be told without engaging with the role of Black anti-apartheid activists in the United States who led a domestic movement to influence foreign policy. As a result, I had to expand my research beyond the types of documentary sources we usually consult and select for inclusion in FRUS, such as high-level White House and State Department policymaking records. I also used annotations to explain a complex domestic political environment that was not always clear from the diplomatic documents in order to meet our mandate to produce a "thorough, accurate, and reliable" documentary history of U.S. foreign relations. In my presentation today, I will describe these methods in more detail and offer some conclusions I hope will be helpful for other editors.

Before I begin, I want to note that everything I say here today is based upon publicly available open source and declassified material.

Black anti-apartheid Activists themselves worked hard to make their impact visible during one of the most significant moments for U.S. foreign relations with South Africa, Nelson Mandela's visit to the United States in June 1990, just a few months after he was released from prison. While a coalition of groups from various racial and ethnic backgrounds, from college students to church groups, comprised the anti-apartheid movement in the United States, primarily, Black anti-apartheid activists led the movement and organized critical campaigns. As part of Mandela's visit, he met with President George H.W. Bush and Secretary of State James Baker. But it was not the White House who organized the trip. Instead, it was the Black leaders of the anti-apartheid movement who invited Mandela and organized his tour throughout the United States.

The committee coordinating Mandela's visit was made up of representatives from the most influential Black-led organizations involved in South Africa policy, including Randall Robinson, the head of TransAfrica, an organization founded to push for U.S. foreign policy to reflect justice for the peoples of Africa and the African diaspora. Some of the other committee members were Congressperson Ron Dellums of California, and Sylvia Hill of the Southern Africa Support Project, a Washington D.C. based grassroots organization focused on Black liberation in southern Africa. The inclusion of Dellums, Chair of the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) speaks to one of the ways the anti-apartheid movement was able to influence policy – a close relationship to the Congressional Black Caucus, a voting bloc in the U.S. House of Representatives that Robinson, Hill, and others convinced to put foreign policy toward South Africa at the top of their agenda.

The decision for activists to coordinate Mandela's visit, and not the White House, was a deliberate one. As Hill recalls in an interview preserved in the *No Easy Victories* online repository, the committee wanted to make clear that while U.S. foreign policy had assisted in the eventual release of Mandela, the Bush administration had adopted a tough stance toward South Africa in the face of pressure generated by Black anti-apartheid activists⁴⁵.

The visit's organizers were so committed to driving home this narrative that they declined to ask the White House for use of an official U.S. aircraft to transport Mandela. Instead, they paid an American businessperson \$130,000 to charter one of his jets⁴⁶. That businessperson? Donald Trump. At the time

⁴⁵ Sylvia Hill interview, 8/12/2004, *Interview for No Easy Victories project*, http://www.noeasyvictories.org/interviews/int16_hill.php

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

he was head of various companies, including a short-lived airline called Trump Shuttle.

Mandela's visit is just one example of how Black anti-apartheid activists sought to demonstrate their role. Not all of their campaigns were successful, but what a careful study of the period through research in the records of both U.S. officials and non-governmental organizations reveals is that in developing its foreign policy toward South Africa, the Bush administration had to consider the impact of their influence.

In his memoirs, Baker acknowledges the domestic implications of U.S. foreign policy toward South Africa, characterizing South Africa as a "domestic civil-rights issue in an overseas venue"⁴⁷.

But what Baker does not specify is how apartheid became a domestic issue, as he says, "indefensible to most Americans"⁴⁸. It was the work of Black anti-apartheid activists to frame the issue in this way. Robinson remembers in his memoirs that when he founded TransAfrica in the late 1970s, "almost no one in the United States knew who Nelson Mandela was, or anything else about South Africa, much less American policy toward it"⁴⁹. It took TransAfrica and their allies organizing large-scale protests for the rest of the American public to learn what was going on in South Africa and mobilize for policy changes⁵⁰.

Both in his memoirs and during his time as Secretary of State, Baker did not always acknowledge that these Black activists had the power to frame how Americans would understand the Bush administration's policies toward South Africa, just as they had successfully framed apartheid as a domestic issue. As the situation in South Africa changed, Baker would have to maneuver within the framing of activists, not the other way around. In compiling the volume, I have sought to select and annotate documents for publication that show how this dynamic worked and how it impacted the implementation of key policy priorities.

In my presentation today, I will discuss one episode featured in the volume that sheds light on this dynamic. I began my presentation with a visit from Mandela. The rest of the presentation will focus on a visit by another

⁴⁷ JAMES BAKER and THOMAS M. DE FRANK, *Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace 1989-1992*, New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1995, p. 219.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ RANDALL ROBINSON, *Defending the Spirit: A Black Life in America*, New York, Plume, 1991, p. 109.

⁵⁰ ROBINSON, *op. cit.*, p. 159.

South African, F.W. de Klerk, nearly one year earlier in July 1989 – a visit that never happened.

When George H.W. Bush took office, his administration publicly sought to distance themselves from the South Africa policies of Bush's predecessor, Ronald Reagan. Reagan's South Africa policy was known as "constructive engagement". This approach, which Reagan's soon-to-be Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker laid out in a *Foreign Affairs* article in December 1980, argued that normal relations with South Africa were necessary since South Africa functioned as a key partner in fighting the spread of communism in southern Africa. While South Africa may have problems, Reagan administration officials argued, it served as an anti-communist bulwark in a strategic region, with Angola and Mozambique governed by Marxist, Soviet-aligned regimes. The philosophy behind constructive engagement maintained working together with South Africa on regional issues would also allow for the U.S. to maintain influence with South Africa, influence that the U.S. could use to urge them toward reform⁵¹.

The anti-apartheid movement rejected the premise of constructive engagement. During Reagan's second term (1985-1989), Robinson's TransAfrica had led the charge for imposing sanctions against South Africa, resulting in Congress passing the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) in August 1986. For activists, sanctions, not constructive engagement, is what South Africa needed to be pushed toward reform.

The Reagan administration vetoed the bill, but in the fall of 1986, a bipartisan group in Congress, aware of how their constituents had come to view apartheid, overturned Reagan's veto of the CAAA and sanctions were imposed on South Africa.

As Dellums reflected in his memoir, overriding this veto sent a powerful message to both South Africa and the Reagan administration: "the people's representatives within the government of the United States had trumped the executive branch, and had taken control"⁵².

Using Congress to enact a foreign policy against the wishes of a presidential administration was not unique to the anti-apartheid movement. Instead it speaks to a broader trend that began in the 1970s when the burgeoning human rights movement sought to use Congress to limit U.S.

⁵¹ CHESTER A. CROCKER, *South Africa: Strategy for Change*, in "Foreign Affairs", 59 (1980), pp. 323-351.

⁵² RONALD V. DELLUMS and H. LEE HALTERMAN, *Lying Down With the Lions: A Public Life from the Streets of Oakland to the Halls of Power*, Boston, Beacon Press, 2000, p. 137.

support for countries that activists saw as violating the human rights of its citizens.

Thus, the Bush administration wanted to make clear from the start that in developing its policy toward South Africa it was looking to work with Congress, not against it. This was especially important to Baker, whose own background was in campaign politics and was more attuned to domestic considerations than other secretaries of state. In Baker's confirmation hearings he condemned apartheid, using language that was clearer and more forceful than that of the Reagan administration.

Baker also said in his confirmation hearing he hoped the U.S. could be a positive influence for change in South Africa. With this in mind, Baker began considering issuing an invitation to de Klerk, then a candidate for President in South Africa, to meet with President Bush. In proposing this invitation, Baker recalled in his memoirs he saw it as a symbolic gesture of support the United States could offer South Africa even as sanctions remained. The meeting with de Klerk, who was running on a reformist platform, could demonstrate the United States still wanted to work with South Africa to encourage reform and resolve regional issues in southern Africa, even if the Bush administration was stuck with sanctions under the CAAA. The visit, Baker suggested, could be paired with a visit from a Black South African who was also pursuing reform⁵³.

Others in the State Department disagreed. In a June 12 memo to Baker, available through Princeton University Library, Dennis Ross, Director of Policy Planning, and Robert Zoellick, Counselor of the Department of State, laid out the case against a Presidential meeting with de Klerk, even if it was paired with a visit from a Black South African like anti-apartheid activist Albertina Sisulu. Ross and Zoellick wrote that because the Bush administration had yet to articulate a substantive policy toward South Africa, the de Klerk visit would be seen as the main signal of what the administration's South Africa policy would be. They explained, "the significance of who the President agrees to see and on what terms will remain the principal measure of where we are heading"⁵⁴. Ross and Zoellick argued that the critical audience for these signals is the Black community: "If the goodwill engendered by reaching out to the Black community (which remains distrustful) is tarnished

⁵³ BAKER, *op. cit.*, p. 220.

⁵⁴ Information Memorandum to Baker from Ross and Zoellick, June 12, 1989, Princeton University Library, Department of Special Collections, Public Policy Papers, James A. Baker III Papers, Series 12: The Politics of Diplomacy, Subseries 12B: Chapter Files, Box 184, Folder 5: Chapter 13-Baker Files, 1989-1995, p. 2.

by the appearance of being too soft on de Klerk, this could hurt the efforts to sustain opposition to more sanctions...”⁵⁵. Here Ross and Zoellick were acknowledging the position of Black anti-apartheid activists to frame the narrative of the visit. If these activists saw the de Klerk visit as a return to the policies of the Reagan administration, they could deploy similar strategies to wrest power away from the White House and enact more sanctions, or other punitive measures, through Congress.

In July of 1989, as it was becoming clearer that de Klerk would likely win his election, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman “Hank” Cohen met with de Klerk in South Africa. Cohen wrote a cable, available through Princeton University, emphasizing that de Klerk was serious about dismantling apartheid and recommending that Bush meet with de Klerk⁵⁶. In the cable, Cohen explained that de Klerk was prepared to provide private assurances to Bush, if they met in person, about his specific plans, which included lifting the state of emergency, releasing prominent political prisoners, including Mandela, and unbanning Black political organizations. Cohen concluded the cable arguing,

“It would be a shame to deal ourselves out of the game just when the situation in South Africa is beginning to develop some fluidity, I believe de Klerk’s visit would be worth the domestic risk”⁵⁷.

Upon reading Cohen’s cable, Baker appeared to agree with Cohen’s assessment. Baker wrote a note on the cable recommending the White House extend an invitation to de Klerk, based on the idea that de Klerk was prepared to give Bush private assurances he would end apartheid.

In his July cable, Cohen had not ignored the context of a powerful anti-apartheid movement at home, explicitly mentioning this context to offer de Klerk something that sounded like an ultimatum,

“I told de Klerk that he should be aware that his visit would be controversial and, if six months following the election, there was no visible progress on ending apartheid then there would be a negative backlash”⁵⁸.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ Telegram 214165/Tosec 100162 from the Department of State to Baker’s Delegation in Bandar Seri Begawan, July 7, 1989. Princeton University Library, Department of Special Collections, Public Policy Papers, James A. Baker III Papers, Series 12: The Politics of Diplomacy, Subseries 12B: Chapter Files, Box 184, Folder 5: Chapter 13-Baker Files, 1989-1995, pp. 1-2.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

But the case that Cohen made to Baker in this cable, the case that Baker ultimately agreed with, was that creating a framework for a productive relationship with South Africa was more important than appearing to take seriously the concerns of a Black-led anti-apartheid constituency at home.

As news leaked of a potential Bush-de Klerk meeting, the anti-apartheid movement began to mobilize. On June 29, Representative William Gray (D-PA), an ally of TransAfrica and the sponsor of the CAAA, drafted a letter urging Bush not to meet with de Klerk. TransAfrica and their supporters in Congress began lobbying for more signatures on the letter.

On July 18, 1989, shortly after Cohen had met with de Klerk, 12 members of Congress held a press conference presenting the letter, which by that date had over 100 signatures from their colleagues in Congress. The *Washington Post* reported that at the press conference the members of Congress said a Bush-de Klerk meeting “would be ‘precisely the wrong message’ to send now because it would hand him a diplomatic victory and help to legitimize National Party policies before any reforms were implemented”⁵⁹. Here members of Congress offer precisely the opposite view of Baker and Cohen – a diplomatic victory for de Klerk would not spur reform, but slow it down.

This made an impression on both Baker and Bush, as Baker recalled in his memoirs. Baker and Bush had a private conversation and decided against a Bush-de Klerk meeting and informed the South Africans that if de Klerk came, his visit would be with Baker and other State Department officials only⁶⁰.

The day after the press conference, July 19, de Klerk announced that not only would he not meet with Bush but he had canceled his meeting with Baker as well and would not come to the United States⁶¹.

In the fall of 1989, TransAfrica sent out a letter to its supporters encouraging them to continue to advocate for pressure on South Africa. At the conclusion of the letter, Robinson mentioned the canceled de Klerk visit as

⁵⁹ DAVID B. OTTAWAY, *Bush Urged Not To Meet S. African*, in “Washington Post”, July 19, 1989.

⁶⁰ BAKER, *op. cit.*, pp. 223-224.

⁶¹ WARREN STROBEL, *De Klerk Cancels visit to U.S.*, in “Washington Times”, July 20, 1989. A copy of this article was found in Baker’s papers. Princeton University Library, Department of Special Collections, Public Policy Papers, James A. Baker III Papers, Series 12: The Politics of Diplomacy, Subseries 12B: Chapter Files, Box 184, Folder 5: Chapter 13-Baker Files, 1989-1995.

evidence of TransAfrica's continued influence⁶². The canceled visit had indeed set a powerful precedent. Over the next four years, anti-apartheid activists in the United States continued to influence the Bush administration to hold off granting concessions to South Africa until more progress was made. TransAfrica successfully lobbied to cancel another planned visit by de Klerk scheduled for June 1990 and went on to influence other key aspects of policy toward South Africa, including the timing and mechanisms by which the Bush administration lifted sanctions in the summer of 1991.

The documents telling the story of the canceled de Klerk visit have been selected for inclusion in the first chapter of the forthcoming *Foreign Relations* volume on southern Africa, featuring some of the documents mentioned in this presentation and others that have yet to be declassified. The annotations I have written for these documents draw from the outside sources I have described today, public statements made by Robinson and other activists, press coverage of their activities, and background information from the archives of TransAfrica digitized by the African Activist Archive at Michigan State University.

In providing documentation on key policy decisions on South Africa after the summer of 1989 through the end of the Bush administration in 1993, the diplomatic documents themselves do not always acknowledge the powerful influence of the anti-apartheid movement. Some of the documents ignore the role of the anti-apartheid movement in making the case for policy decisions. In other parts of the documentary record, officials do reference individual activists, but in doing so make the case that the Bush administration did not need to consider their concerns. At times Black activists involved in South Africa issues felt this dismissiveness in interactions with government officials and perceived it as evidence of racism within the U.S. foreign policy establishment. In his memoirs, Robinson recalled how few Black people got a seat at the table in making decisions regarding foreign policy and criticized the overwhelmingly white foreign policy establishment for what he viewed as a lack of concern about how their decisions would affect Black people around the world. Changing this environment was one of the founding principles behind his organization, TransAfrica⁶³.

⁶² "Right now we have an unprecedented 'window of opportunity' to end Apartheid", Fall 1989. William Minter papers, Michigan State University Library Special Collections, <https://africanactivist.msu.edu/record/210-849-26743/>

⁶³ ROBINSON, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

I want to conclude with expanding on the two main takeaways editors of diplomatic documents can take from this case study on South Africa, which I referenced at the beginning of the talk.

1) Using annotations to further explain a domestic political context: As you all can see from the small sample of documents I shared here, policymakers on South Africa were acknowledging and contemplating the powerful domestic implications of their decisions within their own records. But in these documents they often speak in abstractions. In editing the documents, it is important that we fill in the details for readers about this domestic political context and who the key constituencies were. When these key constituencies include national minorities whose stories have been historically minimized in foreign relations histories, these notes are even more significant for readers.

2) Expanding our source base for research to include archives, memoirs, and oral histories of minority interest groups and their leadership. While our collections consist of diplomatic documents, we all conduct background research to inform our compilations. Adding records from non-governmental groups, such as the African Activist Archive, can help illuminate which foreign policy issues activists were most interested in and provide background on the campaigns they mobilized to try to influence policy. This information can provide critical context to foreign policy documents.

Using these methods in the forthcoming volume on South Africa not only fills in silences in the documentary record, but it also provides a more thorough, accurate, and reliable account of how foreign policy decisions were made.

SESSION 2

PRESENTATION OF THE JOINT EDITION ON «THE
DISSOLUTION OF THE USSR AS SEEN FROM WORLD
CAPITALS

Chair: Francesco Lefebvre D'Ovidio

Keynote speech
By Ambassador Umberto Vattani
The Dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Abstract: Presentation of the joint edition on «The Dissolution of the USSR as Seen from World Capitals.

Keywords: USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev, Boris Yeltsin, European Community, 1991 Soviet coup attempt, G7, NATO, Commonwealth of Independent States, Russian Federation

Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is a great honor and a privilege for me to address this very distinguished audience.

I am particularly grateful to Professor Francesco Lefebvre D'Ovidio for his kind invitation and for giving me the opportunity to meet all of you this morning. I am also greatly indebted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for having made it possible for us to meet here today.

The decision taken by Professor Lefebvre together with the organizers of the International Conference of Editors of Diplomatic Documents to publish this year a collection of documents on “the Dissolution of the USSR as Seen from the World Capitals” is truly commendable.

As Benedetto Croce once explained: “All history is contemporary history”, meaning by that that all serious study of the past has its origin in the concerns and the interests of today. This latest volume is so welcome because it may help understand what is going on in Russia today.

Besides, it enables us to live again, day after day, the dramatic events that we were watching, some thirty years ago on our television screens, captivated but deeply concerned as well. With one significant difference: the accounts before us add a new fascinating dimension to the images in our memory, thanks to the lucid analyses they contain.

Although it reproduces only a selection of the existing documentation in the archives, this collection clearly shows that the capitals of the 15 Western Countries were able not only to follow what was happening on the ground but were also fully informed of the plot and of the intentions of the protagonists of the dramatic events that ultimately led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

The volume begins in 1991 with the August putsch in Crimea, where President Mikhail Gorbachev had been vacationing with his family. Not only

the motives of the coup plotters, but the immediate consequences of the failed coup are carefully analyzed. They describe a rapidly evolving situation that will set in motion an irreversible process.

The mistakes made by President Gorbachev after his return to Moscow are not played down. They stem in large part from the contradictions of the policies he was pursuing, which relied on the more liberal elements of the Communist Party in order to push through reforms, while at the same time leaning on the more conservative forces to keep the Soviet Union alive.

Boris Yeltsin's victory over the coup perpetrators reshaped President Gorbachev's position and would strongly condition his next moves. As one diplomatic envoy put it: Yeltsin was the hero of the day and Gorbachev the martyr.

As a consequence of the Soviet leader's decline, all eyes were on the way the balance of power between the center and the Republics would develop.

The weakness of the center revived the nationalist ambitions of the Republics: they were keen to reassert their autonomy and, one after another, to proclaim their independence.

The diplomats in Moscow were well aware of the seriousness of the problems that could arise regarding borders and the explosive issue of Russian minorities in the Republics, notably in the Baltics and in Ukraine. At the same time, Republican leaders were concerned that Boris Yeltsin's powerful personality could eventually replace the existing relationship between the Soviet center and the Republics with a more binding one with the Russian center.

To add to these problems, the Soviet economic system, strictly controlled by the state and in the hands of a vast class of bureaucrats, was deteriorating at an increasing rate and struggling to curb inflation, which had remained at a level of 19% for the whole year of 1990 but had shot up to 170% in 1991 and was still rising.

In the various assessments, it appears clear that the dissolution of the Soviet Union showed both reassuring and worrying aspects. The Baltic Republics and Ukraine would realise the long-term goal of independence. The fate of other Republics was less clear. Moldova was hardly likely to continue on its own way and could well join Romania. Armenia and Georgia could proclaim their independence but historically the Transcaucasian area had been unstable either as independent states or as regions of the Russian empire. Central Asian Republics were highly dependent on Moscow and could have been drawn into the orbit of their neighboring countries, not all of which were friends of the West.

So far for the analysis.

In the face of the dramatic events that unfolded in those four months, the question is: what was the policy of the West? What initiatives were suggested by individual states? What action, what proposals were put forward by the Twelve of the European Community, by NATO and by the members of the G7?

At the time of the putsch, without hesitation the West had made a firm, prompt and uncompromising condemnation of the coup, and reaffirmed its support for Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin.

The timely reports from Moscow and the coordination which Western Powers held in those hectic hours certainly helped take the right decision. Faced with the immediate lockdown of the Russian Parliament, the call by President Yeltsin of a general strike and his appeal to the Russian people – who had for the first time elected their President – and the failure of the army to carry out the junta's orders, the authors of the coup surrendered after just three days.

In the aftermath, as events in Moscow took on a more rapid pace, the Twelve followed developments closely, but quite soon the orientation of the Western Countries was to let things slide, adopting a wait-and-see attitude, essentially a stance of non-interference. Of course, serious concerns were raised about the security of the nuclear arsenal in case of a foreseeable breakup of the Soviet Union. The question was whether these weapons were to remain under a unified command and whether the 3 Republics of Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, where nuclear warheads were stationed, would be denuclearized.

The worries expressed by the western leaders certainly helped raise the level of attention of the Kremlin.

As time went by and the difficulties for Gorbachev of holding the center together became more and more obvious, centrifugal forces led progressively the 15 Republics to reaffirm their self-determination.

The reports reveal that the West had a keen desire to establish relations with each of the Republics, especially with the Baltics and those closest to the West. The main concern seemed to be the timing of the recognition and the establishment of diplomatic ties.

As for the economic aid and assistance programs, reports from Moscow often suggested to discuss them directly with the individual Republics rather than through the Russian Center.

From mid-September 1991, Foreign Ministry documents show that discussions were underway for possible forms of closer relations, EC

association and NATO membership. As is stated in one of the documents, the alternative of remaining a closed club of 16 could potentially make NATO an anachronism relatively soon. The objective being to widen the area of regional security in Europe to avoid a “security vacuum”. Reference was made to calls from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary for closer links with western organizations.

A similar security concern was voiced with reference to the breakup of the Soviet Union: as the 15 Republics proceeded, each with its individual process, to proclaim their independence, foreseeable tensions and conflicts at the borders could well take place given the presence of conspicuous Russian minorities.

It was equally well understood that, once the center disappeared, the ex-Soviet republics would gravitate over time around neighboring countries towards the West, the East and the South. It was a firm conviction that the western part of the USSR should be drawn towards Europe.

However, no action was suggested: it was specifically stated by a British source that the West should not force greater cohesion than the republican leaders wished to accept. This policy line of no interference seemed widely shared.

In the meantime, the economic situation in the whole territory of the Soviet Union was deteriorating further, with increasing food shortages, roaring inflation and fears for the coming winter. The requests by President Gorbachev for economic and financial support became more and more pressing.

A month before the August putsch, the soviet leader had been invited to take part in the G7 Summit in London (15 and 17 July 1991). In order to let the Russian side know how the Sherpas were preparing the meeting with the Soviet leader, I had been asked by Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti to meet in Moscow with Gorbachev’s personal representative Yevgeny Primakov. It was an easy thing to brief him on how presumably the meeting would have unfolded, but I drew his attention to the questions the Seven would be asking. What was needed was a very convincing report on the reforms underway, avoiding all rhetorical statements. President Gorbachev should have stuck to illustrating the programs underway.

In London, on the 17th of July, to try and define a common line of action, Giulio Andreotti met with President François Mitterrand and Chancellor Helmut Kohl before the session scheduled with the Soviet leader.

In the plenary meeting, Gorbachev depicted with a poignant sense of urgency the economic and financial crisis of the Russian economy, underlining the difficulties and obstacles that such formidable transformation of the

economic system into a market economy entailed, and made a strong plea for a more substantial program of economic aid and technical assistance.

Three countries were determined to help, and said so. Taking the floor after Mitterrand and Kohl, Andreotti listed Gorbachev's significant contributions to the end of the Cold War and the German reunification, as well as the enormous difficulties encountered after centuries of feudalism and communism.

But President George Bush spelled out once more the U.S. point of view, saying that he was against any form of aid for the Soviet leader before he changed the Soviet system and restored it economically by reducing military spending and cutting off funding to Fidel Castro's regime. He believed that, by delaying support, the Soviets would be encouraged to be more serious about reforms. He added that a lifesaver should be thrown only when strictly necessary: if you can swim you should do so.

Great Britain and Japan also expected a more rapid and decisive course of reforms for the building of a democratic and pluralistic society oriented towards a market economy.

In short, while his presence among the representatives of the world's most industrialized countries had bolstered Gorbachev's image, the results of the meetings were meagre and disappointing. The distance between what he had expected and the actual results was clearly discernible.

After the meeting, the last person to see Gorbachev before his return to Moscow was Giulio Andreotti. The Soviet leader appeared tired and disillusioned. He was disappointed by the American and the British reactions because – according to him – they risked jeopardizing the climate of détente that was built in those years and could stir up an anti-Western wave in Soviet society.

He was right: a month later, on the 19th of August, there was the Putsch.

In September, Andreotti travelled to China, on the first visit by a western leader since the Tiananmen events. On his return, he decided to stop over in Moscow for a meeting with the Soviet leader.

It was the 23rd of September, and this was to be his last official meeting with the Kremlin leader. Gorbachev seemed less self-assured, and looked very concerned about the turn of events. Andreotti tried to hearten him, confirming the willingness of the European partners to keep their commitments to provide aid. Meetings were already scheduled in Brussels with the European Committee and in Rome with the President of the International Monetary Fund Michel Camdessus.

Finally, Andreotti told Gorbachev about the upcoming NATO summit to be held in Rome in November, which would approve a new strategic concept. The NATO Summit was convened as planned on the 7th and 8th of November, the Members took note of the profound political changes in East-West relations, which had considerably improved the security environment and on the second day they approved the new strategic concept.

As the Italian Prime Minister was bidding farewell to his colleagues, he received a phone call from Gorbachev, who was anxious to know the results of the summit. Andreotti tried his best to summarize them but this was not the best time. He reassured the Soviet leader and said that he would send his diplomatic adviser to Moscow to brief him. I left for Moscow two days later.

The Soviet Union was well ahead in the process of dissolution. The disappearance of this immense empire, which was taking place – to say it with T.S. Eliot – “Not with a bang but a whimper”, imploding upon itself, would pose innumerable problems, just like, after World War I, the dissolution of the Ottoman and the Habsburg Empires.

The main worry of the Italian Prime Minister was that the collapse of the Soviet Union would strikingly resemble the situation of 1919. The successor of the USSR – the Russian Federation – was to lose a large amount of its territory and, as a consequence, new significant Russian minorities would see the day. Besides, the former soviet army, transferred from the countries where they had been stationed, would feel the return home as a debacle. Finally, the economic system was in shambles, crippled by widespread corruption and hyperinflation. The critical situation about to emerge looked very similar to the situation in Germany after World War I, when harsh conditions were imposed on the defeated nations that eventually favoured the rise of totalitarian regime in Germany and Italy. They were about to repeat the same mistake once again.

The situation was rapidly evolving. The Presidents of the Russian Federation – Boris Yeltsin, of Ukraine – Leonid Kravchuk – and of Belarus – Stanislav Shushkevich – met in Minsk on the 7th and 8th of December, signed an agreement establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States and declared that the USSR “as a subject of International law and geopolitical reality no longer existed”.

At that precise moment the frontiers between the 15 Republics, which until then had been purely administrative lines of demarcation, became state borders, immutable on the basis of the Paris Charter of the New Europe.

Unrest and riots would soon follow in the 8 autonomous regions as well, but this issue did not seem to attract much attention. In 14 Republics, a

large number of soviet citizens of Russian nationality found themselves deprived of their citizenship and realised, to their horror, that they had been separated from their fatherland and now found themselves in a foreign country without having moved an inch.

The only difference between the situation in Germany after World War I and that of Russia was simply the size of the phenomenon: the Russian citizens in this predicament were more than 25 million!

Witnessing the dissolution of the Soviet empire, it was obvious to all the observers at the time that no other issue could have had a greater impact on the future stability of the continent and the world order.

Can it be said that, in the accounts coming from Moscow, great attention was devoted to the course of events likely to take place in the long-term?

There were undoubtedly references to the deterioration of the economy, to the potential conflicts between Republics, the perennial instability in the Caucasus Region and the problem of transforming a monstrous bureaucratic machine governed by an omnipresent Communist party.

The CSI – the Commonwealth of Independent States – was bound never to have a more active or significant political role, in view of the already clearly emerging independent line followed by Ukraine, than the Andean Pact; it was nothing more than a place for summit or assembly meetings.

No suggestions of policy emerged. The West seemed to be fascinated by what was happening, was obviously taking note – with a form of relief – of the disappearance of a former enemy that Reagan had labelled the “evil empire” and was about to reap the benefits of the end of 40 years of Cold War.

And yet, in other times in history, when – at the end of bitter and dramatic wars – the former enemies’ social and economic structures were in ruins and there was a risk they might adopt non-democratic forms of government, the U.S. had responded swiftly, without laying down conditions that would have been difficult to accept, and had proved to be magnanimous, extending a helping hand to former enemies.

As we all know, the aid generously given after the dramatic events of World War II created the conditions for a recovery of the countries of Western Europe, which would have been unthinkable without the help of the U.S., fostering the revival of a dialogue between all the parties who had fought each other brutally in the past. The tool they used to channel aid into a single center that would then distribute the resources in the light of jointly discussed and positively evaluated programs was the Marshall Plan. Some historians would refer to it today as an instance of “geo-economic policy”.

On this occasion, channeling aid through the Center as was done in 1947 for the Western European countries – rather than letting Russia and some less resource-rich Republics such as those in Central Asia drift away – would have helped maintain an egalitarian form of collaboration. This formula, not imposed by the central power but freely accepted by all recipients, could have fostered the success of structural reforms and created a market economy. After all, the Marshall Plan had been originally offered to the Soviet Union, which had rejected it. But the conditions were very different now.

This cooperative scheme, along the lines of the OECE, obviously far less ambitious than the one through which the European Community had been created, might have found support in society, might have improved the security environment and developed an interest in regional cooperation, mitigating centrifugal tendencies and tensions between the Republics.

An appeal to this effect had been made by the Italian Prime Minister Ciriaco De Mita during his visit to Moscow in October 1988, in his speech to the Academy of Sciences. He did not intend to mechanically reproduce the American example of 1947 but, referring to the problems of the convertibility of the rouble, the transformation of the command economy, the efficient use of resources, De Mita believed that the West could provide training and technical assistance programs in addition to financial aid and debt restructuring to help the transition. The goal being, as stressed in the Paris Charter for a new Europe a year before, to create a Common European House and to strengthen, in the 15 Republics, the democratic principles, the respect of Human rights and the rule of law.

An extraordinary opportunity had arisen for the West to facilitate, through a coordinated policy of aid to countries such as those in the Caucasus and Central Asia, a transition to democratic systems based on respect for fundamental freedoms and human rights.

Democracy was on the march everywhere in the world, and the influence of Western values could perhaps have been felt in all the Republics of the former Soviet Union. Only China, Vietnam, North Korea and Cuba remained anchored in communist ideology.

Of course, it is impossible to say what the final outcome would have been. But, as was said a year earlier in Paris, the Charter for a New Europe envisioned a space stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok. An image that clashed with Paul Valery's definition of Europe as a small promontory at the edge of the boundless continent of Asia. The idea at the basis of this was to use the Charter of Paris to reaffirm strongly, through the vast Russian territory, the universality of European values in the Asian continent.

But European countries lacked an adequate foreign policy instrument, which would have enabled them to maintain systematic relations with the Republics included in those two quadrants that could have aspired to belong to the European Common House as long as they remained connected in some way.

At the same time, beyond the ocean, in the USA, there remained an underlying attitude of complacency at the demise of the now historic strategic rival, as revealed in the conclusions of the volume of memoirs written in four hands by Brent Scowcroft with President George H. W. Bush.

Such an opportunity would never again present itself.

The Russian Federation was soon to become the successor of the Soviet Union and its President, following his rapid accumulation of power, was already meeting with distrust among the 14 Republics amid fears of a new Russian aspiration for dominance.

In the economy, the unbridled privatization of state assets, the introduction of an immediate price liberalization, an uncontrolled acceleration of internal reforms gave rise to the rapid transformation of a centralized planned system into an economy in the hands of a few ruthless and corrupt oligarchs.

Progressively, this also happened in the other Republics, where the new leaders were courted by world heads of state.

As for foreign policy, in a complete departure from the paradigm followed in 1990-91 during the Kuwait crisis, the temptation soon appeared in the West to proceed with military initiatives to solve international crises, such as in the Balkans, in Iraq and in Libya, regardless of the position of Moscow, circumventing its veto right in the Security Council.

This led, a few years later, to the formulation of the Primakov doctrine, based on the well-known three principles, according to which the Russian Federation would:

- no longer follow the foreign policy of the U.S. and its allies;
- would try and balance the West's overwhelming power through an alliance with China and India;
- and pursue – in its immediate neighborhood – more assertive policies.

Thereby confirming the prediction that Mikhail Gorbachev had made in Washington while speaking to some Members of Congress: "You cannot humiliate a country and think there will be no consequences".

In conclusion, allow me to recall the visit that Boris Yeltsin made to Rome on the 19th and 20th of December 1991, just a few days before the

dissolution of the Soviet Union on the 26th of December. This was the first official visit by the President of the Russian Federation in a foreign country.

In the meeting with the Russian leader at Palazzo Chigi, Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti praised him for the courage shown in facing the coup makers and repressing the putsch. He went on to say that western leaders had greatly appreciated the role played by Gorbachev in ending the Cold War, through – among other things – nuclear disarmament negotiations, the Charter of Paris, the attempt to create a common European house, the cooperation given in the UN Security Council during the first international crisis after the end of the Cold War, the invasion by Saddam Hussein of Kuwait. It was Gorbachev, he added, who had given the Russian people the democratic institutions and it was thanks to him that, for the first time, they had been allowed to vote for their own President and their Parliament. He assured him that the Italian Government would continue on the path already started of close cooperation with the Russian Federation and the other Republics, and that he would not let the promised aid go unfulfilled. Finally, he wanted the new Kremlin leader to know that he hoped Gorbachev would never find himself in difficulty, but could serenely continue his work in the Foundation he had established with the political aims of defending democracy and vigilant participation in the political process.

The impression these last words made on Yeltsin I have not forgotten. He expressed surprise and some emotion: “Of course, of course”, he hastened to say, “Do not worry” and, holding the Christian Democrat leader’s hand, he shook it firmly.

SESSION 3

THE COMPARATIVE HISTORY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENTS IN THE WORLD

Chair: Ilse Dorothee Pautsch and Sacha Zala

Carola Tischler

Historian, Editor of German-Soviet Relations 1933-1941
Institute for Contemporary History Munich – Berlin

**The People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the USSR (Narkomindel)
1917-1939: Structural Changes of the Soviet Foreign Policy Agency**

Abstract: This paper highlights the significance of Narkomindel, a near "black box" due to limited research. It examines three phases of its development under different external commissars: Georgy Chicherin (1918-1930), who prioritized repatriation and trade missions; Maksim Litvinov (1930-1939), who expanded diplomatic relations and professionalized Soviet diplomacy; and Vyacheslav Molotov (1939-1949, 1953-1956), who aligned Narkomindel with Stalin's policies. The study discusses structural transformations, including the abolition of traditional diplomatic ranks, the diversification of staff composition, and the establishment of the Diplomatic Academy. It also explores the impact of Stalin's purges on Narkomindel, leading to arrests, reorganization, and systemic shifts. Ultimately, the paper underscores the importance of analyzing historical context independently of present-day developments.

Keywords: Narkomindel (NKID), Georgy Chicherin, Maksim Litvinov, Vyacheslav Molotov, Diplomatic Academy, Stalin's terror, Soviet foreign policy

Why is it important to deal with the pre-war Soviet People's Commissariat for Foreign Relations? I would like to say that this Ministry is almost a black box, and that is of course disturbing for such a power as the Soviet Union was in the 20th century. There is really surprisingly little research on the Narkomindel (or NKID), which was the short version of the People's Commissariat. There are a few specialists within Russia; the Foreign Ministry itself mainly publishes representative institutional histories⁶⁴. In Western research there are actually only a few who deal with this Ministry⁶⁵. Why is

⁶⁴ For example: *Rossiiskaia diplomatia: Istorii i sovremennost'*, Moskva, Rosspen, 2001; *Ocherki istorii Ministerstva inostrannykh del Rossii*, 3 vols., Moskva, Olma-Press, 2002; *Izvestnye diplomaty Rossii: Ministry inostrannykh del – XX vek*, Moskva, Moskovskie uchebniki, 2007; *Istoriia Diplomatii Rossii*, Vol. II: 1917-2017, Moskva, Aspekt Press, 2018.

⁶⁵ I am not familiar with research in the Far Eastern and Southern States. I will not list the older literature before 1989. You can find it at: LUDMILA THOMAS, VIKTOR KNOLL (Eds.), *Zwischen Tradition und Revolution. Determinanten und Strukturen sowjetischer*

that? One reason is that access to the archive is difficult. It is not closed, and foreign researchers can also work there. However, you need a lot of time and patience to be satisfied with the files that are made available to you. It is not possible to research finding aids on your own. Secondly, especially with regard to the pre-war years, only a few diplomats had the opportunity to write a diary or their memoirs⁶⁶. Many did not survive the terror of the 1930s, and those who survived it generally had no ambition to publish diaries or memoirs. Last but not least, I would also like to do a little advertising for the edition that a Russian colleague and I have been working on for many years. The third volume of the edition on German-Soviet relations was published in 2023 and we are working on the fourth and final volume. In addition to the actual subject of bilateral relations, this edition also contains many details about the structure and functioning of the Narkomindel⁶⁷. However, these details will not be the subject of this essay. Instead, I would like to summarize the basic characteristics of the Ministry's first 25 years.

The Soviet Union after 1945 was different from the years before the Second World War. I have therefore limited myself to the period when the Ministry was still called the People's Commissariat. There are three different phases of development, and they are linked to the respective external commissars of this period. The first People's Commissar to hold office since the October Revolution, Leon Trotsky, was only in office for five months (from October 1917 to February 1918), so it is not worth dealing with him here. As Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Trotsky is famous for his statement: "I will issue a few more proclamations to the peoples of the world and then shut up the shop". What he himself added to these words is rarely quoted: "Of course, I deliberately exaggerated my position in order to emphasize that the focus is

Außenpolitik 1917-1941, Stuttgart, Franz Steiner Verlag, 2000. Then appeared: SABINE DULLIN, *Des Hommes d'influence: les ambassadeurs de Staline en Europe, 1930-1939*, Paris, Payot, 2001; ALASTAIR KOCHO-WILLIAMS, *Russian and Soviet Diplomacy 1900-1939*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012; KAROLA TISHLER, *Za kulisami Narkomindela (seredina 1930-kh godov)*, in "Slavianskii mir v tret'em tysiacheletii", 15/1-2 (2020), pp. 59-72.

⁶⁶ There are no monographic memoirs, only various scattered essays on specific experiences of Soviet diplomats. One exception: *The Maisky Diaries. Red Ambassador to the Court of St. James's 1932-1943*, New Haven-London, Yale University Press, 2015 (first published in Russian 2009, in German 2016).

⁶⁷ The editors' introductions also list the most important new publications not only on German-Soviet relations, but also on the Narkomindel itself: *Deutschland und die Sowjetunion 1933 bis 1941. Dokumente aus russischen und deutschen Archiven*, ed. by SERGEI SLUCH, CAROLA TISHLER, Vol. 1: *1933 bis 1934*, München, Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 2014; Vol. 2: *Januar 1935 bis April 1937*, Berlin, De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2019; Vol. 3: *April 1937 bis August 1939*, Berlin, Boston, De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2023.

not on diplomacy”⁶⁸. The problem or opportunity for the Bolsheviks at the beginning was that most of the diplomats from the tsarist era or the time of the Provisional Government resigned of their own accord. Only about a dozen employees of the central office and a few foreign diplomats joined the new rulers⁶⁹. As a result, duplicate structures existed in the first few years. As the other States did not recognize the new power, they continued to maintain contact with the Tsarist diplomats and recognized them as Russia's legitimate representatives.

Trotsky's successor was Georgy Chicherin and we will begin with him.

The term of office of Georgy Chicherin (1918 to 1930)

As already mentioned, Chicherin's term of office began at a time when international recognition of the new Bolshevik Government was still pending and diplomatic relations had been reduced to a minimum. In the early years after the October Revolution, the Narkomindel was barely at capacity. Only at the beginning of 1919, the last diplomat accredited in tsarist times, the representative of Switzerland, Édouard Odier, left the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR). In these early years, diplomatic relations existed only with Afghanistan, which was one of the first countries to recognize the Soviet Government in 1919. Diplomatic relations with Persia and Turkey were added in 1920/21. A large part of the Narkomindel's work during this phase consisted of coordinating the repatriation and care of prisoners of war and organizing trade missions. In the first years after the revolution, diplomacy was also seen as a means of supporting the global revolution. However, as early as 1921/23, a distancing from the Communist International (Comintern) began. This marked a transition even at this early stage from revolutionary foreign policy to a more pragmatic and stable diplomatic strategy. Nevertheless, the proclamation of a new diplomacy was in line with post-war developments as a whole and the calls for an end to secret diplomacy. The Soviet Union saw itself as a pioneer of transparent and fair international politics. Between 1921 and 1924, the Soviet Union succeeded in establishing formal diplomatic recognition and trade relations with many major powers – with the exception of the USA. Particularly noteworthy is the

⁶⁸ LEO TROTZKI, *Mein Leben. Versuch einer Autobiografie*, Berlin, Dietz, 1990 (first published in 1929), p. 306.

⁶⁹ For example: *Desjat' let sovetskoj diplomatii. Akty i dokumenty*, Moskva, Izd. Litizdata Narkomindela, 1927. G. TAKHNENKO, *Diplomaticheskaja sluzhba. Ot posol'skogo prikaza do MID RF*, in “*Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizn*”, 3 (1993), pp. 121-131.

close cooperation with Germany, which began in 1922 with the Treaty of Rapallo. This treaty laid the foundations for close economic and military cooperation between the two countries, which were in a similar state of international isolation.

One notable change was the abolition of traditional diplomatic ranks and designations, which underscored the new, revolutionary nature of Soviet diplomacy. In addition to the foreign diplomats and the headquarters moved from Petrograd to Moscow, special representatives of the Narkomindel were deployed in Soviet port cities and cities with large colonies of foreigners to act as contacts for foreigners there. Another special feature of the Narkomindel was the composition of its staff. While many of them were former Bolshevik exiles who were quickly appointed as diplomats, numerous employees also came from other political parties and – as in the rest of the world – from the upper classes. This diversity was reflected in the large number of professions: the staff included doctors, lawyers, engineers and humanities scholars. However, women were underrepresented, which was also completely in line with other countries, with only 4% of middle and senior positions held by women. The Narkomindel was less heavily involved in the factional struggles of the 1920s than other Soviet institutions and was not considered a stronghold of opposition. To put it simply, the factional struggles revolved around Stalin's position on building socialism in one country and Trotsky's on the world revolution. In this respect, the influence that Trotsky had left behind as head of the agency was quite small. However, the foreign policy of the Soviet Union was not determined in the Narkomindel by the People's Commissar alone. A wider body called collegium discussed and decided on important diplomatic matters.

Typical of the social profile of the Soviet Narkomindel of the 1920s was the People's Commissar himself, who came from the Russian minor nobility, whose father had already worked in the Tsarist Foreign Ministry. Chicherin himself was initially a Social Revolutionary before joining the Bolsheviks in exile⁷⁰. When the party subjected the Commissariat to a major cadre analysis in preparation for the XVI Party Congress (summer 1930), it identified many shortcomings from the point of view of the ruling party. Of the just over 1.000 posts in 1930, a total of 56,7% were party members. The proportion of diplomats working abroad was higher (71,1%). However, around 15 percent of

⁷⁰ See LUDMILA THOMAS, *Georgi Tschitscherin. "Ich hatte die Revolution und Mozart"*, Berlin, Dietz, 2012.

party members (as of November 1929) had previously belonged to other parties. A total of 15,6% of cadres (as of March 1930) came from the working class. In absolute figures, however, there were 51 aristocrats, 309 commoners and 2 from the clerics. 21% of the total workforce had completed higher education. Kinship relationships were also examined and a number of ties were identified. The number of family relationships decreased from 1928 (15,1%) to 1930 (8,8%). This phenomenon was described as protectionism and combated. It was also criticized that no special attention was paid to the training of diplomats by the Narkomindel leadership. As a result, it was noted: "The errors in the cadre area not only make the regular activities of the People's Commissariat considerably more difficult, but also impair the correct implementation of Party directives in the field of international politics if the current cadre situation in the NKID is maintained"⁷¹. The aim of the work, which was already carried out during Litvinov's term of office, was, among other tasks, to take greater account of the working class in the selection of cadres, to provide centralized training and to separate employees who were considered unreliable (aristocrats, foreigners, former members of other parties).

The term of office of Maksim Litvinov (1930-1939)

Maksim Litvinov took office as People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs in 1930 at a time when the Soviet Union was striving to expand and consolidate its diplomatic relations. Under his leadership, the Soviet Union succeeded in gaining recognition from several States, including the USA in 1933, which represented a significant diplomatic success. A decisive step in the professionalization of Soviet diplomacy was the founding of the Institute for the Preparation of Diplomatic and Consular Staff at the NKID in autumn 1934⁷². In 1939, this institute was given the name Diplomatic College (since 1974 Diplomatic Academy). This training center was created to systematically train a new generation of diplomats and prepare them for their tasks. This meant that a point that had been criticized in 1930 had been satisfactorily resolved, at least in the eyes of the party.

⁷¹ *Das Narkomindel im Urteil der Partei. Eine Kaderanalyse aus dem Jahre 1930*, Ed. by VIKTOR KNOLL, LOTHAR KÖLM in "Berliner Jahrbuch für osteuropäische Geschichte", 2 (1995), pp. 267-314: 312.

⁷² CAROLA TISCHLER, *Die Hohen Schulen der Diplomatie. Die Anfänge der Diplomatenausbildung in der Sowjetunion*, in: LUDMILA THOMAS, VIKTOR KNOLL (Eds.), *Zwischen Tradition und Revolution. Determinanten und Strukturen sowjetischer Außenpolitik 1917-1941*, Stuttgart, Franz Steiner Verlag, 2000, pp. 205-223.

With the rise of fascism in Europe, especially after Hitler came to power, Litvinov was considered an advocate of the concept of collective security, which he represented eloquently on the international stage. He was considered a gifted orator who was able to present his arguments convincingly and defend Soviet positions powerfully. However, Litvinov's time in office was also marked by the horrors of Stalin's terror. The first wave of arrests began in the Narkomindel in May 1937. Nikolay Krestinsky and Lev Karakhan, two former deputy field commissars, were among the victims of the first wave. Also in May, David Shtern, the long-standing head of the 2nd Western Department responsible for Central Europe and the Balkans, and Vladimir Tsukerman, the head of the 1st Eastern Department responsible for the Near and Middle East, were arrested. The heads of the Legal Department, the 1st Western Department, the 3rd Western Department and the deputy head of the Press Department also disappeared. In the period between October 1937 and February 1938, 14 representatives of the USSR were recalled from the States in which they were accredited. None of these returnees survived. They were representatives from Afghanistan, China, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Romania, the Tuvan People's Republic, Turkey and Hungary. Almost two thirds of the representatives and the upper echelons of the Narkomindel headquarters were repressed. These repressions mainly affected the old revolutionary intelligentsia, which was replaced by new cadres, some of whom came from the ranks of the NKVD, the Commissariat of Internal Affairs. These changes led to a drastic restructuring within the Commissariat and to a climate of fear and insecurity. Unfortunately, a precise cadre analysis from this period of terror, as we have for 1930, is not yet available.

The term of office of Vyacheslav Molotov (1939-1949, 1953-1956)

When Vyacheslav Molotov took over the leadership of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in May 1939, he was faced with new challenges. On the one hand, he tried to weaken the influence of the NKVD again; on the other hand, there was a new wave of purges. The arrests and dismissals that hit the Narkomindel from the summer of 1939 led to many more long-serving, experienced diplomats from many Soviet nationalities having to leave the service. The new diplomats were mainly so-called Great Russians. Thanks to the political purges, a new loyal caste of civil servants emerged under Molotov, who subordinated themselves more closely to the party line. The new diplomats were well trained in the now established system

of the Diplomatic Academy, often by survivors of the old school such as Litvinov, Ivan Maisky, Aleksandr Rotshtein and Boris Shtein⁷³. Foreign policy was now determined to a much greater extent by the party. Stalin had consolidated his domestic position and turned his attention much more to foreign policy⁷⁴. With the establishment of his confidant Molotov as Foreign Commissar and his reorientation towards Germany, as well as the strong position assumed by the new Foreign Trade Commissar Mikoyan, three Politburo members were thus involved in foreign policy. In addition, the fourth Politburo member was the Leningrad party leader Zhdanov, who made several public appearances with articles on foreign policy principles. The loss of importance of the Narkomindel can also be seen in Molotov's three deputies, all of whom came from other areas: Andrey Vyshinsky as the USSR's highest prosecutor and former chief prosecutor of the show trials, Vladimir Dekanozov came from the Commissariat of Internal Affairs and Solomon Lozovsky from the party's trade union work.

Once again, the question of why this topic is so important: In view of current developments, we have a tendency to reinterpret the past through the lens of the present. But the past cannot be explained through the present, but through the past anterior. For what we can learn from the Narkomindel in the 1930s is that it took almost ten years, from 1930 to 1939, before the desired alignment of the Narkomindel with the dictator Stalin was achieved: by means of young, non-independent, party-bound diplomatic cadres who were loyally dependent on the new proletarian state. Throughout the thirties, the Narkomindel retained a certain independence in foreign policy matters. The West did not see this. For Great Britain in particular, Litvinov's policy was a purely communist one that had to be fought. The danger posed by the USSR appeared to be much greater than that posed by Germany. As a result, there was a failure to fight National Socialism together. What could this tell us for today? An undifferentiated policy towards all Russian politicians only welds them together and prevents the internal development of oppositions or alternatives.

⁷³ It was not until 1944 that MGIMO, the Higher Diplomatic School was founded.

⁷⁴ There are very few Stalin biographies that deal with Stalin's foreign policy. One exception is STEPHEN KOTKIN, *Stalin. Waiting for Hitler 1928-1941*, London-New York, Penguin Press, 2017.

Francesco Lefebvre D'Ovidio

President of the Scientific Committee
for the Publication of Italian Diplomatic Documents

The History of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Abstract: The paper provides a comprehensive overview of the evolution of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, tracing its origins and development from the 18th century to Republican Italy. It begins with a comparative history of the development of diplomatic services and foreign offices in Europe from 1700 to the present, highlighting the birth of modern diplomacy during the Renaissance and the establishment of permanent embassies in Italy. The document then details the formation of centralized offices for foreign affairs in various European states, including France, Spain, Sweden, Russia, Austria, Prussia, Denmark, and the Netherlands. The focus shifts to the establishment of the Foreign Office in the Duchy of Savoy, following the Treaty of Utrecht, and the subsequent reforms by Duke Vittorio Amedeo II. The document concludes by discussing the continuity of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the Office of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Sardinia, emphasizing the extension of the Savoy state's institutional system to the unified Kingdom of Italy in 1861.

Keywords: Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Services, Foreign Offices, Renaissance, Permanent Embassies, Centralized Offices, European States, Treaty of Utrecht, Duke Vittorio Amedeo II, Kingdom of Sardinia, Unified Kingdom of Italy, 1861 Savoy State, Cavour, Republican Italy

The following brief description is intended to offer an outline of the gradual formation of centralised bureaucratic organisations for the specific management of foreign policy, which took place – broadly speaking – in most European states in the course of the 18th century, with a specific reference to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

1. Preliminary remarks for a comparative history of the development of a Diplomatic Service and Foreign Office in Europe from 1700 to the present

Diplomacy, in the sense in which we use this word today, was born during the period of the Renaissance: Garrett Mattingly, at the beginning of

his well-known book on *Renaissance Diplomacy*, wrote that “The diplomacy of this period assumed its characteristic form between 1420 and 1530 in a time which we all call the Renaissance, however, we may differ about the limits of the term. Resident embassies, the distinguishing feature, were an Italian invention. They were fully developed in Italy by the 1450s and spread thence, like other Renaissance innovations, to the rest of Europe around 1500. And like other Renaissance innovations, they continued to develop along the lines laid down throughout the period, which ended in 1914, so that their first stage may also properly be called the beginning of modern diplomacy. The new Italian institution of permanent diplomacy was drawn into the service of the rising nation-states, and served, like the standing army of which it was the counterpart, at once to nourish their growth and to foster their idolatry. It still serves them and must go on doing so as long as nation-states survive”⁷⁵. “Diplomacy in the modern style, permanent diplomacy, was one of the creations of the Italian Renaissance. It began in the same period that saw the beginnings of the new Italian style of classical scholarship and in the same areas, Tuscany and the valley of the Po”⁷⁶.

The very first resident ambassadors were probably those appointed by the Gonzagas of Mantova in the first half of the 14th century⁷⁷. The first diplomatic resident agent of whom we have some information served Luigi I Gonzaga (elected on 28 August 1328 “Captain of the People of Mantua”), at the Imperial Court of Louis the Bavarian since 1341⁷⁸. Between 1375 and 1379 Ludovico Gonzaga of Mantua and Bernabò Visconti of Milan exchanged resident ambassadors at each other’s court. The consuls of the Republic of Venice may be deemed to be the precursors of resident ambassadors⁷⁹. As early as 1350 Nicolò Pisani was *Bailo* at the Sublime Ottoman Port, and in 1413, Francesco Foscarini was appointed as ambassador for Venice to the Holy

⁷⁵ GARETT MATTINGLY, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, London, Jonathan Cape, 1955, p. 13; M. S. ANDERSON, *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy 1450-1919*, London, Longman, 1993 (2^a ed. Routledge, 2013), pp. 2-11; DONALD QUELLER, *The Office of Ambassador in the Middle Ages*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1967.

⁷⁶ MATTINGLY, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, cit., p. 55.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 71; ROMOLO QUAZZA, *La diplomazia gonzaghesca*, Milano, ISPI, 1942, pp. 9-10, who dates an early example of a quasi-permanent embassy as early as 1341. See also ANTONIO IVAN PINI, *Dal Comune città-stato al Comune ente amministrativo*, in OVIDIO CAPITANI, RAOUL MANSELLI, GIOVANNI CHERUBINI, ANTONIO IVAN PINI, GIORGIO CHITTOLINI, *Comuni e Signorie: istituzioni, società e lotte per l'egemonia*, Torino, UTET, 1981, pp. 556-562 (“Storia d’Italia” diretta da Giuseppe Galasso, Vol. IV). Also, QUELLER, *The Office of Ambassador* cit., pp. 76-80.

⁷⁸ MATTINGLY, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, cit., p. 71.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, cit., p. 68.

See; in September 1431, Geronimo Cantareno was appointed as Venetian ambassador to Rome⁸⁰. However, proper resident ambassadors for the Republic are generally considered to begin in 1443 and, more consistently, after the Peace of Lodi in 1454⁸¹: by the 1470s, the network of Venetian ambassadors covered Italy and many capitals in Europe⁸². The Holy See had resident ambassadors (“*nuncio*”) since 1430⁸³. The practice of permanent ambassadors was so well-established at the end of the 15th century that in 1492, the King of Naples donated Palace Sanseverino to the Venetian Republic as the seat for its ambassadors. In the Republic of Genoa, the diplomatic system was organised in 1528, following the constitutional reform enacted by Andrea Doria. In Milan, Francesco Sforza, from 1450 appointed Antonio da Trezo as his ambassador in Ferrara and established a permanent embassy in 1466 when he appointed his trusted assistant Nicodemo da Pontremoli as his permanent representative in Florence, where the latter remained for the subsequent 20 years, after an initial phase, with the title of ambassador. From 1455, permanent diplomatic representatives were established between Milan and Naples, Milan and Venice, Venice and Naples. After the peace of Lodi, permanent embassies gradually became a normal practice in Italy⁸⁴, they were adopted systematically from 1460 and spread throughout Europe in the second half of the fifteenth century⁸⁵.

Permanent embassies were established in England in 1479, with the appointment of John Sherwood as permanent ambassador in Rome and, then, in 1505 with that of John Stile as ambassador in Spain⁸⁶. In France, permanent ambassadors were appointed between 1509 and 1522 with the permanent French embassies in Vienna, Florence, Valladolid, London, and

⁸⁰ QUELLER, *The Office of Ambassador*, cit., p. 78.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 82-83.

⁸² See TESSA BEVERLEY, *Venetian Ambassadors 1454-94: An Italian Elite* (unpublished doctoral dissertation), University of Warwick, Department of History, 1999, pp. 189-216 and 377-393.

⁸³ PAOLO BREZZI, *La diplomazia pontificia*, Milano, ISPI, 1942.

⁸⁴ PAOLO PRODI, *Diplomazia del Cinquecento. Istituzioni e prassi*, Bologna, Patron, 1963, pp. 48-55. On precedents of formal resident ambassadors since 1436, see MATTINGLY, *Renaissance diplomacy*, cit., pp. 67-70.

⁸⁵ MATTINGLY, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, cit., pp. 64-82.

⁸⁶ The full list of English diplomatic permanent representatives dates from 1509: GARY M. BELL, *A Handlist of British Diplomatic Representatives, 1509-1688*, London, Royal Historical Society, 1990; D. B. HORN, *British Diplomatic Representatives 1689-1789*, London, Royal Historical Society, 1932 (Camden Third Series, Vol. XLVI); S. T. BINDOFF, E. F. MALCOLM SMITH and C. K. WEBSTER, *British Diplomatic Representatives, 1789-1852*, London, Royal Historical Society, 1934 (Camden Third Series Vol. L).

Venice⁸⁷. In Sweden, permanent resident ambassadors were instituted as late as at the beginning of the 17th Century, beginning with the appointment by Gustav-Adolphus of Jacob van Dyk as resident ambassador at the Hague in December 1616⁸⁸.

2. The institution of a permanent centralised office for the conduct of foreign affairs in European states

The establishment of permanent embassies created a “diplomatic service”, but not a centralised office, entrusted with the task of proposing to the king decisions on foreign policy, preparing instructions to the ambassadors, and keeping of archives. Between the mid-15th century and the beginning of the 18th, foreign policy decisions were taken directly by the king, assisted by his advisors, his Privy Council, his Secretaries of State, etc., but there was not one single Secretary of State, specifically appointed for foreign affairs. In several cases, as in France and England, there were two Secretaries of State, between whom the responsibility for foreign policy was shared, according to geographical areas (countries), and who also had responsibilities in domestic affairs. The birth of ministries (or generally governmental departments) for foreign affairs dates from the period of the formation of the absolute monarchy, the forerunner of the modern state.

The appointment of one single *Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs*, entrusted by the king with the task of directing foreign policy and instructing the ambassadors, took place mainly in the years preceding or following the peace conference of Utrecht (between April 1713 and February 1715), except for France, where it took place earlier (for the first time in 1589)⁸⁹, and

⁸⁷ A. OUTREY, *Histoire et principes de l'administration française des Affaires Étrangères*, in “Revue française de science politique”, III/2 (1953), pp. 298-318; ANDERSON, *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy*, cit., pp. 6-7.

⁸⁸ SVEN TUNBERG, CARL-FREDRIK PALMSTIerna, ARNE MUNTHE, ARNE FORSELL, TORSTEN GIHL and NILS G. WOLLIN, *Histoire de L'Administration des affaires étrangères de Suède*, Upsal, Almquist & Wiksell, 1940, pp. 73-80.

⁸⁹ J. BAILLOU (Ed.), *Les affaires étrangères et le corps diplomatique français*, Vol. I: *De l'Ancien régime au Second Empire*, Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1984, pp. 53-56; M. HAEHL, *Les affaires étrangères au temps de Richelieu. Le secrétariat d'État, les agents diplomatiques (1624-1642)*, Paris, Direction des Archives Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Peter Lang, 2006, pp. 29-30 (Collection “Diplomatie et Histoire”); C. G. PICAVET, *La Diplomatie Française au temps de Louis XIV (1661-1715). Institutions, Moeurs et Coutumes*, Librairie Félix Alcan, 1930. On the reform of the state in France, see B. BARBICHE, *Les institutions de la monarchie française à l'époque moderne*, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 2001, R. MOUSNIER, *Les Institutions de la France sous la Monarchie absolue*, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1974-1980 and P. LEGENDRE,

England, where it took place later (in 1782). The first Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in France dates back to Henry III, with the appointment, on 1 January 1589, of Louis de Revol as Secretary of State designated for the correspondence with Italy, Piedmont and Savoy, Spain, Flanders, France-County, the Levant, Poland, Sweden, Denmark, England, Scotland and Switzerland⁹⁰. Under the reign of Louis XIII, three successive regulations were signed on the attributions of the Secretaries of State: the first one on 21 June 1617, the second one on 29 April 1619, and the third and final one on 11 March 1626. The latter, entitled “*Règlement entre les Secrétaires d’Etat*”, was issued two years after the accession of Cardinal Richelieu to the office of Prime Minister of Louis XIII, as a part of his reform of the state according to the principles of the absolute monarchy; it stated that the King had judged “qu’il est à propos et très expédient pour le bien de ses affaires que le Provinces étrangères soient toutes entre le mains d’un seul de ses secrétaires d’Etat pour en faire les despatches et expéditions qui leur seront demandées” and established four secrétaires d’Etat, of which Raymond Phélypeaux d’Herbault was appointed as Secretary of State for foreign affairs as well as for those within the Kingdom of the Languedoc, Guyenne, Brouage, Aulnis, la Rochelle and general affairs of the Huguenots. Therefore, while d’Herbault was the sole “*secrétaire d’Etat des étrangers*”⁹¹, he was not only responsible for foreign policy but also certain sections of internal affairs.

From the time of the establishment in France of the post of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (1589-1626), an embryonic organisation of the office was also established, with one *commis* and six *clercs* for each secretary of state. Gradually, the *commis* took on the name of “*premiers commis*”, then, from 1659, a second *premier commis* was appointed, and from 1661, a third one. At the beginning of the 18th century, the organisation became more complex, with two or three *premiers commis* placed to direct as many political offices, each

Histoire de l’administration de 1750 à nos jours, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1968. On the institution of permanent embassies and on diplomatic law during the Renaissance, see particularly the classic study by M. DE MAULDE-LA-CLAVIÈRE, *La diplomatie au temps de Machiavel*, Vols. I-III, Paris, Ernest Leroux Ed., 1892-1893. See also MATTINGLY, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, cit. and ANDERSON, *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy*, cit.

⁹⁰ BAILLOU, *Les affaires étrangères*, cit., Vol. I, pp. 56-57; OUTREY, *Histoire et principes*, cit., p. 303; HAEHL, *Les affaires étrangères au temps de Richelieu*, cit., pp. 3-7.

⁹¹ BAILLOU, *Les affaires étrangères*, cit., Vol. I, pp. 58-60; OUTREY, *Histoire et principes*, cit., p. 305; the “Règlement” of 11 March 1626 is published by PIERRE GRILLON, *Les papiers de Richelieu. Section politique intérieure, correspondance et papiers d’État*, Vol. I (1624-1626), Paris, Pedone, 1975, pp. 300-301.

with a variable number of *clerics*, from 3 to 6⁹². The division of the offices was essentially geographical, but a functional division soon began to emerge, with the establishment of specialised offices such as the archives (from the date of the appointment of a first custodian in 1712), the cipher (from 1749) and the administrative office, which was also responsible for passports, surveillance of foreigners, etc. (the “*bureau des fonds*”, founded in about 1765)⁹³. Thus, between 1626 and the first half of the 18th century, the structure of the Secretariat of State for Foreign Affairs in France had taken on the features of a body effectively similar to a modern Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The model set out in France with the appointment of a Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was followed in the Kingdom of Spain⁹⁴. During the 16th and 17th centuries, the government of the Spanish monarchy was based on the “*polisinodal*” system, articulated in a central administration formed by several multipersonal organisations, i.e., the *Consejos*, which had essentially a consultative function as well as a legislative one⁹⁵. A first, important evolution of this system took place in 1621, when Philip IV introduced a new position, that of the *Secretario del Despacho Universal*. After the accession in 1700 to the throne of Philip V, Duke of Anjou and grandson of the King of France, Louis XIV, a new wave of reforms, under the French influence and based on the French model, was introduced at the Spanish Court. A first reform was promoted by the French Ambassador, Michel-Jean Amelot, Marquis de Gournay, with the *Real Decreto* of 11 July 1705, which divided the *Secretaria del Despacho Universal* into two separate secretariats: one for *Guerra y Hacienda*, to which Joseph de Grimaldo was appointed, and the other for external relations, ecclesiastical and justice matters, to which the Marqués de Mejorada was appointed⁹⁶. A further and more thorough reform of the administrative system was introduced following the departure of the Marquis D'Amelot from Spain and the appointment of Marquis Jean Orry. The *Real Decreto* of 30 November 1714 established four *Secretarías del Despacho*

⁹² BAILLOU, *Les affaires étrangères* cit., Vol. I, pp. 96-106; OUTREY, *Histoire et principes*, cit., p. 312.

⁹³ BAILLOU, *Les affaires étrangères*, cit., Vol. I, pp. 106-140; OUTREY, *Histoire et principes*, cit., p. 313.

⁹⁴ JOSE ANTONIO ESCUDERO, *Los secretarios de estado y del despacho (1474-1724)*, I (segunda edición), Madrid, Instituto de Estudios Administrativos, 1976, pp. 298-316; BEATRIZ BADORREY MARTIN, *Los orígenes del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores (1714-1808)*, Madrid, Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, 1999.

⁹⁵ MARTIN, *Los orígenes*, cit., p. 25. JOSÉ MARTÍNEZ MILLÁN and CARLOS J. DE CARLOS MORALES, *Felipe II (1527-1598). La configuración de la monarquía hispana*, [Salamanca], Junta de Castilla y León, 1998, pp. 225-246.

⁹⁶ MARTIN, *Los orígenes*, cit., p. 27.

(Estado, Justicia, Guerra y Marina and Indias); according to the decree, the *Segreteria de Estado* “Ha da tener la correspondencia con las Cortes Estrangeras, embajadores del Rey, embaciados, residentes, o sus Secretarios”; Don José Grimaldo was appointed as new Secretario de Estado⁹⁷.

In Sweden, the organisation of the state was based on the collegial model⁹⁸. Since the 1651 and 1654 reforms, foreign relations were distributed among various secretaries of state, as it was customary at that time in the administrative model of other kingdoms⁹⁹. Following the accession of Gustav II Adolph, the Royal Chancellery was gradually transformed between 1618 and 1626, when the “collegial” system was formally adopted. However, a collegial governance of the *Kanslikollegium* was effectively introduced only with the reform (*Kansliordningen*) of 1661. The chancellery college (*Kanslikollegium*) was geographically divided into three sections: the Finnish, Estonian, Livonian and Ingrian expedition, the German expedition and the Scanian expedition. With Charles XI and Charles XII and the introduction of absolutism, the chancellery was further transformed along functional lines: according to the reform (*kansliordning*) of 1713 six sections or expeditions were established, one *revisionsexpedition* headed by a supreme *ombudsman*, charged with legal affairs, three for internal affairs, and two for foreign affairs, i.e. the first expedition and the German expedition, each headed by an *ombudsråd*¹⁰⁰. Following King Charles XII’s death, the constitutional reforms of 1719 and 1720 reorganised the state in order to reduce the power of the king (beginning the “era of freedom” (*frihetstiden*). Article 22 of the 1720 constitution defined colleges, “qui comme les bras du corps humain s’étendent et embrassent tout ce qui se doit faire et ordonner dans le Royaume”; the fourth *collegium* was the chancellery of the kingdom (*riksens cancellie*) “which is always presided over by one of the Senators, whose Assessors are a Senator, a Chancellor of the Court, three Secretaries of State and four Councillors of Chancery. It is in this College that all the Edicts, ordinances and decrees which concern the Kingdom in general, and the particular privileges of certain towns and persons, their

⁹⁷ CATHERINE DÉSOS, *Les Français de Philippe V. Un modèle nouveau pour gouverner l’Espagne (1700-1724)*, Strasbourg, Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg, 2009, pp. 175-221; MARTIN, *Los orígenes*, cit., pp. 30-35; ANNE DUBET, *Jean Orry et la réforme du gouvernement de l’Espagne (1701-1706)*, Presses Universitaires Blaise Pascal, 2009.

⁹⁸ R.M. HATTON, *Charles XII of Sweden*, New York, Weybright and Talley, 1968, pp. 337-349; TUNBERG *et al.*, *Histoire de L’Administration*, cit., pp. 200-234.

⁹⁹ See TUNBERG *et al.*, *Histoire de L’Administration*, cit., pp. 122-124.

¹⁰⁰ CLAES PETERSON, *Peter the Great’s Administrative and Judicial Reforms: Swedish Antecedents and the Process of Reception*, trans., Stockholm, A.-B. Nordiska Bokhandeln, 1979, pp. 381-384.

patents, letters, mandates and orders are drawn up and sent out. To this College also belong the Memoirs and documents of the Diets and assemblies, alliances with foreign powers, peace treaties with enemies, the care of presenting envoys and giving audience to foreign ministers” (article 28 of the 1720 constitution). The 1720 constitution remained in force until the new constitution in 1776, which terminated the “age of liberty” and reestablished the absolute monarchy, but in which the system of *collegia* and the foreign affairs *collegium* remained unchanged. Finally, with the reform of 1791, the modern ministry of foreign affairs, i.e. the King’s Cabinet for Foreign Correspondence (*Konungens kabinett för den utrikes brevväxlingen*), was introduced.

In Russia, Peter the Great followed closely the Swedish model for the administrative reform in 1715-1722¹⁰¹. The reforms gradually reduced the role of the Duma and of the *prikaz* system¹⁰², by gathering detailed information on the Swedish system of government, and deliberately copying and adapting it to Russia’s needs¹⁰³. In 1711, Peter overhauled the previous system of central government by introducing a new body, the “Ruling Senate” (*Pravitel’stvuiushchii Senat*); subsequently, through a series of *ukazes* in 1717-1720, particularly with the *ukazes* of 11 and 15 December 1717, he instituted the new “colleges” (*kollegii*), which replaced the old *prikazy*¹⁰⁴. The Russian counterpart of the *kanslikollegium* in the *prikaz* structure was the *Posols’kii prikaz* (ambassadorial *prikaz*), which was deeply transformed by Peter the Great in the 1710-1717 period, and in April 1716, the name of the chancellery was changed into that of *Posolskaia kollegiia*. The Russian colleges were formed by a president, a vice-president, four councillors, and four assessors. With a decree (*ukaz*) of 12 (24) December 1718, Peter replaced the Embassy Department and the Embassy Office with a *Collegium* of Foreign Affairs, the tasks of which were defined as maintaining relations with foreign countries. Finally, the organisation of the *Collegium* of Foreign Affairs was decided with

¹⁰¹ K. WALISZEWSKI, *Pierre Le Grand. L'éducation. L'Homme. L'Oeuvre d'après des documents nouveaux*, (3^{me} édition), Paris, Plon, 1897, pp. 525-540; P. BUSHKOVITCH, *Peter the Great: The Struggle for Power, 1671-1725*, Cambridge, Cambridge U.P., pp. 339-382; PETERSON, *Peter the Great's Administrative and Judicial Reforms*, cit.; FERDINAND J.M. FELDBRUGGE, *A History of Russian Law: From the Council Code (Ulozhenie) of Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich of 1649 to the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917*, Leiden - Boston, Brill Nijhoff, 2022, pp. 31-39.

¹⁰² PETERSON, *Peter the Great's Administrative and Judicial Reforms*, cit., pp. 32-52.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, pp. 52-84.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 84-94.

a further decree of 13 (24) February 1720, when the *Posolskaia kollegiia* was reorganised in 1720 as the *kollegiia inostrannykh del*, based on the model of the Swedish *kanslikollegium*. The *kollegiia inostrannykh del* was organised on a geographical basis, with expeditions for different areas: the first expedition secretary had responsibility for European affairs, the second expedition secretary for Oriental affairs, Poland, and Curland¹⁰⁵.

In Austria, the modern organisation of the Chancellery (*Hofkanzlei*) dates from the reform enacted by Emperor Joseph I in June 1705, with the appointment of two Court Chancellors (*Hokanzler*), which maintained a unitary structure: the first Chancellor for the administration of the “*Politica*”, while the second one for that of the “*Juridica*”. The conduct of foreign policy was divided between two different and equal Chancellors. Emperor Charles VI modified this system with the amalgamation of the Foreign Service within one single office and under one single head with the Instruction of the 26th of March 1720: the first *Hofkanzler* was responsible for the “Domestic and State (i.e., Foreign) Affairs”: this was the “*Haus- und Staats- (d. i. auswärtigen) Sachen*”; while the second *Hofkanzler* was responsible for the “*Provincialia*” and “*Judicialia*” (i.e. the internal affairs). At the time, the section of the *Hofkanzlei* assigned to the first Court Chancellor was referred to in official documents as the State Chancellery (*Staatskanzlei*), and the first Court Chancellor as the State Chancellor (*Staatskanzler*)¹⁰⁶.

The modern centralised organisation that laid the foundations of the power of the states of Brandenburg-Prussia was accomplished by the Elector of Brandenburg, Frederick Wilhelm, the “Great Elector” (1640-1688). In the 1640s, the Great Elector decided on foreign policy issues within a small group of the Privy Council. Privy Councillors who influenced foreign policy were Konrad von Burgsdorff, Otto von Schwerin, Joachim Friedrich von Blumenthal, and George Friedrich von Waldeck. In 1651, Frederick William reorganised the Privy Council and created an inner council, the cabinet, which gradually became the most important body¹⁰⁷. Frederick William I (1713-40)

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 385-393.

¹⁰⁶ *Jahrbuch des K.u.K. Auswärtigen Dienstes, 1911: Nach dem Stande vom 31. März 1911*, Fünftehnter Jahrgang, Wien, Druck und Verlag der K.K. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1911, pp. 1-20.

¹⁰⁷ REINHOLT AUGUST DORWART, *Administrative Reforms of Frederick William I of Prussia*, Cambridge, Harvard U.P, 1952; F. L. CARSTEN, *The Great Elector and the Foundation of the Hohenzollern Despotism*, in “The English Historical Review”, 65/255 (Apr. 1950), pp. 175-202; MCKAY DEREK, *The Great Elector: Frederick William of Brandenburg-Prussia*, London, Routledge, 2018; MICHAEL W. SPICER, *Public Administration under ‘Enlightened*

accomplished the most important reform of the centralized state, within the collegial system. The king controlled foreign policy decisions and ruled through a Privy Council (*Geheimer Rat*), responsible for foreign policy, defence, and financial policy. He assigned the title of State Secretary (*Geheimer Etatssekretarius*) to the official responsible for external relations. Although in 1713 Frederick William I created a collegial structure for the Department of Foreign Affairs, composed by Ilgen, Printz, and Dhona to the Department of Foreign Affairs, in reality Ilgen exercised a monocratic power.

Following the death of Ilgen, Frederick William issued his new instructions of 8 December 1728 (based on Ilgen's advice shortly before his death), with which he established a department of foreign affairs headed by a college, formed by von Borck and Knyphausen, two collaborators of Ilgen, and in addition two expediting secretaries. In 1733, the new department was called the *Kabinettsministerium* (Department of Foreign Affairs)¹⁰⁸. The department was headed by a collegial structure formed by Count Adrian Bernhard von Borck, Baron Friedrich Ernst zu Inn und Knyphausen, and Ludwig Otto von Plotho as *Kabinettsminister*. The collegial organisation operated on the basis of a common discussion on foreign policy issues, meeting ambassadors, correspondence with Prussia's ambassadors and the conduct of negotiations. In foreign affairs, Frederick William I took advice from the *Kabinettsministerium* together with the Secret Chancery (*Geheime Kanzlei*) and the Cabinet. But day-to-day responsibility for Prussia's foreign policy was exercised by the *Kabinettsministerium* under the King's overall direction.

In the Kingdom of Denmark and the United Provinces, the reform of the organisation of the conduct of foreign policy took place later in the 18th century. In the late Middle Ages, the Danish Royal Chancery was responsible for foreign correspondence, which was conducted in German for Germany, in Danish for Sweden, and in Latin for other European countries. After 1460, when the Danish King acquired Holstein, the Chancery was divided into two sections: a German Chancery, responsible for the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, as well as for correspondence with Germany and Western Powers in Europe, conducted in German, and a Danish Chancery, responsible for correspondence with Sweden and Russia, conducted in Danish. The regulations for the German Chancery issued by King Christian II (1513-23) appointed a German Chancellor, with the official title of Secretary or first

Despotism' in Prussia: An Examination of Frederick the Great's Administrative Practice, in "Administrative Theory & Praxis", 20/1 (Mar. 1998), pp. 23-31.

¹⁰⁸ DORWART, *Administrative Reforms*, cit., pp. 47-51.

Secretary, responsible for the keeping of the correspondence received, which was registered in two separate books: the Latin letter-book (from 1506-1512) and the German letter-book (from 1537-1538), superseded in 1540 by the “*Auslandische Registranten*”, in German, and in 1563 by a series of Latin letter-books until 1683¹⁰⁹. The organisation of the direction of foreign policy was reformed with the instructions of 26 July 1670, when a Privy Council was introduced. The division between the German Chancery and the Danish Chancery remained in place until 1676, after the fall of the head of the Danish chancery, Peder Schumacher Griffenfeld, when the instructions of 30 May 1676 concentrated foreign policy within the Foreign Department of the German Chancery, assigned to a Chief Secretary. Finally, with the Royal decree of 24 December 1770, the German Chancery was abolished, and its duties were assumed by the Department of Foreign Affairs, which continued to have sole responsibility for foreign policy until 8 August 1848, when it was changed into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

With the exception of the Netherlands and Naples, England was the last important European state to adopt a modern organisation for the conduct of foreign policy, by appointing only one minister to this task. The office of Secretary of State was instituted at the end of the 17th Century, when two Secretaries of State were appointed, one for the Southern Department (or Province) and one for the Northern Department (or Province)¹¹⁰. The two Secretaries of State were not concerned only with foreign policy, and the distribution of responsibilities between them varied from time to time. The Southern Department was responsible for France, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Switzerland, Turkey, and the Barbary states, as well as Home and Irish affairs and Colonies, until in 1768 a third secretary for colonies was added. The Northern Department was concerned with overseas countries. Until 1698, the offices of both departments were housed in Whitehall, then they moved to the Cockpit until 1771, when they moved to Cleveland Row (St. James’). In 1782, with George III, two separate secretaries of state were created one for the Home Office and the other for the Foreign Office¹¹¹, and on 27 March 1782 Charles

¹⁰⁹ ARTHUR G. HASSØ and ERIK KROMAN, *Danish Department of Foreign Affairs until 1770*, Copenhagen, Rigsarkivet, 1973, pp. 1-3 (Vejledende Arkivregistraturer, n. XVI); STEEN M. OUSAGER and HANS SCHULTZ HANSEN, *The Department of Foreign Affairs 1770-1848*, Copenhagen, Rigsarkivet, 1997, p. 1 (Vejledende Arkivregistraturer, n. XXIV).

¹¹⁰ RODNEY BRAZIER, *Ministers of the Crown*. Oxford, Clarendon, 1997, pp. 9-10.

¹¹¹ M. A. THOMSON, *The Secretaries of State 1681-1782*, London, Cass Frank, 1932, pp. 1-28 and 90-104; D. B. HORN, *The British Diplomatic Service 1689-1789*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1961, p. 1; and Id. (Ed.), *British Diplomatic Representatives 1689-*

James Fox, who had previously been appointed “One of His Majesty’s Principal Secretaries of State”, was appointed sole Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

In the United Provinces of the Netherlands, the evolution of a separate organisation for the conduct of foreign affairs was delayed by the constitutional confederal structure of the state, the limited functions of the centralised institutions and their relations with the seven provinces, as well as by the history of stadholder and stadholderless periods. The Stadholder (*Stadhouder*) and the Grand Pensionary (*Raadpensionaris*) were responsible for both internal affairs and foreign relations. An effective centralised office for the conduct of foreign affairs was established only after the fall of the United Provinces and the constitution of the Batavian Republic, in 1795, which led to the institution of the modern Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Departement van Buitenlandse Zaken*, then *Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken*) on 12 March 1798¹¹². On 9 March 1798, Willem Berend Buys, who since 27 January 1798 had been the secretary for the Department of Foreign Affairs (*Departement voor de Buitenlandse Zaken*) for the provisional Executive Government of the Batavian Republic, was appointed as the first Agent of Foreign Affairs (*Agent van Buitenlandse Zaken, Buitenlandse Betrekkingen*)¹¹³.

In the Kingdom of Naples, the reorganisation of the state administration took place upon the arrival of Carlo di Borbone in 1734¹¹⁴. From 29 April 1734, there were two *Segreteria di Stato*, one for foreign affairs, for war and navy, *Casa Reale*, ecclesiastical affairs, economy and finance, which was headed by Montealegre; the second one, for justice, headed by Bernardo Tanucci¹¹⁵. The reform decided on 30 July 1737 divided the two *segreteria* into four, but foreign affairs (i.e., correspondence with the king’s ambassadors abroad as well as with foreign ambassadors in the kingdom), remained in the hands of Montealegre, together with several other areas, such

1789, London, Royal Historical Society, Offices of the Society, 1932 (Camden Third Series, Vol. XLVI).

¹¹² ÉMILE DE LAVELEYE, *La forme du gouvernement dans la République des Provinces Unies*, in “Revue des Deux Mondes”, III/4-4 (15 Août 1874), pp. 865-891; G.W. VREEDE, *Inleiding tot eene Geschiedenis der Nederlandsche Diplomatie*, 4 vols., Utrecht, Broese, 1856-1865.

¹¹³ REINILDIS E. VAN DITZHUYZEN, A.E. KERSTEN, A.L.M. VAN ZEELAND, A.C. VAN DER ZWAN, *Tweehonderd jaar Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken*, The Hague, Staatsdrukkerij en Uitgeverij (Sdu), 1998.

¹¹⁴ CATELLO SALVATI, *L’azienda e le altre Segreteria di Stato durante il primo periodo borbonico (1734-1806)*, Roma, 1962 (Quaderni della “Rassegna degli Archivi di Stato”, 14); ARCHIVIO DI STATO DI NAPOLI, *Archivio Borbone. Inventario sommario*, Vol. I, Roma, 1961, p. XI.

¹¹⁵ M. SCHIPA, *Il Regno di Napoli al tempo di Carlo di Borbone*, Napoli, Pierro, 1904, pp. 332-359.

as war and navy¹¹⁶. Thus, foreign affairs were still dealt with together with other matters. With the reform of 10 June 1755, the first of the four *segreterie di stato* was abolished, and *State*, i.e., foreign affairs, was attributed to Bernardo Tanucci as well as the other responsibilities he had¹¹⁷. On 6 October 1759, before the king departed towards Spain, there was a further reorganisation of the *segreterie di stato*, which were again divided into four, with foreign affairs being still attributed to the *prima segreteria*, headed by Tanucci¹¹⁸. On 27 October 1776, Tanucci's role was finally terminated, and, on 26 May 1778, a new organisation was decided by the new government: all matters, except for foreign affairs and royal estates, were transferred from the *prima segreteria* to the three other *segreterie*¹¹⁹. However, the attribution of foreign affairs to the *primo segretario di stato* was not to last for long: with the reorganisation of 16 July 1789, and then with the further one of 9 September 1791, foreign affairs were again given, together with war, navy and trade, to the *prima segreteria*, headed by Acton¹²⁰. Foreign affairs were thus never really the specific field of a single department or *segreteria di stato*, until, on 26 June 1802, a complete reorganisation created six *segreterie di stato*, the first one being the *real segreteria di stato e affari esteri*¹²¹. A modern central state organisation was, however, effectively created only during the French monarchy. On 22 February 1806, following the second French occupation, the *segreterie di stato* were abolished and substituted with modern ministries, among which the ministry of foreign affairs¹²². To this post, on 3 June 1806, King Joseph Bonaparte appointed the Marquis of Gallo, who reorganised the

¹¹⁶ SCHIPA, *Il regno di Napoli*, cit., pp. 359-360; RUGGERO MOSCATI, *L'archivio della Prima Segreteria di Stato napoletana durante il regno di Carlo Borbone*, in "Notizie degli Archivi di Stato", gennaio-marzo 1943, Roma, Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato Libreria, 1943, pp. 92-95; MINISTERO DELL'INTERNO, *Archivio di Stato di Napoli. Archivio Borbone. Inventario Sommario*, Vol. I, Roma, 1961, pp. XI-XIII (Pubblicazioni degli Archivi di Stato, Vol. XLIII).

¹¹⁷ SCHIPA, *Il regno di Napoli*, cit., p. 522.

¹¹⁸ SALVATI, *L'azienda*, cit., pp. 14-15.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 16-17.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

¹²¹ Real Decreto [...] July 1802, in SALVATI, *L'azienda*, cit., pp. 34-40 and 111-120. The first secretary for foreign affairs was Acton (1802-1804), followed by Micheroux (from 13 May 1804).

¹²² SALVATI, *L'azienda*, cit., p. 45.

Ministry¹²³. Finally, the constitution of 20 June 1808 established six ministers, among which one was the minister of foreign affairs¹²⁴.

3. The establishment of a Foreign Office (the “*Segreteria di Stato per gli Affari Stranieri*”) in the Duchy of Savoy

In the Duchy of Savoy, in the aftermath of the Treaty of Utrecht, Duke Vittorio Amedeo II adopted the French model for the organisation of a centralised state, introducing the great reform of the legal and administrative structure of the Savoy states, in the direction of absolutist principles and, therefore of administrative centralization. Although the previous statutes of Amadeus VIII of 1430 already included provisions concerning secretaries and similar provisions were also contained in subsequent statutes of the duchy, it is, as a matter of fact, only with the reform implemented by Victor Amadeus II, after the assumption of the title of King of Sicily following the Treaty of Utrecht and subsequently the title of King of Sardinia, that a distinction was introduced between the Secretary of War and the Secretaries of State and between the two Secretaries of State, for External (or Foreign) Affairs and for Internal Affairs, and, therefore, it is only at this time that one can properly speak of an office of the Secretariat of State for External Affairs¹²⁵.

The Duke of Savoy and Prince of Piedmont, Victor Amadeus II (at the time, from 1713 to 1720, King of Sicily,), laid the foundations for the organisation of the central offices with the two statutes of 1717: the Royal Edict of 17 February 1717, which established the “Council of Ministers”, in which the eight ministers, including the first secretaries of state, were gathered with consultative functions, and split the Secretariat of State into two Secretariats of State, one for “external” (or “foreign”) affairs and the other for “internal affairs”, headed by two first secretaries of state, and the Secretariat of War¹²⁶; and the subsequent edict of 11 April 1717, by which the “*aziende*”

¹²³ *Memorie del duca di Gallo*, ed. by BENEDETTO MARESCA, in “Archivio storico per le province napoletane”, XIII/2 (1888), p. 335 and pp. 336-338; JACQUES RAMBAUD, *Naples sous Joseph Bonaparte 1806-1808*, Paris, Plon, 1911, pp. 378-379.

¹²⁴ *Le costituzioni italiane*, ed. by A. AQUARONE, M. D'ADDIO and G. NEGRI, Milano, Ed. di Comunità, 1958, pp. 370-378.

¹²⁵ FELICE AMATO DUBOIN (Ed.), *Raccolta per ordine di materie delle leggi, editti, manifesti, ecc. Pubblicati dal principio dell'anno 1681 sino agli 8 dicembre 1798 sotto il felicissimo dominio della Real Casa di Savoia in continuazione a quella del senatore Borelli, compilata dall'avvocato Felice Amato Duboin*, Tomo VIII, Vol. X, Torino, Eredi Bianco e C., 1832, pp. 317-318.

¹²⁶ Regio editto di stabilimento del Consiglio dei Ministri, e di regolamento per le Segreterie di stato e di guerra, 17 febbraio 1717, in DUBOIN (Ed.), *Raccolta*, cit., Tomo VIII,

(corresponding to the “*hazendas*” in the Spanish Kingdom), i.e. the organisational structures, of finance, war, artillery, factories and fortifications, of the Royal Household, and for “general control were reformed”¹²⁷.

Two days before the statute that established the office, the single first Secretary of State, Marquis Caron of Saint-Thomas, was replaced by two first secretaries of state: Marquis Ignazio Solaro del Borgo was appointed first Secretary of State for external affairs, therefore he was the first to hold the position corresponding to that of minister, at the head of the future Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs¹²⁸; while Pietro Mellarède was appointed to the Secretariat of State for Internal Affairs.

The subsequent reforms carried out by Victor Amadeus and his minister Gropello with the “Royal Constitutions” of 1723 and 1729, a systematised re-edition of pre-existing norms from the Statutes of Amadeus VIII, represented a new phase in the transformation, already begun by Emanuele Filiberto, of the state of Savoy structures of the *Ancien Régime*, from medieval forms to the new concept of the absolute state. These reforms were continued and completed after 1749 by Victor Amadeus II’s son, Carlo Emanuele III, and his minister, Giambattista Lorenzo Bogino¹²⁹. The conception behind Victor Amadeo’s reforms was to ensure greater effectiveness and efficiency to the state structure and, therefore, to implement in a more widespread way, with a uniform diffusion over the territory, the execution of the decisions taken at the central level by the monarch, therefore a complete realisation of the absolute state. In this sense, the articulation of the central

Vol. X, cit., pp. 331-348. On the reforms of Victor Amadeus II, see G. SYMCOX, *L’età di Vittorio Amedeo II*, in P. MERLIN, C. ROSSO, G. SYMCOX and G. RICUPERATI (Eds.), *Il Piemonte sabauda. Stato e territori in età moderna*, Torino, UTET, 1994, pp. 394-402; GUIDO QUAZZA, *Le riforme in Piemonte nella prima metà del Settecento*, Vol. I, Modena, STEM, 1957, pp. 55-60; D. CARUTTI, *Storia della diplomazia della Corte di Savoia*, Vol. III, Torino, Fratelli Bocca, 1879, p. 617; CH. STORRS, *Savoyard Diplomacy in the eighteenth century (1684-1798)*, in D. FRIGO (Ed.), *Politics and Diplomacy in Early Modern Italy. The Structure of Diplomatic Practice, 1450-1800*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 210-254.

¹²⁷ DUBOIN (Ed.), *Raccolta*, cit., pp. 567-608; see QUAZZA, *Le riforme in Piemonte* cit., Vol. I, p. 56.

¹²⁸ DUBOIN (Ed.), *Raccolta*, cit., p. 318; see SYMCOX, *L’età di Vittorio Amedeo II*, cit., p. 399. Therefore, Duboin points out, the division of the single Secretariat of State into two appears to have been completed two days before the edict, with the Royal Patents appointing the Marquis Ignazio Solaro del Borgo as First Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, of 15 February 1717. On Solaro, see V. CASTRONOVO, *Borgo, Ignazio Solaro di Moretta, marchese del*, in *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani*, Vol. 12, Milano, Istituto dell’Enciclopedia italiana, 1971.

¹²⁹ See G. SYMCOX, *Dinastia, Stato, amministrazione*, in W. BARBERIS (Ed.), *I Savoia, I secoli d’oro di una dinastia europea*, Torino, Einaudi, 2007, pp. 71-85.

structure of the state, while being a direct emanation of the sovereign, begins to take on the characteristics of modern bureaucratic organisation; as Guido Quazza wrote, the reorganisation creates “the mechanism for the elaboration of decisions at the centre and for the transmission and application of them to the whole state”, the institutional instrument for the reform of the state¹³⁰.

4. Continuity of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the Office of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Sardinia

The present-day Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the same institution that was created in 1717 by the Duke of Savoy (then King of Sicily, later of Sardinia) in Torino. With the birth, in 1861, of a unified state, the Kingdom of Italy, the institutional system of the Savoy state was extended to the annexed provinces. Whether one wants to accept the thesis of continuity and absorption by the Savoy state or that of the birth of a new state, it is in any case a fact that the pre-existing rules and institutions in Piedmont were extended – and not always at the time of annexation, but sometimes in subsequent phases, as for the codes – to the rest of Italy. The monarchy, the Constitutional Charter (the “Statuto albertino”) and the administrative institutions of Savoy were gradually transferred without interruption¹³¹.

On 17 March 1861, when the Kingdom of Italy was proclaimed, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was none other than the Ministry of the Kingdom of Sardinia, the ancient Secretariat of State for External Affairs (*Segreteria di Stato per gli Affari Stranieri o Esterni*), reformed into the new concept of the Ministries according to the administrative reforms that are a consequence of

¹³⁰ QUAZZA, *Le riforme in Piemonte*, cit., Vol. I, p. 55. On the Royal constitutions, see I. SOFFIETTI and C. MONTANARI, *Il diritto negli Stati sabaudi: fonti ed istituzioni (secoli XV-XIX)*, Torino, Giappichelli, 2008, pp. 53-95.

¹³¹ In general, on the continuity between the Savoy state and the unitary state, see A. SANDULLI e G. VESPERINI, *L'organizzazione dello Stato unitario*, in “La rivista trimestrale di diritto pubblico”, 1 (2011), pp. 47-95 and F. CAMMARANO, *La costruzione dello stato e la classe dirigente*, in F. CAMMARANO, E. DECLEVA, G. MONTRONI, G. PESCOLOLIDO e B. TOBIA, *Storia d'Italia, 2. Il nuovo stato e la società civile 1861-1887*, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1995, pp. 3-16. On pre-unitary legislation in Italy see C. GHISALBERTI, *Dall'antico regime al 1848. Le origini costituzionali dell'Italia moderna*, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1974 and *Unità nazionale e unificazione giuridica in Italia. La codificazione del diritto nel Risorgimento*, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1979. On constitutional aspects of the formation of the Kingdom of Italy and on the debate on continuity and discontinuity of the Savoy state see ID., *Storia costituzionale d'Italia 1849-1948*, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1974, pp. 87-108.

the new constitution, i.e. the “Statuto Albertino”, octroyed by King Charles Albert in 1948.

The same structure, the same men, the same offices, located in Piazza Castello n. 18, Turin, in the building purpose-built as the headquarters of the Kingdom’s secretariats of state on a project by Filippo Juvarra and Benedetto Alfieri, continued to perform their job in the name of the new Kingdom, without any transformation or adaptation to the broader and more demanding tasks entrusted to it, until officials from the pre-unification States were introduced into its organisation and its structure was revised; and, then, until the transfer of the capital, and therefore also of the headquarters of the Ministry, to Florence.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs continued to be Camillo Cavour, in the new government formed on 23 March 1861, who kept the post until his death on 12 June 1861. The Secretary General was Domenico Carutti, from 11 October 1859 to 2 March 1862; several Ambassadors remained in the same seat, such as: in Belgium, Lupi di Montalto (from February 1851 to 18 January 1866); in Denmark, Migliorati (from December 1859 to December 1863); in Great Britain, Roberto Taparelli D’Azeglio (from April 1859 to April 1869); in Prussia, Edoardo De Launey (from July 1856 to November 1864); in Russia, Francesco Maria Sauli (from September 1856 to July 1862).

Following the armistice of Cassibile (3 September 1943) and its public announcement (8 September 1943), the whole Italian Government and thus the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were transferred to Brindisi; the Ministry was practically dismantled; in February 1944 the Government was transferred to Salerno and on 4 June 1944 it returned to Rome. Augusto Rosso, who was Secretary General from 1 August 1943, was appointed Commissioner for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the responsibilities of which were limited to the dispatch of administrative tasks.

On 15 July 1944, the Ministry was reconstituted, still under the Monarchy, in its previous offices in Palazzo Chigi with a ministerial decree by Badoglio (head of Government and Minister for Foreign Affairs) and with the following Order of Service n. 1 of the same date.

On 2 June 1946 the referendum on the institutional form of the State was held by universal suffrage in the Kingdom of Italy. At the time of the proclamation of the Republic and the adoption of the new Constitutional Charter, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Italy became the new Republican Ministry of Foreign Affairs, maintaining its structure and personnel as a result of its reconstitution in July 1944, when the same

structures pre-existing during the Fascist period were reorganised, with the same personnel, except for the purges.

From the Secretariat of State for External Affairs of the Savoy State in 1717 to today's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, therefore, there is no solution of continuity and it is therefore from the establishment of the former that it is necessary to start, as the date of birth of the ministry and to describe its evolution.

Antonio Varsori

University of Padua

Scientific Committee for the Publication of Italian Diplomatic Documents

**Italy's Diplomacy from Fascism to the Republic:
Continuity or Radical Change?**

Abstract: This study examines the transformation of the Italian diplomatic corps during the transition from the Fascist regime to the Republic, analyzing the extent of Fascistization within the career and the adaptability of diplomats to shifting political contexts. It engages with historiographical debates on Fascist foreign policy, contrasting the interpretation that its primary patterns were expansionist imperialistic goals with perspectives emphasizing continuity from Liberal Italy. Particular attention is given to Mussolini's attempts to restructure the diplomatic corps, including socio-economic shifts and career reforms. The discussion extends to the post-war period, assessing the influence of diplomats who entered during Fascism on Italy's foreign policy in the Cold War era. While early Republican diplomacy maintained elements of continuity, a generational shift in the late 1950s and 1960s introduced new ideological influences, reinforcing Atlanticism and Europeanism. The study concludes that Italy's diplomatic evolution reflected a complex interplay of continuity and transformation, shaped by historical legacies and pragmatic national interests.

Keywords: Italian diplomacy, Fascist foreign policy, Republican Italy, Mussolini, Galeazzo Ciano, Cold War, Atlanticism, Europeanism

A newsreel from the Istituto LUCE in June 1937 was dedicated to the inauguration by the then Minister Galeazzo Ciano of the staff club of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs located on Lungo Tevere dell'Acqua Acetosa in Rome. The images glorified the work carried out by the regime and showed a smiling Ciano, particularly aware of his role, surrounded by a large group of young ladies from Rome's high society¹³². The club still exists and has even been expanded: it is equipped with a swimming pool, tennis courts, and an elegant restaurant. The reading room that appears in the 1937 film has obviously undergone some changes. A modern visitor will still be able to notice a plaque bearing the names of all the presidents of the club – usually retired Ambassadors –, with the name of the first president clearly on display: Count

¹³² <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ucPVRriHOE&t=8s>.

Galeazzo Ciano di Cortellazzo. It would be all too easy to take this small episode as an example of the continuity that would characterize the diplomatic career from fascism to the Republic and it is cited here only as a starting point for this contribution.

The question of the changes in the Italian diplomatic corps from the Fascist regime to the new Italian Republic is very complex and it poses a series of questions to which the present contribution, though in a synthetic way, tries to give some answer. First of all did the Italian diplomatic career experienced a real Fascistisation or did the Italian diplomats adapt themselves to both the Fascist regime and its foreign policy goals? What was the influence exerted by the diplomats who had entered the career during the Fascist period on Republican Italy's early foreign policy, a period when the Rome authorities worked out post-war Italy's fundamental choices for the nation's role in the new international system shaped by Cold War?

The first question is closely linked to a wider historiographical debate on a complex and thorny issue: did a Fascist foreign policy exist and, if so, which were its main characteristics? It is usually stated that there are two main schools of thoughts: on one hand the historians, some of them foreigners, such as MacGregor Knox and James Burgwyn, who argued that since Mussolini's coming to power in 1922 there was a "Fascist foreign policy", whose main patterns were expansionist imperialistic goals which did not exclude the resort to aggressive military initiatives¹³³. On the other hand there are interpretations by Italian historians, such as Renzo De Felice, who offered more nuanced views and did not exclude elements of continuity between the foreign policy pursued by Liberal Italy and the Fascist regime, at least till the mid-1930s¹³⁴. Following the latter school of thought Italian diplomats concurred in maintaining some of this continuity. A recurrent example is the

¹³³ For example see MACGREGOR KNOX, *Mussolini Unleashed 1939-1941. Politics and Strategy in Fascist Italy's Last War*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982; ID., *Destino comune. Dittatura, politica estera e guerra nell'Italia fascista e nella Germania nazista*, Torino, Einaudi, 2003; JAMES BURGWIN, *Il revisionismo fascista. La sfida di Mussolini alle grandi potenze nei Balcani e sul Danubio 1925-1933*, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1979; ID., *Italian Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period*, Westport (Connecticut), Praeger, 1997. Along similar lines see also ENZO COLLOTTI, *Fascismo e politica di potenza. Politica estera 1922-1939*, Milano, La Nuova Italia, 2000.

¹³⁴ RENZO DE FELICE, *Mussolini il Duce*, Vol. I, *Gli anni del consenso 1929-1936*, Torino, Einaudi, 1974. For a recent and exhaustive analysis of the continuity in Italy's foreign policy between Liberal Italy and the Fascist regime see FRANCESCO LEFEBVRE D'OVIDIO, *L'Italia e il sistema internazionale dalla formazione del governo Mussolini alla grande depressione (1922-1929)*, 2 vols., Roma, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 2016, especially the first volume, pp. XCVI-LIII.

role that was played till 1926 as Secretary General of the Italian Foreign Ministry by Salvatore Contarini, an influential and powerful diplomat of the Liberal tradition¹³⁵.

In order to find a solution to this dilemma, the issue can be examined through the mirror of the diplomatic career. On Mussolini's coming to power in 1922 only two Italian Ambassadors decided to resign in contrast with the new leader's positions on foreign policy issues: Count Carlo Sforza and Alfredo Frassati, but it is to be noticed that they were politicians too, though Sforza was a career diplomat who in 1920 has been appointed Foreign Minister in the last Giolitti Government. Besides Contarini's role, it is difficult to argue that most Italian diplomats in the early 1920s, a very tiny elite of few hundred people, did not share the views of most members of the Liberal conservative ruling class, that saw Fascism as a solution, perhaps a temporary one, to both the troubles and social disorder of the immediate post-war period and the "Bolshevik threat"¹³⁶. Mussolini and the leading members of the Fascist movement appeared to share the goals of the nationalist movement, which had been created in 1911, and the need of imposing Italy as a great power, the latter, a goal which very likely was regarded as valid by most Italian diplomats. Actually it is possible to argue that, besides the tones and sometimes the methods – in this case it would be possible to cite the occupation of Corfu in 1923 –, there was some continuity between the early foreign policy pursued by Mussolini and the one of the conservative representatives of the Liberal political class. In this connection we may point out Antonio Salandra's and Sidney Sonnino's position, Salandra's well-known declaration about Italy's "sacred selfishness" and their goal to achieve for Italy the role of a great power¹³⁷.

Some historians, however, have argued that in the second half of the 1920s Mussolini, who was Foreign Minister till 1929, tried to "fascistize" the Italian diplomatic corps. In this context it has been cited that: a) he abolished

¹³⁵ On Salvatore Contarini's role see LEFEBVRE D'OVIDIO, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 213-236 and the bibliography quoted in this volume. On the characteristics and role of the Italian diplomatic corps see the recent contribution by GERARDO NICOLOSI, *Diplomazia liberale. Istituzioni e uomini dall'Unità alla Repubblica*, Milan, Luni, 2023.

¹³⁶ On the fear of the "Bolshevik threat" by the Italian upper classes see VALENTINE LOMELLINI, *La grande paura rossa. L'Italia delle spie bolsceviche (1917-1922)*, Milano, Franco Angeli, 2015.

¹³⁷ On Salandra and Sonnino see BRUNELLO VIGEZZI, *Da Giolitti a Salandra*, Firenze, Vallecchi, 1969. See also ANTONIO VARSORI, *Radioso maggio. Come l'Italia entrò in guerra*, Bologna, il Mulino, 2015 and SANDRO ROGARI and ANTONIO VARSORI (Eds.), *Sonnino dal meridionalismo alla politica estera*, Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, 2024.

the post of Secretary General, b) he abolished the so-called “rendita”, i.e. the condition of financial autonomy for being a diplomat, so opening the career to members of the middle class and weakening the traditional role played by member of the aristocracy with their close ties to the monarchy; c) the merging in 1928 of the consular career with the more prestigious diplomatic career, which implied the involvement in the latter of members of the middle class, the so-called “ventottisti” (the “twenty-eighters”)¹³⁸.

These elements cannot be forgotten, but it is difficult to argue that till the early 1930s the main Fascist foreign policy goals were too different from the ones pursued by Liberal Italy in the immediate post-war period. In spite of Mussolini’s bombastic revisionist declarations, mainly in order to please the domestic public opinion – an aspect of Mussolini’s foreign policy already pointed out by Ennio Di Nolfo in his first book published in 1960 – ¹³⁹, at least till 1934/1935, Italy relied and supported the so-called Versailles system, which had recognized Italy’s role as a great power; supported Austria’s independence, was with Britain the guarantor of the Locarno agreements, signed the Briand-Kellogg treaty, actively took part in the League of Nations activities and tried to contain Hitler’s early revisionist policy (e.g. The Pact of Four, the Mussolini-Laval agreement, the Stresa Conference)¹⁴⁰. Obviously the Fascist regime pursued a strong “revisionist” policy against Yugoslavia, but even before 1922 numerous Italian diplomats and military leaders regarded Yugoslavia as a potential enemy, a sort of heir of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire¹⁴¹. During the Fascist regime the officials of the Italian Foreign Ministry appeared as loyal followers of this pre-Fascist hostile policy towards the new Slav State.

Since the mid-1930s, with the war against Ethiopia and the involvement in the Spanish Civil War Italy’s foreign policy became overly aggressive and appeared to be largely influenced by Fascist ideals¹⁴². Italian

¹³⁸ On this aspect see FABIO GRASSI ORSINI, *La diplomazia*, in ANGELO DEL BOCA, MASSIMO LEGNANI, MARIO G. ROSSI (Eds.), *Il regime fascista. Storia e storiografia*, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1995, pp. 277-328. See also LEFEBVRE D’OVIDIO, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp.199-264; NICOLOSI, *op. cit.*, pp. 192-213.

¹³⁹ ENNIO DI NOLFO, *Mussolini e la politica estera italiana (1919-1930)*, Padova, CEDAM, 1960.

¹⁴⁰ LEFEBVRE D’OVIDIO, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

¹⁴¹ On Fascist foreign policy towards Yugoslavia see MASSIMO BUCARELLI, *Mussolini e la Jugoslavia (1922-1939)*, Bari, Edizioni B. A. Graphis, 2006.

¹⁴² On these two episodes in Italy’s foreign policy, besides RENZO DE FELICE, *Mussolini. Il Duce. Gli anni del consenso (1929-1936)*, Torino, Einaudi, 1974; ID., *Mussolini. Il Duce. Lo stato totalitario (1936-1940)*, Torino, Einaudi, 1981; see also NICOLA LABANCA, *La*

diplomats adapted themselves to this new turn in the nation's foreign policy, but we may wonder if most of them were mainly influenced by the belief that, due to Mussolini's policy and Fascism it had been possible to achieve the final goal which had characterised Italy's foreign policy since the Unification: the international recognition of Italy's as a great power. Such an attitude may be interpreted as an "opportunist" choice, which was also mirrored in a foreign policy which was based on the concepts of "peso determinante" and "ago della bilancia": Such concepts, however, cannot be regarded as new elements created by the Fascist regime foreign policy, because they had already been characteristics of the foreign policy pursued by the Kingdom of Sardinia since the 18th century, when during the years of the European wars the House of Savoy had often shifted alliances on the basis of both the state's national interests and possible territorial advantages, not to speak of the well-known "waltz turns" which had characterised the Italian diplomacy during the Giolitti's era in the first decade of the 20th century¹⁴³.

Now what about the role played by Galeazzo Ciano in developing a "Fascist" foreign policy and the Italian diplomats' attitude towards his choices? Once again we may wonder if most Italian diplomats perceived Ciano as a career diplomat rather than the son of a Fascist leader and Mussolini's son-in-law; a sort of lucky former colleague, who as Foreign Minister became a sort of benign patron of young bright and promising members of the diplomatic career¹⁴⁴. Last but not least, on the eve of the Second World War had the diplomatic career experienced a radical change in its social composition? In this connection it is of some help an analysis of the membership of the diplomats posted abroad in 1939 on the basis of the lists that are available in the collection of the Italian Diplomatic Documents: in 1939 Italy had 58 diplomatic representations with usually one or two career diplomats in each post. 32 Embassies listed one or more members of the aristocracy for a total of 36 nobles with imposing names such as: Baron Gioacchino Scaduto di Mendola di Fontana degli Angeli, the Marquis Giuliano Capranica del Grillo, the Marquis Falchetto Malaspina di Carbonara e di Volpedo, Prince Don Ascanio Colonna, the Marquis Antonio Meli Lupi di Soragna, Count Bonifacio

guerra d'Etiopia (1935-1941), Bologna, il Mulino, 2015; JOHN F. COVERDALE, *I fascisti italiani alla guerra di Spagna*, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1977.

¹⁴³ See for example ROSARIA QUARTARARO, *Roma tra Londra e Berlino. La politica estera fascista dal 1930 al 1940*, Roma, Bonacci, 1980.

¹⁴⁴ On Galeazzo Ciano see the recent biographies: EUGENIO DI RIENZO, *Ciano*, Roma, Salerno Editrice, 2018; TOBIAS HOF, *Ciano. The Fascist Pretender*, Toronto, Toronto University Press, 2021.

Pignatti Morano di Custoza. Of this list, with the exception of Meli Lupi di Soragna, we only remember their names and titles. But in this list we may add some diplomat of noble origins who played a leading role in post-war Italy: Giovanni Fornari, Massimo Magistrati, Pasquale Diana, who in 1939 were posted abroad or Giulio Del Balzo at the Foreign Ministry in Rome. We may argue that on the eve of the Second World war the presence of members of the aristocracy in the diplomatic corps was still relevant¹⁴⁵. Nevertheless there were also some diplomats posted abroad who were issued from the middle class and who would play relevant roles in post-war Italy's foreign policy: Pietro Quaroni, Francesco Fransoni, Adolfo Alessandrini, Emanuele Grazzi, Gastone Guidotti, Attilio Cattani.

Italy's involvement in the Second World War was at the origins of a turning point in Italy's diplomatic career. Like many Italians most diplomats thought that Italy could profit from the Axis military victory, but in late 1942, especially after the Axis defeats at El Alamein and in Russia, the diplomats were among the first members of the establishment who understood that the conflict would end with the Allied powers' victory and Italy's defeat. Though the members of the diplomatic service were not at the origins of the early Italian peace feelers, some of them were involved in these fruitless initiatives.

The fall of fascism and especially the armistice of September 1943 with the birth of the Italian Social Republic and the formation of the Kingdom of the South posed to Italian diplomats the dilemma of which side to take. Some, including some "twenty-eighters", such as Serafino Mazzolini, Filippo Anfuso, Attilio Tamaro, Attilio Di Cicco, decided to join the Italian Social Republic or Republic of Salò, created by Mussolini with German support. But the majority remained faithful to the oath made to the sovereign¹⁴⁶. In this regard, a few years ago, on the basis of research into the personal files of a series of diplomats who would play a prominent role in the post-war period, interesting elements had emerged in order to understand their position in post-Fascist Republican Italy. There were the cases of those who were in Rome in September 1943, such as Vittorio Zoppi, Emanuele Grazzi, Alberto Rossi

¹⁴⁵ *I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani* (henceforward DDI), Serie IX, Vol. I: 4 settembre-28 ottobre 1939, Roma, Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato, 1954.

¹⁴⁶ ANTONIO VARSORI, *Continuità e discontinuità nella diplomazia italiana*, in UGO DE SIERVO, SANDRO GUERRIERI, ANTONIO VARSORI (Eds.), *La prima legislatura repubblicana. Continuità e discontinuità nell'azione delle istituzioni*, Vol. I, Rome, Carocci, 2004, pp. 155-172. For a recent analysis of the role played by some influential diplomats since the Unification till the Republic see LUCIANO MONZALI, *La diplomazia italiana dal Risorgimento alla prima Repubblica*, Milano, Mondadori Education, 2023.

Longhi. Invited by Mazzolini to join the RSI and move to the north, they refused this prospect, among other things citing, as Grazzi did, a series of medical certificates stating that, being affected by hepatitis with cholecystitis and rheumatoid arthritis, he could not tolerate the climate of the Po Valley (sic!). It is significant that Mazzolini accepted these obvious excuses, placing them on leave, probably on the basis of esprit de corps or opportunistic considerations about the future. It is needless to say that the sick people suddenly recovered when Rome was liberated, and as one of them declared to the Commission for the purge, immediately presented himself to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and resumed regular service. The case of Del Balzo, a representative to the Vichy Government, is significant. Arrested by the Germans for refusing to join Mussolini's Social Republic, he was handed over to the fascist authorities who sent him into confinement at the spa resort of Salsomaggiore (sic!). Faced once again with the possibility of joining the fascist state, Del Balzo refused once again and his confinement was confirmed, asking him where he intended to settle. Del Balzo declared to the Commission for the purge that he had declared the first city that came to mind, but then that he had gone to Rome to await the arrival of the Allies. Also interesting is the case of Massimo Magistrati, who, as head of the Bern office, declared himself in favour of the King, but who was burdened by the fact that he had married Ciano's sister and, according to some, had drawn advantages for his career, so much so that he was placed on retirement at the end of the conflict¹⁴⁷.

At the beginning the Government of the Kingdom of the South, led by Marshal Badoglio, and the diplomacy that remained faithful to the king intended to underline the elements of continuity in the conduct of Italian foreign policy. In this sense, the reinstatement of the function of Secretary General, entrusted since Brindisi to Renato Prunas, is significant. It is not considered appropriate here to return to the fundamental role played by this diplomat in the contacts with the Soviet representatives and in the recognition of the Badoglio Government by the USSR, which among other things implied the appointment of Pietro Quaroni as Italian representative in Moscow. In this case, reference is made to the study by Ennio Di Nolfo and Maurizio Serra; both authors pointed out the link between Prunas' initiatives and the traditional foreign policy pursued by the House of Savoy in the eighteenth

¹⁴⁷ VARSORI, *op. cit.*, *passim*. On the occasion of this research the personal files of the following diplomats had been examined: Vittorio Zoppi, Alberto Rossi Longhi, Umberto Grazzi, Giulio Del Balzo, Massimo Magistrati, Pietro Quaroni.

century trying to achieve room for diplomatic manoeuvre through exploiting the contradictions and rivalries among allied nations¹⁴⁸.

Much more important for the present analysis was the decision taken by the first full anti-fascist Government led by Ivanoe Bonomi to promote a partial de-fascistization of the diplomatic corps through the appointment of a series of “political” ambassadors: Giuseppe Saragat (Paris), Eugenio Reale (Prague), Nicolò Carandini (London), Alberto Tarchiani (Washington), Manlio Brosio (Moscow in place of Quaroni), Tommaso Gallarati Scotti (Madrid then London), Sergio Fenoaltea (Nationalist China). This decision aimed at demonstrating that there had been a discontinuity in Italy’s foreign policy.

But what was the influence of these “political” anti-fascist diplomats in determining the foreign policy of republican Italy? The presence of some of them was very brief, for example Saragat remained in Paris for a few months; Carandini remained in London until 1947; both preferred to quickly return to political activity¹⁴⁹. The case of Gallarati Scotti was different: after a period in Madrid, he was transferred to London where he remained until 1951, playing a non-secondary role, but he ended up leaving the post due to differences of opinion with the Ministry¹⁵⁰. Thus, the only cases of particular importance were those of Alberto Tarchiani and Manlio Brosio. The first played a fundamental role in determining Italy’s Western choice: from the organization of De Gasperi’s trip to Washington in 1947 to Italy’s adherence to the Atlantic Pact. But it was a particular case, determined by the “political” importance of Tarchiani’s position in the framework of relations between Italy and the United States; it is true that he remained in the American capital for ten years, but this was also the only diplomatic role played by Tarchiani and his career ended with the end of his mission in the United States¹⁵¹. The only career with

¹⁴⁸ ENNIO DI NOLFO and MAURIZIO SERRA, *La gabbia infranta. Gli Alleati e l’Italia dal 1943 al 1945*, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2010. See also the memoirs by PIETRO QUARONI, *Ricordi di un ambasciatore*, Milano, Garzanti, 1954; ID., *Valigia diplomatica*, Milano, Garzanti, 1956; ID., *Il mondo di un ambasciatore*, Milano, Ferro, 1965.

¹⁴⁹ LUCA RICCARDI (Ed.), *Nicolò Carandini il liberale e la nuova Italia 1943-1953. Con documenti inediti*, Firenze, Le Monnier, 1993.

¹⁵⁰ ANTONIO VARSORI, *Tommaso Gallarati Scotti diplomatico. L’esperienza dell’ambasciata a Londra*, in LUCIANA PAZZAGLIA and CLAUDIA CREVENNA (Eds.), *Tommaso Gallarati Scotti tra totalitarismo fascista e ripresa della vita democratica*, Milano, Cisalpino Istituto Editoriale Universitario, 2013, pp. 159-168.

¹⁵¹ On Alberto Tarchiani see ID., *Dieci anni tra Roma e Washington*, Milano, Mondadori, 1955; DANIELA FELISINI (Ed.), *Tormenti di un ambasciatore. L’anno conclusivo di Washington (1954)*, Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, 2006; DOMENICO FRACCHIOLLA, *Un ambasciatore della nuova Italia a Washington. Alberto Tarchiani e le relazioni tra Italia e Stati Uniti (1945-1948)*, Milano, Franco Angeli, 2012.

characteristics similar to the tradition of the Italian diplomacy was that of Brosio, who would have moved from the Embassy in Moscow to that in London, from there to Washington, then to Paris, to then become Secretary General of NATO and then return to politics only in the 70s as a senator for the Liberal Party¹⁵². With Brosio, the experience of “political” ambassadors, a characteristic present in many Western nations, ended, and the Italian diplomatic career returned to being a field strictly reserved for “technicians” recruited through a tough and selective competition¹⁵³.

Excluding the few personalities of political extraction referred to, it was largely career diplomats who had entered the Ministry during fascism who held more important roles in the post-war period, especially in the General Directorates within the Ministry. In this regard, it is important to underline that the function of Secretary General would remain constantly in the hands of career representatives: Renato Prunas left his place to Francesco Fransoni, who in turn in 1948, by decision of Sforza, was replaced by Vittorio Zoppi, who until then had been responsible for the important General Directorate of Political Affairs. An equally important function was carried out by Emanuele Grazzi, General Director of Economic Affairs with leading skills in the management of Italy's participation in the Marshall Plan. The case of Massimo Magistrati should also be underlined. As mentioned, having been placed into early retirement at the end of the conflict – but not purged – Magistrati appealed to the Council of State, winning. Reinstated in his career, he took on the important role of Director of International Cooperation, playing a significant role in the initial stages of Italy's European choice: from the Schuman Plan that would lead to the birth of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), to the Pleven Plan with the attempts to create the European Defence Community (EDC) and the European Political Community (EPC)¹⁵⁴. Finally, we cannot overlook Pietro Quaroni, one of the most

¹⁵² Brosio left some important diaries which have been published in four volumes: MANLIO BROSIO, *Diari di Mosca 1947-1951*, ed. by FAUSTO BACCHETTI, Bologna, il Mulino, 1986, *Diari di Washington 1955-1961*, *Diari di Parigi 1961-1964*, *Diari NATO 1964-1972*, ed. by UMBERTO GENTILONI SILVERI, Bologna, il Mulino, 2008, 2009, 2011.

¹⁵³ There has been an unique breach in such a rule when in 2016 the Renzi Government appointed a politician, Carlo Calenda, as Italian representative in Brussels at the European Union. Such an appointment was resented by the members of the diplomacy. But Calenda resigned for personal reasons after a short period in office. See <https://www.ilfoglio.it/politica/2016/01/21/news/perche-un-ambasciatore-politico-come-calenda-non-deve-fare-scandalo-91784/>, https://www.agi.it/politica/calenda_lascia_bruelles_dopo_un_mese_e_mezzo-756246/news/2016-05-08/.

¹⁵⁴ See the list in DDI, Serie XI, 1948-1953, Vol. VI: *26 luglio 1951-30 giugno 1952*, ed. by PIETRO PASTORELLI e FRANCESCO LEFEBVRE D'OVIDIO, Roma, Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca

influential Italian diplomats who, especially in the long years spent in Paris, had to deal with all the most important decisions of Italian post-war foreign policy. What was their basic attitude regarding the international role of post-war Italy? In my opinion, they adhered to the objective of the anti-fascist ruling class, which, having put aside the dreams of a great power nurtured by both Liberal Italy and the fascist regime, aimed at rebuilding Italy's role as a medium regional power capable of exercising some influence in the traditional areas of Italian foreign policy: Europe and the "enlarged" Mediterranean, without neglecting the need for a special relationship with the American superpower. Some of them brought the conditioning of the past into their actions: just think of Zoppi's nationalism regarding the future of the former colonies, Quaroni's "cynicism" regarding the two superpowers emerging from the war or on many aspects of European construction. A common characteristic was a sort of "nationalism", or perhaps it would be better to speak of "patriotism", adapted on the one hand to the new reality of a bipolar international system, on the other to the limited capabilities of post-war Italy. It should also be noted that the fundamental choices of the Italian Republic were determined by political leaders and such political decisions were carried out by diplomats, often admirably, as recalled by the influential Christian Democrat leader Emilio Taviani¹⁵⁵, who pointed out their role as high officials or if it may be preferred as "servants of the State", therefore as executors of government directives; the only ones who allowed themselves at least in part to conduct a political action were Tarchiani, who however was a "political" ambassador and Quaroni, to whom even government officials seemed to recognize a certain margin of discretion¹⁵⁶.

della Stato, 2015. See also VARSORI, *Continuità e discontinuità nella diplomazia italiana*, cit., pp. 163-166; NICOLSI, *op. cit.*, p. 227 ff.

¹⁵⁵ PAOLO EMILIO TAVIANI, *Politica a memoria d'uomo*, Bologna, il Mulino, 2002, pp. 132-133. Taviani wrote: "We have been criticized for having kept or taken on men from the fascist period in office with the justification that they were technicians, competent. Instead we did very well. Many diplomats who had grown up with Grandi, with Ciano, who had been fascists in the 1930s, served the interests of Italy with intelligence, sometimes even with self-denial in the short years of the royal transition and in the early years of the Republic" (original version: "Siamo stati criticati di aver mantenuto o assunto in carica uomini del periodo fascista con la giustificazione che si trattava di tecnici, di competenti. Invece abbiamo fatto benissimo. Molti diplomatici che erano cresciuti con Grandi, con Ciano, che erano stati fascisti negli anni Trenta, servirono gli interessi dell'Italia con intelligenza, talvolta anche con abnegazione nei brevi anni della transizione regia e negli anni della prima Repubblica").

¹⁵⁶ ANTONIO VARSORI, *Dalla rinascita al declino. Storia internazionale dell'Italia repubblicana*, Bologna, il Mulino, 2022, pp. 17-186.

A change in the diplomatic corps manifested itself between the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s also due to a question of generational change, with the entry into service or the career progression of the “Mau Mau”, the young diplomats close to the Christian Democrat leader and often Foreign Minister Amintore Fanfani. These younger diplomats were not free from third-worldism influences, but they were also convinced that Atlanticism and Europeanism represented the two pillars of Italian foreign policy and that their primary task – as was obvious – was to promote Italy’s national interests¹⁵⁷.

In conclusion and returning to the initial questions: continuity or discontinuity between fascism and the republic in the context of the diplomatic career? In all likelihood a combination of these two elements based on the assumption that the Italian diplomat belonged – and belongs – to a numerically restricted group of individuals, is influenced by a strong esprit de corps, above all he regards himself and is considered an interpreter and defender of national interests, as well as a “servant of the state”.

¹⁵⁷ FABIO GRASSI ORSINI, *La “rivoluzione diplomatica” del secondo governo Fanfani*, in AGOSTINO GIOVAGNOLI and LUCIANO TOSI (Eds.), *Amintore Fanfani e la politica estera italiana*, Venezia, Marsilio, 2009, pp. 195-204. On the characteristics of the Italian diplomatic corps see ENRICO SERRA, *La diplomazia in Italia*, Milano, Franco Angeli, 1988. For a recent analysis see EMIDIO DIODATO e RAFFAELE MARCHETTI, *Manuale di politica estera italiana*, Bologna, il Mulino, 2023. These younger diplomats were called “Mau Mau” for their struggle against their colleagues of the old generation and for their sympathetic attitude towards Italy’s dialogue with the post-colonial leaders of the nations which emerged from the process of decolonisation.


Dr Michael Kennedy

Executive Editor, Documents on Irish Foreign Policy, Royal Irish Academy

«The Department is the apple of your eye, bone of your bone, flesh of your flesh»: how Joseph Walshe’s world view shaped Ireland’s Department of External Affairs

Abstract: The career of Irish diplomat Joseph Walshe, Secretary General of the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs from 1922 to 1946 shows how one person can exert a strong personal influence to shape the structure and outlook of an organisation.

Keywords: Ireland, inter-war history, diplomatic history, Joseph Walshe, Department of External Affairs, administrative history, Eamon de Valera



*“Joseph Walshe in the mid-1940s”.
Source: University College Dublin Archives,
Eamon de Valera papers, P150/2717.*

“The Minister’s housekeeper, in her black shawl, left us with the glass dish of fruit in the centre of the dinner table. It caught the fire’s rays, offsetting Dublin’s fog that seemed now to be creeping into the room itself. With the coffee to warm us too, we sat a long time. The Minister, selecting for himself a great, glowing orange from Italy, held it up as he expatiated on the mysteries, temporal and spiritual, of our globe. ... The point of his silver fruit knife he touched to the orange, the side toward the flames: here was Rome, he smilingly told us, all warm and burnished. His Rome, he said, was the Rome of the pagan and the Christian world alike. There was where his world lay; where his world had its beginning and where it would, he

hoped, have its end. Ireland might be, indeed was, a political pastorate for him, but not his ultimate destiny”¹⁵⁸.

Thus in *The Michigan Quarterly Review* American writer Mary C. Bromage¹⁵⁹ captured an evening between the wars with Joseph Walshe, a cunning, mercurial and enigmatic Francophile lawyer, the founding father of Ireland’s Department of Foreign Affairs¹⁶⁰. The eminence grise of inter-war Anglo-Irish relations, Walshe built and maintained the structure of the then Department of External Affairs as its first Secretary General from 1922, until his appointment as Ireland’s first Ambassador to the Holy See in 1946. The Department was, as a colleague wrote to him in 1934: “the apple of your eye, bone of your bone, flesh of your flesh”¹⁶¹.

When I thought about the theme of this session, I wondered did the mechanics of structures perhaps crowd out the motivations of the individuals who created them. Which were more important: the structures or the intentions of their originators?

Walshe, like most of Ireland’s first diplomats, came from the revolutionary generation which gained independence from Britain in 1922¹⁶². When his colleague Robert Brennan announced that he could not accept the 1921 Treaty settlement with Britain as the basis for Irish independence, Walshe, then thirty-six years old, was picked from the Irish mission in Paris to replace Brennan as head of Ireland’s three-year-old diplomatic service¹⁶³.

¹⁵⁸ MARY C. BROMAGE, *Roman love story*, in “The Michigan Quarterly Review”, 2/1 (1963), pp 18-20: p. 18.

¹⁵⁹ Mary C. Bromage (1906-94), journalist, academic, administrator and author, in particular on Irish history.

¹⁶⁰ The only full-length biography of Walshe is AENGUS NOLAN, *Joseph Walshe: Irish foreign policy 1922-1946*, Cork, Cork University Press, 2008. See also MICHAEL KENNEDY, “Nobody Knows and Ever Shall Know from Me That I Have Written It”: *Joseph Walshe, Éamon de Valera and the Execution of Irish Foreign Policy, 1932-8*, in “Irish Studies in International Affairs”, 14 (2003), pp 165-183 and DERMOT KEOGH, *Profile of Joseph Walshe, secretary of the department of external affairs 1922-1946*, in “Irish Studies in International Affairs”, 3/2 (1990), pp 59-80.

¹⁶¹ NA (National Archives of Ireland, Dublin), DFA (Department of Foreign Affairs), Secretary’s Files, S78(a), McCauley to Walshe, 30 January 1934.

¹⁶² For an overview history of the Department of Foreign Affairs see JOHN GIBNEY, MICHAEL KENNEDY and KATE O’MALLEY, *Ireland: A voice amongst the nations*, Dublin, Royal Irish Academy, 2019.

¹⁶³ Online biographies for Walshe, Brennan and the other diplomats and political figures who appear in this paper can be found in the *Dictionary of Irish Biography* (www.dib.ie).

Brennan, a provincial journalist, was local in perspective. Walshe was European, staunchly Catholic, and was the product of the early-1900s intellectual climate in France and Belgium where he had studied as a Jesuit novice. His Catholicism was ultramontane, his church was universal, with Rome and the Holy See at its centre.

The Irish diplomatic service split over the 1921 Treaty and, in 1922, as Ireland itself descended into civil war (pro-Treaty and anti-Treaty), Walshe set about rebuilding the External Affairs. The supporters of the Treaty gained the upper hand and their foreign policy for the new state had Ireland take “its place amongst the nations” with an independent foreign policy.

Under Brennan, the structure of External Affairs had been decentralised. Envoys had almost complete autonomy. From the start Walshe imposed a strongly centralised structure. He believed in closed government and secret diplomacy. The pressures of civil war made secrecy paramount and the style stuck firmly. The Minister of the day worked through Walshe. Diplomats in headquarters and in Ireland’s small network of overseas missions worked strictly to Walshe. They received instructions from him on a need-to-know basis. All despatches crossed Walshe’s desk and Walshe alone dealt with the Minister. He was the gatekeeper. And that was how it remained until Walshe left for the Holy See in 1946. There was no delegation of authority.

Assistant Secretary Seán Murphy appears to have taken few initiatives. Departmental lore has it that Walshe kept top-secret material to himself, carrying it around his department in a locked black ledger. An example of Walshe’s style in action, was Legal Adviser Michael Rynne writing to Ireland’s Permanent Delegate to the League of Nations: “The Secretary is still away on leave, and I have no reason (and probably no right!) to anticipate his mind on the matter of the [Assembly] Delegation”¹⁶⁴.

But there was a problem. Walshe had his internal structure in place, but he was still only ‘Acting Secretary’. His young department was seen across the Irish public service as a dispensable luxury in the cash-strapped post-civil war years. Walshe needed to establish his position. He chose his time. In July 1927 his minister, Kevin O’Higgins, was assassinated – the civil war had many legacy issues – and Prime Minister William Cosgrave temporarily took the External Affairs portfolio. Seeing his chance, Walshe ensured Cosgrave upgraded him to full Secretary. Now ranking equal to his peers Walshe and his new Minister Patrick McGilligan managed a modest expansion of overseas

¹⁶⁴ MICHAEL KENNEDY *et al.* (Eds.), *Documents on Irish Foreign Policy*, Vol. V, Dublin, Royal Irish Academy, 2006, No. 75, Rynne to Cremins, 19 August 1937.

missions in the late-1920s. As befitted Walshe's world view, these were to the Holy See, Paris and Berlin, and in that order.

When the anti-Treaty side took power after the 1932 election Walshe expected to be dismissed by incoming Minister for External Affairs, the former Anti-Treaty leader Éamon de Valera. Seeking to make himself indispensable, Walshe wrote to de Valera explaining how he could assist his new minister in the conduct of Anglo-Irish relations. Dismantling the 1921 Treaty was de Valera's primary foreign policy goal. Walshe signed off "no one will ever know from me that I have written this to you"¹⁶⁵ and returned from meeting de Valera to tell anxious colleagues: "He's charming, simply charming"¹⁶⁶.

Now that he was confident in maintaining his job, Walshe took further steps to make sure his department was secure. De Valera was Prime Minister as well as Foreign Minister and understood the primacy of foreign policy. The all-powerful Department of Finance might still wish to close External Affairs, but when such rumours arose Walshe had only to talk privately to Minister. He could overplay his hand, and by the mid-1930s was often no longer submitting foreign policy issues to Cabinet, using the argument that as his Minister was foreign minister, as well as prime minister, there was no need to get agreement if de Valera already pronounced on an issue. A rap on the knuckles from the Cabinet Secretary ended this behaviour.

By the mid-1930s no one was talking of closing down External Affairs, the department had grown in stature under de Valera's ministry and Walshe's command. Walshe was central to the negotiation of the 1938 settlement with Britain. Uncomfortable as a civil servant, he often blurred the line between civil servant and politician. When representing de Valera in London at high level talks, British officials wondered was it Walshe or de Valera who was Ireland's Minister for External Affairs.

Having defined his own role, that of his department and the place of his department in the civil service pecking order, it is no surprise that Walshe also defined the type of people who should be Ireland's diplomats. He had a disdainful attitude towards the ordinary Irish person, writing in 1933 that "the very great majority of our people are still profoundly ignorant of – and indifferent to – most of the things that make for a decent individual or state

¹⁶⁵ MICHAEL KENNEDY *et al.* (Eds.), *Documents on Irish Foreign Policy*, Vol. IV, Dublin, Royal Irish Academy, 2004, No. 7, Walshe to de Valera, 12 March 1932.

¹⁶⁶ See KEOGH, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

life”¹⁶⁷. Despite there being an independent civil service appointments commission, Walshe would recruit in his own image – seeking single men who could be missionaries for the young independent state, likening them to the Irish missionaries who crossed Dark Age Europe carrying the message of Christianity. Women, who had been, by the standards of the day, prominent in the pre-1922 service, were eased out, helped by a prohibition across the civil service on married women holding posts. Ireland’s sole female diplomat was Walshe’s private secretary, Sheila Murphy.

Compared to the more diverse base of the pre-1922 diplomatic service, new recruits of the 1920s and 1930s were male, mostly francophone and often had legal training¹⁶⁸. Like Walshe they were Irish and internationally educated, often Jesuit educated and nearly always Catholic. Middle class Dublin was a small place between the wars and Walshe had often informally met many of his future recruits when they were university students.

By 1939 Walshe had all in place. He had defined his own post and pushed its limits, established his Department’s internal hierarchical structure and its external posture. He also had a considerable influence on the recruitment of personnel. There was one more item to secure. From 1922 External Affairs had been based in Government Buildings. These shared facilities were not to Walshe’s liking. When the Earl of Iveagh sought to bequeath his Dublin townhouse to the Irish state, Walshe pounced, securing Iveagh House as his departmental headquarters; the Department of External Affairs opened for business there in mid-1941.

Walshe’s relationship with de Valera was strengthened by the shared experience of wartime diplomacy. Their greatest test was managing Ireland’s Second World War pro-Allied neutrality. Their last joint venture was the September 1945 Heads of Missions conference in Iveagh House. Walshe had been at the head of the Department of External Affairs for nearly a quarter of a century. The following year, in 1946, he reached what Bromage referred to as “his ultimate destiny” – not only his appointment as Ireland’s first Ambassador, but as Ireland’s first Ambassador to the Holy See.

Can one person really make and shape the structure of a foreign service? The example of Joseph Walshe suggests they can. How long can that

¹⁶⁷ MICHAEL KENNEDY *et al.* (Eds.), *Documents on Irish Foreign Policy*, Vol. IV, Dublin, Royal Irish Academy, 2004, No. 214, memorandum by Walshe “State Publicity – General Principles”, 13 December 1933.

¹⁶⁸ For example, Fredrick Boland, Denis Devlin, John J. Hearne, William P. Fay and Michael Rynne – though Rynne was a Germanist.

influence last? The example of Joseph Walshe shows that it is perhaps ephemeral. Walshe was of his time, and it was passing. The 1945 Heads of Missions conference showed how his and de Valera's world view was out of touch with the Cold War world. Walshe's successor, Fred Boland, long his heir apparent, was a Harvard-educated technocrat, who later turned down the post of UN Secretary-General in succession to Dag Hammarskjöld. Boland swiftly restructured External Affairs in a manner befitting the multilateral diplomacy Ireland favoured after 1945¹⁶⁹. That structure, made up of interacting sections, remained largely intact until the early-1970s. Boland also appointed the first female Third Secretaries, he did not pose as the Minister's eminence grise and he delegated power to his Assistant Secretaries and to the new rank of Counsellor appointed beneath them.

In 1956, whilst travelling back to Rome Walshe was taken ill in Cairo where he died and is buried. Two years earlier my mother had had afternoon tea with him here in Rome at the Villa Spada on the Janiculum Hill, then the Irish Embassy to the Holy See. They later drove at breakneck speed across Rome and she remembers him talking animatedly in Italian to waiters at a restaurant in Ostia¹⁷⁰. Walshe's personality was vivid. It was imprinted on the structure of Ireland's Department of External Affairs in its formative years and in its institutional memory. A story goes that Walshe had the swimming pool at the Villa Spada drained when one of Boland's new female recruits took a dip in it. One man can create and build the structure of an institution and indeed dominate its workings. In Joseph Walshe the Department of External Affairs had, as we say in Irish 'fear an féin', translating to English one might say he was 'a man apart'.

¹⁶⁹ See MICHAEL KENNEDY, *The challenge of multilateralism: the Marshall Plan and the expansion of the Irish diplomatic service*, in TILL GEIGER and MICHAEL KENNEDY, *Ireland, Europe and the Marshall Plan*, Dublin, Four Courts Press, 2006, pp 102-130.

¹⁷⁰ Information from conversation with Catherine Kennedy, 2024. My mother was in Rome for the ordination of her brother Leo as a member of the Holy Ghost Order. Walshe was a friend of her uncle, John Leydon, who was the Secretary General of the Department of Industry and Commerce.

Helena Pinto Janeiro

Diplomatic Institute, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Portugal
& Institute of Contemporary History, Faculty of Social Sciences and
Humanities, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Portugal

Diplomats of the Carnation Revolution: Women & Beyond

Abstract: The formal admission of Portuguese women into the diplomatic corps was one of the democratic gains following the Carnation Revolution of 25 April 1974. Yet, this landmark achievement is rarely highlighted in narratives of women’s democratic progress and is almost entirely absent from comparative studies on female diplomats. This paper argues that this omission should be rectified and that the International Committee of Editors of Diplomatic Documents (ICEDD) is well-positioned to contribute to that effort. With its collaborative experience in comparative diplomatic history, ICEDD provides an ideal forum for this initiative. I begin by exploring who might be considered the “diplomats of the revolution” – from a young man in Salgueiro Maia’s military column to political appointees and the first women admitted into the diplomatic career. While the political appointment of top diplomats was not new, the fact that one of them was a woman certainly was. So too were the first women admitted as attachés in 1975 and 1976. Though their numbers were small and their positions mostly junior, their traces in the recently declassified diplomatic documents from the revolutionary period are precious. All the more valuable, then, are the oral histories of these pioneers, gathered by the Oral Memory of Portuguese Diplomacy project.

Keywords: Women in Foreign Affairs, Political Ambassadors, Portuguese Revolution of 25 April 1974, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Portugal, Portuguese Diplomatic Documents, Oral History, Comparative History

1. The “Hippy Army” and a Soon-to-be Diplomat: Portuguese Diplomatic Documents of the Carnation Revolution

Following the adage “When in Rome, do as the Romans do”, let me begin with the front page of the Italian newspaper *La Stampa*, published in Turin two weeks after Portugal’s Carnation Revolution¹⁷¹. Its headline was telling: “The Gentle ‘Coup’ of Lisbon”. Indeed, the military uprising of 25 April 1974 was almost entirely bloodless – a striking contrast considering that the

¹⁷¹ Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Portugal, AHD/SII/107 / Newspaper cutting: *Il “golpe” gentile di Lisbona*, in “La Stampa”, 10 May 1974.

Salazar/Caetano regime was the longest-standing dictatorship in 20th century Western Europe¹⁷². The four civilians killed that day by the political police were a tragic exception in what was otherwise a jubilant and peaceful mass celebration of newfound freedom. A spontaneous gathering of civilians turned a coup into a revolution, and instead of bullets, carnations bloomed from the rifles of the soldiers – like “a hippy army”, as *La Stampa* marveled.



Among those marching in the column led by Captain Fernando Salgueiro Maia (1944–1992), who famously arrested the head of the government, was a 20-year-old named Francisco Ribeiro Telles¹⁷³. Though he only joined the diplomatic service in 1984, and thus cannot be strictly called a “diplomat of the revolution”, his later contribution was pivotal. Forty years on – and fifty years after the revolution – it was during his tenure as Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) that the Portuguese diplomatic documents from the revolutionary period (until 1975) were declassified in bulk.

This move, endorsed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who extended it to documents up to 1976¹⁷⁴, bypassed the usual bureaucratic

Francisco Ribeiro Telles (the first military on the left) with his comrades, in the middle of the civilian crowd. Source: Private Archive, Photograph, Lisbon, 24th April 1974

¹⁷² Between 1926 and 1974, there was, first, a military dictatorship (1926-1933), and then, the Salazar’s New State (“Estado Novo”), which, like Franco’s Spain, survived the fall of the nazi-fascist regimes after the Second World War. António de Oliveira Salazar (1889-1970) was only replaced as head of the government (1932-1968) by Marcelo Caetano, after being mentally incapacitated by a stroke. Caetano (1932-1974), a former Salazar’s Minister, had been, in his youth, leader of the fascist-like youth organisation “Mocidade Portuguesa” and of the executive board of the only party allowed by the anti-democratic regime (“União Nacional”). When he took over from Salazar, expectations that he would be able to reform the regime and end the colonial wars in Africa by negotiating with the liberation movements were dashed.

¹⁷³ *25 de Abril – Os 240 que prenderam Caetano*, Lisboa, Edições Público, 1999.

¹⁷⁴ The year in which the new Constitution was approved, and the elections were held that gave rise to the first constitutional government and the first President of the Republic elected by direct universal suffrage.

step-by-step approval of the Declassification Commission. By removing red tape and granting researchers free access, Portuguese diplomacy made a clear contribution to the commemoration of the revolution's 50th anniversary¹⁷⁵.

2. Diplomats of the Revolution

Although young Ribeiro Telles would become a key figure in democratic diplomacy, he cannot be considered a “diplomat of the revolution” in the strict sense. Unsurprisingly, the recently released Portuguese Diplomatic Documents from 1974-1976 contain no trace of his early involvement, as he only entered the service a decade later.

So, who were the diplomats of the Portuguese revolution?

Diplomats, by definition, represent a country, not a regime. Most of those who had served under the Estado Novo continued in their roles after the revolution, maintaining their professional standards with little disruption. Aside from a few resignations by ambassadors with strong ideological leanings, and a few purges – most of which were later reversed – the ministry's conservative machinery continued to operate smoothly¹⁷⁶. While these diplomats did begin to follow the new political directives with varying degrees of enthusiasm, labeling them “diplomats of the revolution” seems a stretch.

More fitting candidates might be the young diplomats whose first international postings occurred just after the revolution. Though they had entered the career during the final years of the dictatorship, they completed their probationary periods at the MFA headquarters in Lisbon and embarked on their first foreign missions in the post-revolutionary era.

While researching for the ICEDD's most recent book, *The Fall of the USSR as Seen from the World's Capitals*¹⁷⁷, I came across one such diplomat: Manuel Marcelo Curto. Having joined the service in 1972, Curto received his first foreign posting in Moscow in October 1974, when Portugal's first Embassy in the USSR capital was finally inaugurated. A decade later, he returned as

¹⁷⁵ Another way was to set up the website *The 25th April Revolution and the New Diplomacy*: <https://diplomaciaerevolucao.mne.gov.pt/pt>.

¹⁷⁶ PEDRO AIRES OLIVEIRA, *A esfera do possível: Política externa e diplomacia na transição para a democracia (1974-1976)*, in FERNANDO ROSAS and MARIA INÁCIA REZOLA (Eds.), *Revolução portuguesa, 1974-1975*, Lisboa, Tinta da China, 2022, pp. 313-350. See, also, BÁRBARA REIS, *Ninguém gosta de falar sobre os saneamentos no MNE*, in «Público», 20 August 2020.

¹⁷⁷ FRANCESCO LEFEBVRE D'OVIDIO (Ed.), *The Fall of the USSR as Seen from the World's Capitals*, Roma, Ministero degli Affari Esteri e della Cooperazione Internazionale, 2024.

the embassy's second-in-command, witnessing the USSR's collapse firsthand – an event documented in the ICEDD publication. He later returned to Moscow as Portugal's Ambassador.

Diplomats like Curto, whose careers began abroad only after the fall of the dictatorship, might more accurately be described as diplomats “of democracy” rather than of the revolution.

More appropriately, the true “diplomats of the revolution” were the political ambassadors appointed in the immediate aftermath of 25 April¹⁷⁸. Returning to the example of the Embassy in Moscow, we find Mário Viçoso Neves (1912–1999), who became Portugal's first Ambassador to the USSR in 1974¹⁷⁹. He arrived in Moscow shortly after Curto and another career diplomat, Pedro Madeira de Andrade, who had been sent ahead to prepare for the embassy's opening. A respected journalist with a fascinating biography I will not detail here, Neves made a notable contribution after his Moscow tenure by editing the Portuguese diplomatic documents from the Spanish Civil War and World War II. This editorial work continued a series begun by General Fernando Santos Costa in 1961, titled *Ten Years of Foreign Policy 1936-1947*. Santos Costa, a central figure in Salazar's war cabinet and long-time minister, had produced ten volumes aimed at portraying Portugal under Salazar as a peaceful “oasis” in a war-torn world. In 1980, Neves edited the eleventh volume, shifting the narrative to include Portuguese suffering during WWII¹⁸⁰, notably in East Timor. A former war correspondent himself¹⁸¹, Neves published documents that Salazar had previously suppressed¹⁸² – shedding light on the

¹⁷⁸ See PEDRO AIRES OLIVEIRA, *op. cit.*, p. 341.

¹⁷⁹ MÁRIO NEVES, *Missão em Moscovo. Experiência da primeira embaixada no país dos Sovietes*, Lisboa, Editorial Inquérito, 1986.

¹⁸⁰ MÁRIO V. NEVES, *Explicação prévia*, in MINISTÉRIO DOS NEGÓCIOS ESTRANGEIROS, *Dez Anos de Política Externa, 1936-1947. A Nação Portuguesa e a Segunda Guerra Mundial*, Vol. 11, Lisboa, Imprensa Nacional-Casa da Moeda, 1980, p. 8. The fifteen-volume collection was published between 1961 and 1993.

¹⁸¹ He was one of the few reporters of the Spanish Civil War to witness the massacre of Badajoz by Francoist troops in 1936, an experience that marked him for life. The final article he sent to the Portuguese newspaper “Diário de Lisboa” was cut by the censorship and remained unpublished for decades: MÁRIO NEVES, *A chacina de Badajoz: relato de uma testemunha de um dos episódios mais trágicos da Guerra Civil de Espanha, agosto de 1936*, Lisboa, Ed. O Journal, 1985. See also <https://www.newsmuseum.pt/en/imortais/mario-neves>.

¹⁸² Namely the ones included in the report made by the Governor of East Timor on the years he has been held de facto prisoner by the Japanese occupants. The book was published in 1947 but soon after the entire edition has been apprehended on Salazar's orders. It has only been fully reedited five decades later: MANUEL DE ABREU FERREIRA DE CARVALHO, *Relatório dos acontecimentos de Timor: 1942-45*, Lisboa, Cosmos and IDN, 2003.

devastation in Portugal's Southeast Asian colony¹⁸³, now the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste.

Finally, the diplomats who entered the career from the bottom ranks following the fall of the dictatorship also deserve the “revolutionary” label. This group marked a historic shift: for the first time, women were permitted to enter the diplomatic service, whether at entry-level or top-ranking positions. Yet, the experiences of these women – Portugal's “generation of the revolution” – have been largely overlooked in fifty years of historiography on Portuguese diplomacy¹⁸⁴. And yet, in both traditional diplomatic records and oral history archives, ample material exists for those willing to explore it.

3. Women Diplomats: A Revolution Achievement

The inclusion of women was, in many ways, the most striking change in the Portuguese diplomatic corps brought about by the revolution of 25 April 1974¹⁸⁵. While this is undeniably true, it does not tell the whole story.

¹⁸³ Even so, the documents fall far short of fully illustrating the scale of the devastation and death in East Timor during the three years of military conflict during the Japanese occupation. In Portugal, to this day, the tens of thousands of Timorese and Portuguese dead have (almost) no place in Portugal's collective memory of the Second World War. See HELENA PINTO JANEIRO, *Portuguese Memorials of the World War II, between Remembrance and Oblivion*, in MANUEL BRAGANÇA and PETER TAME (Eds.), *Memories of the Second World War in Neutral Europe, 1945-2023*, Abingdon and New York, Routledge, 2024, pp. 79-97.

¹⁸⁴ To nuance this dominantly male gaze, I have recently analysed the Portuguese democracy's commitment to multilateralism, from the journey of the pioneering women of 1975 and 1976. See HELENA PINTO JANEIRO, *Diplomacia multilateral no feminino: a geração da revolução*, in “Negócios Estrangeiros”, 26 (2024), pp. 213-234 https://idi.mne.gov.pt/images/Revista_Negocios_Estrangeiros/n%C2%BA26_25_de_Abril/RevistaNegociosEstrangeiros_n%C2%BA26_14_HPJaneiro.pdf. From a more general perspective, see the pioneering master's thesis BY ISABEL LEMOS, *As mulheres na carreira diplomática: 1974 a 2004*, Lisboa, 2019 in <https://repositorio.iscte-iul.pt/handle/10071/2033>; and, with the latest statistical data: ROSA PODGORNÝ and MARTA SOARES ALVES, *Quantas são? Onde estão?*; SARA FALCÃO CASACA and SUSANA RAMALHO ALVES, *Género e carreira diplomática: assimetrias e desafios*, in “Negócios Estrangeiros”, 24 (2023), pp. 8-36 and pp. 37-64, respectively, both in <https://idi.mne.gov.pt/pt/publicacoes-e-estudos/revista-negocios-estrangeiros/negocios-estrangeiros-n-24-mulheres-na-diplomacia>.

¹⁸⁵ In 1974, women were also finally allowed to pursue careers in the judiciary and in certain senior positions in public administration, which until then have been reserved for men. See VIRGÍNIA FERREIRA, *Engendering Portugal: Social Change, State Politics, and Women's Social Mobilization*, in ANTÓNIO COSTA PINTO (Ed.), *Modern Portugal*, Palo Alto, The Society for the Promotion of Science and Scholarship, 1998 and DANIELA MELO, *Women's Movements in Portugal and Spain: Democratic Processes and Policy Outcomes*, in “Journal of Women, Politics & Policy”, 38/3 (2017), pp. 251-275.

Portuguese women had been working in the MFA throughout the First Republic, the Military Dictatorship, and the Estado Novo. However, from 1939 to 1963, Decree 29970 – signed on 13 October 1939 by Salazar, who was also serving as Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time – explicitly forbade them from marrying or having children. Despite this, many women employed in the MFA were highly qualified, although most were confined to administrative roles, where a few rose to positions of leadership. As for diplomatic and consular roles abroad, the historical record reveals a handful of notable cases: a cultural attaché in a major embassy (Maria de Lourdes Belchior Pontes, stationed in Rio de Janeiro from 1963 to 1966); a consul (Mary Noonan¹⁸⁶, who headed the Consular Section at the Portuguese Embassy in Dublin from 1972 to 1979, following seven years as vice-consul¹⁸⁷); and several vice-consuls. Nevertheless, none of these women were allowed access to the diplomatic career itself.

The formal admission of Portuguese women into the diplomatic career was made legally possible only in July 1974 – decades after many of their



international counterparts. Brazil allowed women in 1918 (despite banning them again from 1938 to 1954); the United States followed in 1920, Turkey in 1932 (with a similar ban from 1934 to 1957), Denmark in 1934, Norway in 1939, France in 1945, the UK in 1946, Canada in 1947,

The forerunner: Maria de Lourdes Belchior Pontes, while Cultural attaché in the Portuguese Embassy in Rio de Janeiro (1963-1966). Source: National Library of Portugal, BNP, Esp. E42, Cx. 44

¹⁸⁶ I am grateful to Michael Kennedy, who gathered a few more biographical details on her: Mary Harnett (née Noonan) died on 6 July 2004 in Mount Carmel Hospital on Dublin's southside, close to where she lived in Churchtown. She is buried in Fermoy in Cork in the south of Ireland.

¹⁸⁷ See *Anuário Diplomático e Consular Português*, Lisboa, Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, 1965-2004. In 1980, the *Anuário* was not published. From 1981 to 2004, Noonan appears on the Embassy's lists but in a lower (administrative) position, while the person in charge of the Embassy's Consular Section is now a diplomat (number 2 in the Embassy's ranking).

Sweden in 1948, and Japan in 1949¹⁸⁸. Even Spain (1932–1941, and again from 1962¹⁸⁹) and Italy (1963) preceded Portugal¹⁹⁰.

In short, from a purely legal perspective, Portugal's exclusion of women from diplomacy was an anachronism – albeit one that ended with the First Provisional Government after the dictatorship's fall. In July 1974, Mário Soares (1924–2017), then Minister of Foreign Affairs, oversaw the passing of Decree-Law 308/74. Article 25 of the decree eliminated the previous requirement that candidates for the diplomatic career had to be male. Just over two months after the revolution, this legal change opened the door to gender equality in the MFA. In November 1974, a competition for embassy attachés was opened and eleven women passed this first diplomatic exam open



to both sexes¹⁹¹. Five of them were appointed embassy attachés on 13 August 1975. The remaining six¹⁹² would have to wait until the following year to take office. Among them was Maria Margarida Figueiredo, who had already been working at the MFA since February 1974.

From left to right: Isabel Pádua; Margarida Figueiredo; and (after the Swedish wife of a future diplomat) Vera Fernandes, in a reception at the Necessidades Palace. Source: Private Archive, Photographer unknown, Lisbon, [1975?]

¹⁸⁸ See KARIN AGGESTAM and ANN TOWNS, *The gender turn in diplomacy: a new research agenda*, in “International Feminist Journal of Politics”, 21/1 (2019), p. 15, Table 1. Alexandra Kollontaï was the first Soviet Ambassador to Norway in 1924.

¹⁸⁹ *El ingreso de las mujeres en la Diplomacia en España (1878-1975): Un análisis de las trayectorias de las primeras diplomáticas españolas*, Madrid, Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, 2022.

¹⁹⁰ JULIE ANNE DEMEL, *Female “Diplomats” in Europe from 1815 to the Present*, in OLIVIER DARD, SONIA BLEDNIAK and ISABELLE MATAMOROS (Eds.), *Encyclopédie d’histoire numérique de l’Europe*, Sorbonne Université, 2020, <https://ehne.fr/en/node/12323>.

¹⁹¹ List of successful candidates in the competition for embassy attachés in *Diário do Governo*, 2nd Series, No. 133, 11 June 1975, p. 3534. A total of forty-three candidates were approved.

¹⁹² In 1976, the second wave of women who qualified in the same competition, which opened at the end of 1974, will assume their positions: Anabela Cardoso, Maria da Conceição Moreira, Maria do Carmo Allegro de Magalhães, Maria Isabel Machado, Margarida Figueiredo and Teresa Poças.

3.1. The Pioneers of 1975: Female Diplomats at the Bottom

Let us now focus on the five young women who made up the pioneering group of 1975: Ana Martinho, Ana Barata (1944-2019), Maria Dinah Azevedo Neves, Maria Isabel de Pádua, and Vera Maria Fernandes¹⁹³. On average, they were 29 years old and came from a range of professional backgrounds – law, secondary education, and civil service (specifically in the Ministry of Corporations and Social Security). Three of them were from Lisbon, one from Porto, and one from a small, isolated village near Bragança in the North of Portugal. Their academic qualifications were equally diverse: two held degrees in Law, one in Social and Political Sciences, and two in Philology. After passing the entrance exam, they joined the MFA on a probationary basis and completed their apprenticeship in Lisbon. In 1978, they were officially appointed as Third Secretaries of Embassy.

During her job interview, Maria Isabel de Pádua was asked by one of the examiners what she intended to do with her husband (*sic*). Fortunately, she had already filed for legal separation, which made the question less distressing than it might have been. Later, the passing of the divorce law – another achievement of the revolution¹⁹⁴ – allowed her to divorce formally, resolving the issue of the hypothetical “husband-consort”. Nonetheless, Pádua was the only member of the 1975 group who eventually left the diplomatic service following her second marriage. Her new husband was Daniel L. Dolan, an American diplomat she had first met in Lisbon, while he was working at the US Embassy. They reconnected in New York at the United Nations headquarters, where Pádua was stationed from 1979 to 1981. Ironically, that post – Portugal’s Permanent Mission to the UN – was both her first and last foreign assignment. At the time, the US Department of State prohibited its

¹⁹³ So far three of them have been interviewed by the Oral Memory of Portuguese Diplomacy Project. See ANA BARATA and PEDRO AIRES OLIVEIRA, *Entrevista à Embaixadora Ana Maria de Almeida Hidalgo Barata*, Lisboa, 9 March 2016, 26 February and 15 March 2017, published in 2022 in <https://memoriaoraldiplomacia.mne.gov.pt/pt/entrevistas/ana-barata>; VERA FERNANDES and HELENA PINTO JANEIRO, *Entrevista à Embaixadora Vera Maria Fernandes*, Lisboa, 8 May, 5 June and 11 July 2024, to be published in 2025; MARIA ISABEL DE PÁDUA and HELENA PINTO JANEIRO, *Entrevista à Segunda Secretária de Embaixada Maria Isabel Lino Neto de Pádua [Dolan]*, Lisboa, 22 August 2024, to be published in 2025.

¹⁹⁴ Portuguese married by the Catholic Church were legally prevented from divorcing until Decree-Law 261/75 of 27 May was passed, after an amendment to the 1940 Concordat, negotiated with the Holy See by the new Portuguese authorities after the 1974 revolution.

diplomats from marrying foreign diplomats, effectively ending her career in Portuguese diplomacy¹⁹⁵.

During her years in Lisbon and later in New York, Pádua became acutely aware of the global reality of gender discrimination. She followed the work of the UN General Assembly's Third Committee on Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural Issues, and bore witness to the early steps of a decade-long multilateral effort that culminated in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), adopted in 1979¹⁹⁶.

Other members of the 1975 group preferred domestic assignments or ministerial cabinet roles, limiting their postings abroad. Family considerations – particularly the challenge for spouses to maintain their own careers while accompanying female diplomats – often played a decisive role. Maria Dinah Neves, for example, had only two foreign assignments throughout her career: six years in Madrid and five in Milan. Her husband, a practicing lawyer, did not accompany her. Others had more international mobility. Ana Martinho, whose husband was a plastic artist with a more adaptable profession, served in four foreign missions: seven years at the UN in New York, one and a half years at the OECD in Paris, and four-year terms in both Prague and Vienna (OSCE). Ana Barata, who was divorced, had six long-term foreign postings: CSCE in Belgrade, Madrid, London, NATO in Brussels, Zagreb, and OSCE in Vienna.

Vera Maria Fernandes held the highest number of foreign assignments and in the most geographically diverse locations: Le Havre and Rouen, Vienna, Budapest, Goa, Ramallah, Addis Ababa, and Sofia. In her first posting as Consul in Le Havre and Rouen, Fernandes encountered blatant institutional sexism. She was denied the right to open a bank account in her own name because, although married, she had not taken her husband's surname. The bank insisted the account be opened by her husband. However, her husband had given up his own promising career to accompany her and was not authorized to work in France – so he could not open the account either. The only solution was to add his surname to her bank documents¹⁹⁷. Thus, Madame Reis Santos was created – a name that didn't appear on her passport and bore no connection to her legal or diplomatic identity. Despite holding

¹⁹⁵ DE PÁDUA and PINTO JANEIRO, *op. cit.* In fact, she took an unlimited leave absence and returned to the Portuguese MFA just before her retirement.

¹⁹⁶ See PINTO JANEIRO, *op. cit.*, pp. 219-220 (section «Pádua e Martinho na ONU. Eliminação de todas as formas de discriminação»).

¹⁹⁷ DE PÁDUA and PINTO JANEIRO, *op. cit.*

diplomatic status, she was forced into a symbolic erasure that no man in her position would have faced.

In Portugal, too, the institutional framework was not always equipped to deal with female diplomats and their families. In 1981, when her second daughter was born in France, Fernandes became the first Portuguese diplomat to give birth while posted abroad. Under pressure from her superior at the MFA, she was forced to forgo the maternity leave she was legally entitled to. Ironically, she had previously benefited from this same right after giving birth to her first daughter in Lisbon, thanks to the post-revolution expansion of social protections¹⁹⁸.

3.2. The Pioneers of 1975: Women at the Top

Also in 1975, two women entered the diplomatic sphere directly at the highest levels – one as a scientific adviser, the other as an ambassador. Both came from exceptional scientific and professional backgrounds: Maria Adelaide Brandão (1939–2008), a nuclear physicist, and Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo (1930–2004), a chemical engineer.

Between 1975 and 1979, Maria Adelaide Brandão served as Scientific Adviser to the Portuguese Delegation to the OECD. In this role, she represented Portugal in a wide array of committees – those concerned with Science Policy, Education, Industry, Energy, Environment, and also in the Nuclear Energy Agency. She played an active role in negotiations for Portugal's accession to the International Energy Agency, under the OECD umbrella.

As for Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo, she entered at the very top, becoming Portugal's Ambassador to UNESCO from 1975 to 1981¹⁹⁹. Her path-breaking role, however, had begun much earlier. In 1954, she had become the first woman to lead the Studies and Projects Department of the Companhia União Fabril (CUF), the largest industrial group in the Iberian Peninsula and one of the biggest chemical conglomerates in Europe at the time, with over 10.000 employees. Her public service trajectory continued with the 1974 revolution: she was among the first two women to be appointed as *Secretárias de Estado*²⁰⁰, and soon after became the first female Minister in a Portuguese

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁹ Although she was prevented from resuming her post in Paris in January 1980, by the government that succeeded her.

²⁰⁰ In Portuguese governments, *Secretário/a de Estado* (literally: Secretary of State) is a lesser position than Minister. The other woman in this first cabinet after the revolution was Maria de Lourdes Belchior Pontes (1923-1998).

government. Her diplomatic experience, too, predates her formal ambassadorial role. Before 1974, she had already been a member of the Portuguese delegations to the UN General Assembly (1971-1972) and had built up significant international experience through her participation in various civil society and religious organizations – including the 1961 session of the UN Commission on the Status of Women in Geneva. Notably, she is still the only woman to have served as Prime Minister of Portugal (1979-1980), and only the second woman in Europe to do so, following Margaret Thatcher by just two months. She also remains the only Portuguese Ambassador to have later



served as Head of government. Symbolically, her first press conference as Prime Minister-designate of the Fifth Constitutional Government took place in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' historic seat, the Palácio das Necessidades – the home of Portuguese ambassadors.

Ambassador Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo presents the guidelines for her future government. Necessidades Palace, Lisbon, July 1979. Source: Caring for the Future Foundation in the CD25A Archive, Photo 0153.041.001

3.3. Old habits die hard (1975-2024)

Old habits die hard, so it took another thirteen years for a second woman to be appointed Ambassador of Portugal. Maria Raquel Bettencourt Ferreira²⁰¹, a law graduate and high-ranking civil servant, became Ambassador in Stockholm in 1988 and in Tokyo in 1993. Before that, since the 1960s, she had gained extensive international experience in the field of multilateral organizations, as a Portuguese delegate to EFTA, GATT and the European Communities. She kept being involved in multilateral diplomacy also after 1974, thanks to the growing commitment of Portuguese democracy to Europe.

²⁰¹ See HELENA PINTO JANEIRO, *Mulheres embaixadoras? Foi preciso uma revolução*, in “Descendências Magazine”, 53 (May 2025), pp. 30-33, <https://descendencias.pt/mulheres-embaixadoras-foi-preciso-uma-revolucao/>

A decade later, two more women were appointed heads of mission, both of them career diplomats: Maria do Carmo Allegro Magalhães in 1998 in Windhoek and Ana Barata in 1999 in Zagreb. But it wasn't until 2005 that two women became full Ambassadors: Ana Martinho and Margarida Figueiredo. Martinho has also been the first, and so far the only, female Secretary General of the Ministry, a position she held between 2013 and 2017.

In 50 years of Portuguese democracy, almost 200²⁰² women have joined the diplomatic career, but only one woman, Teresa Gouveia, a high-ranking civil servant, has been Minister of Foreign Affairs (2003-2004). Although we are still far from equality, diplomacy is no longer a gentleman's club.

4. For a Transnational History of Women in Diplomacy

Borrowing the title of a fellow panelist, I would argue that the history of women in diplomacy constitutes a substantial – and largely unwritten – chapter of the institutional histories of foreign ministries around the world. The same applies to the comparative and transnational history of women in diplomatic service, which remains strikingly underdeveloped. It is worth questioning whether Portugal's case diverges significantly from that of older democracies – especially if we look beyond the mere chronology of legal access to the career. Consider, for example, the restrictions placed on married women. In the United States and the United Kingdom, married women were barred from working as diplomats until 1972 and 1973, respectively²⁰³. Portugal, by contrast, had until 1974 barred all women from entering the diplomatic service, regardless of their marital status. One might argue that barring married women is less severe than banning all women. But that logic only holds if we accept the illusion that a woman's identity – especially her gender identity – can somehow be “neutralized” or stripped away, which, of course, is not the case.

I will close with an anecdote. While conducting research, I found that a woman had served as a cultural adviser at the Portuguese Embassy in Rio de Janeiro during the 1960s. When I mentioned this to a colleague at the MFA, her response was telling: “Oh, she doesn't count, she was like a nun!”. The woman in question, Maria de Lourdes Belchior Pontes, was in fact a highly respected intellectual and a professor at the University of Lisbon. She was unmarried and a devout Catholic. Similarly, Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo, the

²⁰² See PODGORNÝ and SOARES ALVES, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

²⁰³ KAREN E. SMITH, *Missing in Analysis: Women in Foreign Policy-Making*, in “Foreign Policy Analysis”, 16/1 (2020), pp. 130-141.

first female Ambassador and later Prime Minister, was also unmarried and deeply committed to Catholic lay associations.

In both cases, these women were seen as exceptions who could be accepted within a male-dominated system. Married women followed in their footsteps, but their history remains largely unwritten. And yet, it is not a national story alone.

So, I end with a question: Can the ICEDD contribute to writing this history – finally and fully – as part of a broader, transnational perspective?

Since I first asked this question in the Rome Conference, the creation of DiploDocWomen in March 2025 allows me to be sure it can. After all, the DiploDocWomen - Women, Diplomacy, and Diplomatic Documents is a transnational research network launched under the auspices of ICEDD.

Richard Smith

Principal Historian, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office

The Unwritten History of the Foreign Office

Abstract: This paper examines some of the reasons why an authorised or officially sponsored history of the Foreign Office has never been written.

Keywords: official history, institutional history, authorised history

Unlike some countries, the British Foreign Office does not have an authorised or officially sponsored history and I thought it might be interesting to examine why this might be.

There are, of course, plenty of histories of the Foreign Office, from the scholarly to the anecdotal (and I use 'Foreign Office' here to describe the organisation for its entire history). Some of these histories have been written by academics, others by retired diplomats, and others by well-informed journalists, often with a good deal of Foreign Office support. These include Geoffrey Moorhouse, *The Diplomats: The Foreign Office Today* (1977); Simon Jenkins and Anne Sloman, *With Respect, Ambassador: An Inquiry into the Foreign Office* (1985); John Dickie, *Inside the Foreign Office* (1992). These accounts, often well-written and informative, tend to tell the inside story of the Foreign Office at the time of writing, along with something of its history, but they are not attempting to be comprehensive. The closest one might say the Foreign Office has come to an official institutional history is with two books.

Firstly, *The Foreign Office* by John Tilley and Stephen Gaselee published in 1933. It was part of a series of studies – "The Whitehall Series" – into the work of different government Departments. The authors were both 'insiders' who knew how the office worked: Tilley, was a retired diplomat who ended his career as Ambassador to Japan but spent many years as Chief Clerk. Gaselee was Librarian and Keeper of the Papers. The manuscript was read by the then Foreign Office Permanent Under-Secretary, Sir Robert Vansittart. The introduction makes it clear it is a history of the office, and not of policy or foreign secretaries. The second book was published in 1955, also titled *The Foreign Office* by Lord Strang, Permanent Under-Secretary from 1949-53. This book was part of a series commissioned by the Institute of

Public Administration called – “The New Whitehall Series”. Strang did not write the book, it was drafted by a junior diplomat, but Strang commented on the draft and eventually agreed to sponsor the finished product. Several senior diplomats, along with Professor E. L. Woodward, author of the official history of British diplomacy during the Second World War, commented extensively on the draft. The preface described it as “a book about the Foreign Service by the Foreign Service”. The Tilley and Gaselee book, is quite anecdotal and gossipy in style. Its value today stems from the insight it gives into the thinking of diplomats and officials about their world and its history at that time. The Strang book often comes across as an extended attempt to justify to the 1950s taxpayer the need for an ever-growing Foreign Service.

Since then, interest in writing an institutional history has resurfaced periodically but without any resolution. In 1992 for example a publisher approached the Foreign Office with the idea of commissioning a single volume “first-rate authoritative history” for the “intelligent lay public”. The office was supportive of the project and a search took place to find, in their words, “the best man” for the job. The best man turned out to be a woman: Dr Zara Steiner. She had a detailed knowledge of diplomatic history in the 19th and 20th centuries, and had authored and edited works on the Foreign Office and the State Department. There were few people with a better understanding of the right questions to ask when considering the history of a foreign ministry. However, the project progressed no further. Since then, three ‘authorised’ histories have appeared of Britain’s intelligence services: Christopher Andrew’s history of MI5 (2009), Keith Jeffrey’s history of MI6 (2010) and most recently John Ferris’s history of GCHQ (2020). Commercially published, combining organisational history with operational detail, they proved popular and successful. How did these institutional histories succeed and what are the difficulties facing those who contemplate writing a similar history for the Foreign Office?

Scope

Is this a history of British foreign policy or of the Foreign Office as an institution? It is not easy to combine the two in one book. In 1992 the publisher came to see it as less of an institutional history, more of an account of the evolution of the Office, British Diplomacy, traditions and personalities. The Foreign Office is a very different organisation to the intelligence Agencies. It is one of the great offices of state, embedded in the whole history of Britain’s relationship with the wider world, and with domestic politics. Encompassing

250 years of British foreign policy and imperial history *and* the history of the Foreign Office as an institution in one book is difficult: if it were easy, more people would have done it by now. And that book would have to be very bulky. *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, published in 1922-3, ran to three volumes of around 700 pages each. What is meant by the Foreign Office? Historians are perhaps daunted by the complexity of its organisation and by its three changes of official identities in its history, all of which have added to that complexity rather than streamlined it²⁰⁴. What do we mean by foreign policy? History has shown that the foreign affairs of any country is intimately bound up with other affairs of state; domestic, military, economic. The extent to which 'the foreign' can be extracted from the inevitably wider range of sources this would entail, is difficult to see.

Scale

At the very least, one would have to start in 1782, the formal inception of the modern-day Foreign Office. Most scholars would not have the desire or indeed the stamina to engage with the literally hundreds of thousands of volumes of documents this would entail. It is well known that The National Archives measures its Foreign Office material in terms of *miles* of shelf space. This would be a major investment of time and resource – at least 5 years, and perhaps beyond the scope of a single author: research assistants would be needed. One way around this could be a multi-volumed official history each covering an historical period manageable within reasonable human endeavour, rather than one single massive volume. There is precedent here, albeit on a smaller scale, with a set of individually authored essays published for the bicentenary of the Office in 1982: *The Foreign Office, 1782-1982*.

Scribe

Then there is the question of the author: should it be an insider or an outsider? An outside author would need to be recruited; they and/or their academic institution would have to be paid a large fee; they would need several researchers, who would also need to be paid. The book is unlikely to be a runaway best-seller like the Agency histories so some form of subsidy may be required. Insiders may be cheaper and bring special knowledge, but they might not have the same resonance with the public and might be accused of tailoring

²⁰⁴ Foreign Office from 1782, Foreign and Commonwealth Office from 1968, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office from 2020.

what they write to political expediency. Even if there is no official interference, they might never be regarded as fully independent. There is also the question of tone. The history needs to avoid triumphalism on the one hand and undue apologetics on the other. It must not be bland: it must not read as though written by a committee.

Is a history needed?

All this leads to the obvious question: why bother with an official history? If someone wants to write a history of the Foreign Office, let them. Its archives are open from 1782 right through to the 1990s. There is also a vast secondary literature to draw on. This is a very different situation from the Agencies, whose archives were not open (MI6) or only partially open (MI5), and where a free market could not prevail: only one author could be allowed privileged access to each archive. The fact that no one has yet tried to write such a history may be an indication of the difficulties any 'authorised' historian would face. If there was a clear market opportunity for such a book, someone would have written it already.

However, the idea still holds periodic attraction for some in the Office. In the introduction to his *Future FCO Review* of April 2016, diplomat Tom Fletcher wrote: "The maps and chaps on the walls of King Charles Street remind us of buccaneering predecessors who set out to promote Britain's interests and values. . . . We should know their stories, because they are our stories"²⁰⁵. The last of his 36 recommendations was to "Promote a better understanding of the FCO's history and inheritance. Commission a 'History of the FCO' which all staff receive on joining". An official history could help inform the debate about the future role and identity of the Foreign Office. Since the creation of a professional Civil Service in the mid nineteenth century, the Foreign Office in all its incarnations has wrestled with issues surrounding allegations of elitism, of snobbery and of being a 'closed' world. This remains the case.

So, is there a way forward? The above seems to suggest that there might never be a set of suitable circumstances for an official history of the Foreign Office to be produced. Writing history is difficult: it's both time-consuming and intellectually challenging, but that is not a reason not to try. At the end of the day, you can get too hung-up on definitions. Perhaps all you need is to set out (and justify) parameters and then write the book you think

²⁰⁵ <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/future-fco-report>

can and should be written. The approaching 250th anniversary of the Foreign Office in 2032 might provide renewed impetus for such a project. And could the FCDO Historians do what no one else has done? Could they produce a book which does justice both to the history of the Foreign Office and the history of British foreign policy; a book whose judgements are wholly independent; a book which is accessible and not impossibly bulky? Not necessarily an 'authorised' history, simply a history: one that would stand or fall by its quality, not by any official endorsement? Well, come back in a few years and find out.

SESSION 4

QUESTIONNAIRE UPDATES AND PRESENTATION OF
COUNTRY PROGRAMMES

Chair: Richard Smith

Jillian Beard

Assistant Director, Historical Publications Section,
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Documents on Australian Foreign Policy in the Indo-Pacific region

Abstract: The latest offerings in the Australian Documents in Australian Foreign Policy series trace Australia's role in the decolonisation of the Pacific territories of Nauru and Papua New Guinea in the postwar period. The documents reveal the concerns and considerations public officials and politicians grappled with when balancing the interests of the peoples of Nauru and Papua New Guinea against those of Australia. Forthcoming volumes on Australia's relations with South Asia and the Southwest Pacific are also briefly discussed. Together, the relationships documented here, provide a strong sense of the significance of the Indo-Pacific in Australia's postwar foreign policy.

Keywords: Documents on Australian Foreign Policy (DAFP), Indo-Pacific region, Australia's postwar foreign policy, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, South Asia, Southwest Pacific

Documents on Australian Foreign Policy – recent outputs

Australia's Documents on Australia Foreign Policy (DAFP) series has grown by two volumes since the last International Conference of Editors of Diplomatic Documents (ICEDD). At the time of the last ICEDD in Warsaw in 2022, the second DAFP volume on the interwar period had just been published. The first of two volumes on that topic, *Australia and the World 1920-1930* by Professor James Cotton was published 2019. The second, *Australia and the World 1920 -1930* also by Professor Cotton, was published in late 2021. The official launch of these volumes was delayed by the Covid pandemic, but they were successfully launched by Australia's Assistant Foreign Minister, Tim Watts, in March 2023.

Since the previous ICEDD, two of the volumes that were in the process of being compiled, have been completed. On reflection, the topic of both those volumes and a number of upcoming volumes awaiting publication highlights a distinguishing feature of Australia's foreign policy, that is, its need to navigate the plurality of its settler colonial origins, its European cultural

heritage and its geostrategic location(s) in Asia, the Pacific, the Asia Pacific region or more recently the Indo-Pacific²⁰⁶.

Both volumes published since 2022 cover Australia's relationship with Papua New Guinea (PNG). These volumes follow an earlier publication in the DAFP series that documented bilateral relations with PNG. *Australia and Papua New Guinea 1966-1969* edited by Stuart Doran was published in 2006. After the publication of that volume, it was anticipated that a second volume covering the period 1970-1975, be compiled. That proposed singular volume has subsequently become two. The first, *Australia and Papua New Guinea: The Transition to Self-Government 1970-1972* has been followed by *Australia and Papua New Guinea: The Push to Independence 1972-1975*.

The next few volumes to be published in the DAFP series were also initially conceived as singular volumes – in this case covering Australia's relations with Nauru, the world's third smallest country. It transpired that the complexity of the relationship was not commensurate with the size of the country. Instead of a singular volume, it has taken three DAFP volumes to accurately capture this relationship between 1945 and 1968.

The first volume, *Australia and Nauru: The Phosphate Trusteeship and the Resettlement Issue 1945-1962* is currently in press and will likely be available by the end of 2024. The two remaining volumes are divided in much the same way as the PNG volumes – their titles, *Australia and Nauru: Political Advancement and the Abandonment of Resettlement 1962-1965* and *Australia and Nauru: The Path to Independence 1965-1968*, explain their contents. These second and third volumes are currently undergoing final edits and are likely to be in press by the end of this year.

My report will initially focus on the themes of these volumes before briefly discussing my own upcoming volume on South Asia and the way in which our forward program's work on the Indo-Pacific region attests to its continued capacity to compile material that – in keeping with the original vision of senior officer, Keith Shann in the 1970s – is of "importance to [the] present work of the Department"²⁰⁷.

The capacity of the DAFP series to acquit this remit is exemplified in these recent volumes. The number of volumes devoted to accurately and

²⁰⁶ MEG GURRY, *Identifying Australia's 'Region': from Evatt to Evans*, in "Australian Journal of International Affairs", 49 (1995), pp. 17-31; MEG GURRY, *Australia and India: Mapping the Journey 1944-2014*, Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 2015.

²⁰⁷ Submission to Gilchrist, *Publication of Documents on Australian External Relations*, 3 April 1967, National Archives of Australia: A1838, 584/3/1 PART 1.

coherently documenting these relationships (six in total) underscores that historically, the Pacific region has figured heavily in the work of Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and its antecedents. Geography suggests it always will. The Papua New Guinea and Nauru volumes document relationships in which Australia was a minor colonial power at a time when decolonisation was gathering momentum. The rights of colonised peoples were also being considered by the United Nations and what was then known as the British Commonwealth. This required Australia's deep engagement with this and other fora, at a time when its own relationship with Britain was being recalibrated. The complexity of Australia's navigation of these relationships and the development of workable foreign policy in the circumstances, accounts for the burgeoning of these volumes.

DAFP Volumes - Australia and Papua New Guinea

The first of the recently completed Papua New Guinea volumes picks up where the first in the trilogy left off. The first Papua New Guinea volume had documented, among other things, the transfer of responsibility for the oversight of New Guinea to a new Department of External Territories and the Australian Government's canvassing of the possibility of PNG becoming a seventh Australian state.

The second volume provides an early indication that future Prime Minister Gough Whitlam (then leader of the Opposition) was in favour of independence for Papua New Guinea and that he considered delays to that process problematic. During a 1965 visit to PNG he declared the rest of the world would consider it "anomalous" if the territory did not attain independence by 1970²⁰⁸. Whitlam's suggestion was ambitious and although it was unrealised by 1970, the documents reveal a quickening pace in the steps taken towards self-governance. This was particularly apparent after the appointment of Andrew Peacock as Minister for External territories in February 1972, coinciding as it did with the election of an expanded Papua and New Guinea House of Assembly.

That election, designed to increase the capacity for local decision-making and transition away from Australian rule, saw the emergence of Michael Somare's National Coalition Government which challenged the

²⁰⁸ BRUCE HUNT and STEPHEN HENNINGHAM (Eds.), *Australia and Papua New Guinea: The Transition to Self-Government 1970-1972*, Sydney, University of New South Wales Press, 2020.

dominance of the United Party²⁰⁹, a conservative grouping concerned with the impacts of self-governance on their highlands-based constituency. The confluence of these events hastened self-governance, making questions about the likelihood and importance of economic self-sufficiency and sustainability for PNG, more pressing than ever. The documents also reveal that it was understood by mid-1972 that this would require an increased investment by Australia. Following the election of the Whitlam Government in early December of that year, the pace of change was even further accelerated.

This increased rate of change was not unproblematic – as documents in the third PNG volume confirm. In the haste to facilitate self-governance and transition to independence, the Australian Government neglected to sufficiently incentivise capable Australian public servants to remain for long enough to provide effective guidance to incoming officials – resulting in issues of inefficiency and independence for the PNG public sector from the outset. This difficulty was particularly apparent in the emergent local police force, and to a lesser extent the PNG defence forces – which were funded more generously due to Australia’s concerns about the defence of Papua New Guinea and Australia’s northern region²¹⁰.

The transition to self-governance had also involved the unification of disparate regions and interests in PNG, and this proved increasingly problematic as the transition to independence was initiated. The Bouganville region presented a particular challenge. Rich in mineral resources and consequently disproportionately wealthy in comparison to other provinces, Bouganvilleans were less inclined towards the unification of provinces that was inherent in the independence process. The Whitlam Government regarded this as a *future* issue for a newly independent PNG to solve, and the documents included in the volume raise the question of whether a slower transition may have facilitated a governance arrangement that shared this wealth differently and provided a more enduring resolution, mitigating future strife²¹¹.

²⁰⁹ BRUCE HUNT and STEPHEN HENNINGHAM (Eds.), *Australia and Papua New Guinea: The Transition to Self-Government 1970-1972*, Sydney, University of New South Wales Press, 2020.

²¹⁰ BRUCE HUNT and STEPHEN HENNINGHAM (Eds.), *Australia and Papua New Guinea: The Push to Independence 1972-1975*, Sydney, University of New South Wales Press, 2022.

²¹¹ BRUCE HUNT and STEPHEN HENNINGHAM (Eds.), *Australia and Papua New Guinea: The Push to Independence 1972-1975*, Sydney, University of New South Wales Press, 2022.

At a time when self-governance was becoming inevitable in PNG, Australia was also in the process of transferring responsibility for Nauru back to the Nauruan people. A former colony of the German Empire, Nauru was jointly administered by Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom by way of a League of Nations mandate granted at the conclusion of the first world war. The island was subject to Japanese occupation during World War II and towards the end of that war, Australia and its counterparts lobbied the American Chiefs to retake the island in order to secure their access to the phosphate deposits so critical to their agricultural industries.

Having been unsuccessful in those efforts, Australia redoubled its determination to reoccupy Nauru after the war; promptly repairing and replacing damaged phosphate mining equipment²¹². The first of the three volumes, *Australia and Nauru: Phosphate Trusteeship and the Resettlement Issue 1945-1962*, documents Australia's role in the administration of the trust territory from 1945 until the arrival of the fifth United Nations Visiting mission to Nauru in 1962. It charts the transformation in the Australia – Nauru relationship from a typical colonial administration during the 1940s, and 50s, to one characterised by what might be called 'enlightened self-interest' as Australia, and its colonial counterparts, attempted to balance the realities of decolonisation and the emergence of Nauruan sovereign interests, against Australia's ongoing reliance on the rich phosphate deposits that constituted the island's richest resource.

The documents bear out Australia's efforts to maintain access to Nauruan phosphate in the face of increased pressure from Nauruan officials for more adequate payment for it. They capture Australia's negotiations with the governments of New Zealand and the United Kingdom as co-administrators, and also with the British Phosphate Commissioners who were charged with providing the administering governments with high grade phosphate at the lowest possible price.

During the period that Australia administered Nauru under a League of Nations mandate, monitoring of that administration and the contingent phosphate mining was minimal and sporadic. With the change to the administration of a Trusteeship after the Second World War, the governance of the island, the extraction of its phosphate and the treatment of its indigenous peoples came under greater scrutiny via the United Nations

²¹² COLIN MILNER, STEPHEN HENNINGHAM and MATTHEW JORDAN (Eds.), *Australia and Nauru: Phosphate, Trusteeship and the Resettlement Issue 1945-1962*, Sydney, University of New South Wales Press, 2024.

Trusteeship Council (UNTC). The volume documents this scrutiny of Australia's activity and the efforts of a series of representatives to navigate the regulations and requirements of the UNTC.

The second of the three volumes documents the negotiation of a series of gradual increases in royalty payments to the Nauruans. These increases saw the 1960 royalty rate reach double what it had been in 1940. Recognising the island would likely verge on being uninhabitable once the phosphate deposits were exhausted, Australian officials turned their attentions to investigating sites the Nauruan people might consider amenable for their resettlement.

In 1960, the possibility of resettlement on the Australian mainland was seriously considered, but by 1964 after a series of negotiations, Head Chief, Hammer de Roburt rejected what had been called "a generous offer", citing concerns about maintaining the racial and national identity of his people²¹³. Instead, in 1965 a target date of 31 January 1968 was set for Nauru's independence²¹⁴.

The third volume, still in the compilation stage, will capture Nauru's eventual transition to independence in 1968.

Australia's relations with South Asia (1947-72)

The themes of decolonisation and strategic interest present quite differently in the documents related to my own work on the volume covering Australia's relations with three countries of South Asia – India, Pakistan and what was then known as Ceylon, between 1947 and 1972.

Australia's relations with these three countries – all members of what was then known as the British Commonwealth, has not been examined in the depth that might be expected of countries that share that affiliation. Australia's relationship with India during this period has been discussed in the most detail of the three, but even that relationship has been considered as lacking the significance that might be expected. The reasons given include Australia's restrictive immigration policy, the conservatism of Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies and his Cold War concerns about Communism and

²¹³ STEPHEN HENNINGHAM and MATTHEW JORDAN (Eds.), *Australia and Nauru: Political Advancement and the Abandonment of Resettlement*, Document 293, Sydney, University of New South Wales Press, 2025 forthcoming.

²¹⁴ STEPHEN HENNINGHAM and MATTHEW JORDAN (Eds.), *Australia and Nauru: Political Advancement and the Abandonment of Resettlement*, Document 425, Sydney, University of New South Wales Press, 2025 forthcoming.

the preservation of the Commonwealth²¹⁵. The challenge then, is how to document a relationship in which there were few significant actions, agreements or even conflict.

One issue on which Australia did engage with India during this period was the Kashmir crisis. Australian High Court Justice Owen Dixon was appointed as the United Nations' Representative for India and Pakistan in March, 1950. Nehru was prepared to agree to the Australian mediator, he told Kashmiri Prime Minister Sheik Muhammad Abdullah in April 1950 – because he had a “high reputation for independence, integrity and ability”. Dixon delivered his report to the UN in September of that year, but with India and Pakistan continuing to differ on the implementation of the report's recommendations, no substantial progress towards a resolution was made.

As the intractability of the crisis became more apparent, Australia endeavoured to further cultivate relationships with both India and Pakistan, in the hope that it could assist in facilitating a solution. Australian High Commissions in New Delhi and Karachi were in constant communication with the Department of External Affairs in Canberra about how to manage these relationships. The Kashmir conflict precipitated an uncomfortable Commonwealth 'family' dynamic where Australia was required to consider its role in restoring the relationship between quarrelling 'siblings', while factoring in the views of a distant parent in Britain and an influential 'uncle' in the United States. Of course, the Kashmir conflict remains unresolved to this day, and Australia's relationship with India and Pakistan are now pursued more independently of each other as the significance of Commonwealth links have diminished and regional security agreements have become more commonplace.

Future DAFP volumes

The Historical Publications section plans to produce two further volumes related to the Indo-Pacific in the foreseeable future. Having completed volumes on Papua New Guinea and Nauru, Dr Stephen Henningham will be turning his attention to completing a volume on Australia's relations with the Southwest Pacific between 1950 and 1983. The overarching theme of the volume is decolonisation and the way it played out in relation to two broad topics. The first of these topics is regional organisation. In the late 1940s,

²¹⁵ MEG GURRY, *Australia and India: Mapping the Journey 1944-2014*, Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 2015.

largely at the behest of External Affairs Minister Evatt, Australia took a leading role in establishing the South Pacific Commission – a regional advisory body whose membership included Australia New Zealand, France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Netherlands. The Commission was primarily concerned with what was then referred to as ‘native welfare’, mostly through the lens of economic development.

The second major consideration of the volume will be developments in three of the Southwest Pacific countries, namely Fiji, the Solomon Island and the New Hebrides (which became Vanuatu). The volume will trace the changing nature of these regional forums as the islands of the Pacific sought and obtained independence and formed their own regional organisations. The documents will convey the ways in which Australia, together with New Zealand ensured they remained members of locally – driven fora, and the contributions Australia sought to make, particularly to reforms that improved governance arrangements and equalised the voices of island representatives. These were significant developments, particularly with respect to improving environmental protections and fishing rights.

The focus on Fiji will, among other matters, document the significant economic interests Australia had there – namely the Colonial Sugar Refining Company and Burns Philp Trading Company, both of which were engaged in Fiji’s plantation economy. In contrast to Fiji, the British Solomon Islands were significantly less developed both economically and socially. It was mooted that Australia assume responsibility for the administration of the protectorate, but this did not eventuate due to the costs involved. The Solomon Islands became independent in 1978, and Australia subsequently provided aid and technical assistance to the new nation. Australia also considered administering Britain’s interest in the Anglo-French Condominium of the New Hebrides. But costs were also a factor in this idea failing to progress. Instead, Australia sought to build relations with the emerging nationalist leadership of what would become Vanuatu, through the South Pacific Forum.

Australia’s Documents on Foreign Policy series continues to build a record of Australia’s relationships beyond our region and themes of historical significance. There are volumes currently in the early stages of compilation on relationships as varied as those with the United States of America and China, and a thematic volume documenting the reappraisal and rejection of the White Australia Policy between 1940 and 1980.

Brendan Kelly

Deputy Director of the Foreign Policy Research and Foresight Division,
Head of the Historical Section, Global Affairs Canada

**Re-imagining *Documents on Canadian External Relations*:
The Past, Present and Future of the Series**

Abstract: First published in 1967, the *Documents on Canadian External Relations* (DCER) series enjoys a sterling reputation in the academic community, but it currently faces certain challenges. This paper explores the origins and early development of the series, as well as some of the obstacles confronting it today. It concludes by examining how the series is being fundamentally re-imagined in order to preserve its long-term viability as a major scholarly resource.

Keywords: Documents on Canadian External Relations, Canadian diplomatic history, Global Affairs Canada, Vietnam War

Introduction

I would like to begin by thanking our Italian hosts for organizing this year's International Conference of Editors of Diplomatic Documents (ICEDD). It is my first such meeting, and my experience so far could not be more positive.

I also wish to pay tribute to someone many of you knew, Greg Donaghy, my predecessor as head of the Historical Section at Global Affairs Canada.

Greg joined the government in the 1990s and became one of Canada's leading historians of international relations. In 2019 he moved to the University of Toronto to head the Bill Graham Centre for Contemporary International History. Greg thrived in this new role, but on July 1, 2020 – Canada Day – he was taken from us prematurely. He leaves behind an enormous body of work, including books, edited collections, and over fifty scholarly articles.

Greg also believed strongly in ICEDD and formed many friendships here. He was particularly committed to Canada's diplomatic documents series – *Documents on Canadian External Relations* – or “DCER” for short. Between 1996 and 2002, he edited six volumes of DCER before becoming its general editor.

As Greg's successor, I have a simple goal in this paper: to give you a sense of DCER's past, present, and future. First, I will cover its origins and evolution. I will then address some of the challenges it now faces. Finally, I will discuss how we are addressing those challenges and, in doing so, re-imagining the entire series.

Origins of DCER

Although DCER began publication in 1967, the idea for the series was first raised in Canada in the late 1940s in what was then called the Department of External Affairs²¹⁶. Some of the department's archives were literally piled up to the rafters in the attic of its headquarters. Something had to be done, even if that meant simply destroying unimportant documents and sending the valuable ones to the National Archives. In the circumstances, the editing and publishing of key documents from Canada's diplomatic history was a particularly attractive possibility. Strong nationalists, Canadian diplomats were proud of their country's development into full nationhood in the first half of the twentieth century. During the Second World War, from the fall of France to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Canada had been Britain's most important ally in the conflict, playing a key role in such fields as weapons and food production. Emerging from the war with a strong economy and one of the world's largest navies and air forces, Canada cast off the timidity of its 1930s foreign policy and became an active player in building the post-war rules-based international order. A much more self-confident Canada was naturally eager to tell its diplomatic story. There was also an element of keeping up with the Joneses – in this case, Uncle Sam and John Bull. Since the Brits and especially the Americans had well-established diplomatic documents programs, it was feared that the Canadian role in certain historical events would either be ignored or distorted unless Canada had a series of its own.

In addition, there was a growing push from academics to access the Department's historical records. Their requests reflected the growing Canadian public interest in foreign policy in the 1950s. During this decade, once known as the "golden age" of Canadian diplomacy, Canada seemed to be punching above its weight in the world. When Foreign Minister Lester B.

²¹⁶ The information in this section of my paper draws heavily on GREG DONAGHY, *Documenting the Diplomats: The Origins and Evolution of Documents on Canadian External Relations*, in "The Public Historian", 25/1 (Winter 2003), pp. 9-28.

Pearson was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his key role in helping to defuse the Suez Crisis, Canadians basked in the afterglow of his triumph²¹⁷.

Although the time seemed ripe to inaugurate a Canadian diplomatic documents series, the project remained shelved during the 1950s. The Department had a Historical Division, but its responsibilities also included maintaining the archives, the departmental library, and the newspaper clipping service. Nor was it staffed by professional historians – such as your humble writer and the team he heads today – but rather clerks and diplomats. And not just any diplomats. According to one commentator, the Historical Division was known as “the drying-out division”, a dumping ground for both aging foreign service officers no longer at the top of their game and those not competent enough to staff available postings²¹⁸. The motto of the Historical Division back then might well have been, “Out of sight, out of mind”.

Yet, against all odds, DCER was approved by the Canadian Government in 1960. Over the next few years, staff wrestled with such questions as periodization, selection, and the need to consult with the Foreign Office in London before publishing certain British documents. These issues still loomed large when the first DCER volume appeared in 1967, Canada’s centennial year. As Paul Martin, the Canadian Foreign Minister at the time, wrote in the preface to the first volume, “Although the foreign policy of any country must from time to time be adapted to changing circumstances, there are in it continuing threads which represent the ideals, as well as the interests, of a people. A knowledge of past policy is therefore of value not only to scholars who study and interpret Canadian history but also to those who seek a broader understanding than a knowledge of current events can provide”²¹⁹.

The first DCER volume covered the years 1909 to 1918, 1909 being when the Department of External Affairs was founded. The second volume focused on Canada’s role at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. The third one documented the years from 1919 to 1925. Unfortunately, these early volumes were disappointing. They suffered from, as Greg Donaghy observes, “an uncertain mandate, inadequate funding, and a woeful lack of historical

²¹⁷ See GREG DONAGHY, *Coming off the Gold Standard: Re-assessing the ‘Golden Age’ of Canadian Diplomacy*, paper presented to the symposium *A Very Modern Ministry: Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada*, University of Saskatchewan, 28 September 2009, at http://www.suezcrisis.ca/pdfs/Coming_off_the_Gold_Standard.pdf.

²¹⁸ DON PAGE, *History and Foreign Policy: The Role and Constraints of a Public Historian in the Public Service*, in “The Public Historian”, 6/2 (Spring 1984), p. 25.

²¹⁹ PAUL MARTIN, *Preface*, in *Documents on Canadian External Relations*, Vol. 1, Ottawa, Queen’s Printer, 1967, p. iii.

expertise”²²⁰. They also tended to focus on the result of the policy process, not its development, thereby impoverishing the narrative. As well, the selections reflected the natural cautiousness of the bureaucrats behind the volumes who were used to working anonymously.

Such a conservative vision for DCER was ill suited to the public mood of the 1960s, which increasingly demanded greater openness and transparency from government. As Canadian foreign policy struggled to reach a consensus on such questions as nuclear weapons and the Vietnam War, academics demanded a more accurate record of Canadian diplomacy – warts and all. In a comparison that haunts the Historical Section to this day, Canadian academics also criticized DCER for its slow production pace compared to the more well-established (and much better resourced) American series. As one influential professor quipped, “DCER is moving with all deliberate speed – the speed of a heavily tranquilised snail”²²¹.

To its credit, the Department took these criticisms to heart. It began to hire professional historians, first part-time and then full time, to work on the volumes. It also broadened the series mandate to include the policy process. The new approach promised, as the introduction to the seventh volume in the series announced in 1974, a “comprehensive self-contained record of the major foreign policy decisions taken by the Government of Canada, and of the reasons for taking them, as well as of the major international events and trends affecting Canada, as evidenced mainly in the files of the Department of External Affairs”²²².

The result was a great success. With its volumes on Canadian diplomacy during the Second World War, DCER came into its own. Once its most vocal critics, academics were now its greatest champions. Since 1967, twenty-nine DCER volumes have been published covering the years 1909 to 1963 in Canadian diplomatic history. There have also been three special volumes – two on Newfoundland’s relationship with Canada before joining the country and a more recent volume on Arctic sovereignty in the late nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth²²³.

²²⁰ DONAGHY, *Documenting the Diplomats*, cit., p. 10.

²²¹ JAMES EAYRS, *Diplomacy and its Discontents*, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1971, p. 36.

²²² DAVID R. MURRAY, *Introduction*, in *Documents on Canadian External Relations*, Vol. 7, part 1, Ottawa, Information Canada, 1974, p. ix.

²²³ In 2024, all DCER volumes were re-scanned using the latest technology, improving their legibility, image quality, and keyword searchability. These digital editions can be consulted and downloaded through the Global Affairs Canada Digital Library.

Today, as with the other national programs affiliated with ICEDD, DCER is a major resource for scholars and university students. It is the first port of call for any serious researcher in the field. It is also a key resource for those who cannot visit the Canadian archives in Ottawa and is used as a teaching tool in university classrooms. In short, to quote a distinguished Canadian historian, the DCER series “is one of the great publishing enterprises in our [Canada’s] history”²²⁴.

Current challenges facing DCER

Having discussed DCER’s past over the last half century, I would now like to discuss its status at present. The last regular DCER volume was published over a decade ago, in 2013. Since then, we have released only one volume – the Arctic edition referred to earlier.

There are several reasons for this. First and foremost, personnel. In the 1980s the Historical Division had twelve people; today, we are a Section of three. Until recently, only one of our members worked on DCER. The research on the volumes (but not their editing) was contracted out to graduate students and other researchers. This was not necessarily a bad thing since it offered employment opportunities to the next generation of scholars in the field, but the government’s contracting process has become extremely complicated and wait times for security clearances excessive.

Second, as always there are financial challenges. Contract research is not cheap. Nor are the transcribers, indexers, printers, and other professionals needed to produce the series. Moreover, funding a historical publication like DCER is not easy in a foreign ministry understandably focused on the present and the world’s so-called “perma-crisis”. It is also a fact that government finances, not just in Canada but around the world, will be tight in the coming years.

Third, as alluded to before, DCER is not the sole focus of the Historical Section. In 2017 we published the third volume of the official administrative history of Canada’s Department of External Affairs, covering the years 1968 to 1984. The book was very well received, but for a variety of reasons, some outside of our control, it took twenty-two years to complete, draining scarce resources. Like many of ICEDD’s members, we also write academic articles, give talks, host events, and answer history-related questions from our

²²⁴ J.L. GRANATSTEIN, review of DCER vols. 14 and 15, in “The Canadian Historical Review”, 78/1 (March 1997), p. 118.

department, from diplomatic missions abroad, and from members of the public. As well, we maintain a popular online Heads of Mission Abroad database that lists Canadian ambassadors from the late nineteenth century to the present.

Fourth, and this is the final challenge I will note, now that DCER has entered the 1960s in terms of its coverage, we are facing a volume problem. The records seem endless, raising questions about the feasibility of trying to document every major foreign policy issue or event that Canada faced in a given year. As we know, globalization led to an ever-expanding foreign policy agenda. Also, development assistance assumed a greater priority, as Canada looked increasingly beyond the North Atlantic world to the Global South and to such regions as the Indo-Pacific.

This broadened scope generated what seemed like tons of new documents, a problem for which there is no easy solution. On the one hand, we could proceed as we had always done, but books that were already almost 1,500 pages each (even with the text at font size 9.5!) would now be even longer and more time-consuming to research; on the other hand, we could greatly reduce the number of documents printed, but, in doing so, risk skimming the surface in a way that would not satisfy our readers.

Future: The DCER series re-imagined

The final section of this paper focuses on DCER's future and how, in response to the challenges I have outlined, we are re-imagining for the first time in half a century what the series is and how it is done.

I should stress that my team and I at Global Affairs Canada are new, our predecessors having retired. Although we may lack experience, I think it is also fair to say that we are more prepared to question the previous way of doing things and to chart a new path.

In that vein, it was clear that we could not do both DCER and begin work on a new volume of the Department's official administrative history. If Volume 3 took twenty-two years, how many years would Volume 4 take? We thus paused the project and are exploring ways to cover this history differently, whether through another book, shorter articles, or other contributions. In that sense, this year's joint ICEDD project on the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 was timely, since this is a topic that we would have explored.

Pausing the official administrative history has allowed us to take an "all-hands-on deck" approach to DCER. It was clearly no longer feasible for

only one of us to be involved in the project – we all needed to be. This has led to some major changes. I am now both General Editor and Editor of the series. The two members of my team are DCER’s researchers, meaning no expensive contractors and long delays for security clearances.

Finally, it was obvious that the comprehensive DCER approach of the past – in which every major foreign policy issue or event for Canada in a given year was covered in a single volume – was no longer sustainable. As a result, our most important change was to adopt a thematic approach whereby new volumes cover a single topic over the span of many years. Our recent volume on the Arctic did this, but it was supposed to be an exception to the chronological and comprehensive format the series had always followed. We have now permanently re-oriented DCER towards the thematic, taking inspiration from some of the national teams within ICEDD of similar size who have adopted a like approach.

What we lose, of course, is comprehensiveness. What hopefully we gain is showing how Canadian policy on a key issue or event developed over the long term. In the old DCER volumes there would often be “cliff-hangers” because the volume usually ended with the calendar year, unlike wars and negotiations. As a result, readers of our latest volume always had to wait several years for the next book to continue the story. Now, in a single, self-contained volume, readers will be able to see how the Government of Canada handled a topic in its entirety.

Our first thematic volumes will document Canadian diplomacy during the Vietnam War, from 1963 to 1973. Vietnam was arguably the most important foreign policy issue of the 1960s and early 70s, overshadowing all else. Canada’s special interest in the conflict arose in part because in 1954 we had agreed with communist Poland and non-aligned India to supervise the ceasefire in Vietnam that led to France’s withdrawal from that country. By the mid-1960s our diplomats were still in Vietnam, despite there being no peace to supervise. But our presence there gave us a voice in the resolution of the conflict.

Thus, we delivered messages to the North Vietnamese on behalf of the Americans, sent our diplomats on secret probing missions to Hanoi, tried with other countries to bring the fighting to an end, and in 1973 briefly served on a new truce commission in Vietnam created after the signing of the Paris Peace Agreements. In short, Canadian diplomacy during the Vietnam War featured Canada’s best and brightest diplomats and had a major impact on relations with the United States, our neighbour and closest ally.

Although we cannot predict how our readers will respond to DCER's shift to a thematic approach, the change is designed to preserve the series by making it more viable as a major scholarly resource. Naturally, we still have many challenges. As noted, in producing the volume, we contract out such tasks as transcription, indexing, and printing, but the process is time-consuming and costly. To save time and money, we are considering making future volumes digital only and dropping the index. As many of ICEDD's members know, we also hired a publishing consultant to advise us last year. We are grateful to everyone who responded to her emails and requests for meetings about their respective programs. The information she gathered has been of great help to us as we explore new ways to streamline.

Conclusion

So that is DCER's storied past, its challenging present, and, I hope, its promising future.

I would like to end by noting that, despite this being my first ICEDD meeting, it is already clear to me how valuable this forum is. The challenges we face – from resources to methodology – are common ones, making it even more important that we gather periodically to discuss them and share best practices.

While our individual projects may be national in scope, internationally we are part of a larger community. Our meetings – and ICEDD's continued existence – testify to the fact that our work is read and that it is important. Countries need more diplomatic history – not less; we need more editors of diplomatic documents – not fewer. Given the fraught state of the world today, our mission has never been greater.

Giuliana Del Papa

Head of the Policy Planning, Statistics and Historical documentation Unit
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Public Diplomacy and the Publication of the Italian Documents

Abstract: In 2021, the Policy Planning, Statistics, and Historical Documentation Unit was incorporated into the Directorate-General for Public and Cultural Diplomacy. This reform presents an excellent opportunity to reflect on the role of history and its sources in the institutional activities of the Italian Foreign Ministry. Therefore, we will examine the publication of Italian diplomatic documents from its inception in 1946 to the present day, analyzing its transition from the secrecy-transparency dialectic typical of Open Diplomacy to the new objectives pursued within the framework of Public Diplomacy. Finally, we will provide an update on the progress made since the last conference in Warsaw in 2022.

Keywords: Open Diplomacy, Public Diplomacy, Secrecy-Transparency

Good morning everyone, since this is the first time I take the floor I would like to add my voice to previous speakers from this Ministry in stressing how pleased we are to have you here. I also thank Prof. Francesco Lefebvre, Rita Luisa De Palma and all of my team for the terrific work done to make this possible. The quality of the discussions we have had so far and the collective work that led to the publication of the book on the dissolution of the USSR are of great satisfaction to all of us.

I am the head of the Policy Planning, Statistics and Historical Documentation Unit, a long challenging and demanding denomination for a structure that encompasses past history, present analysis and future planning. After the latest reform of the Ministry at the end of 2021 the Unit was framed within the new Directorate-General for Public and Cultural Diplomacy, together with communication and cultural promotion, and therefore more directly tasked to pursue public diplomacy.

Tuning the work of scholars and researchers with the rhythms of diplomatic activity has become increasingly difficult. Prof. Lefebvre and I have discussed several times how to find the most effective way to put the knowledge of the scholars in the Scientific Committee and the huge work done in editing diplomatic document at the service of current diplomacy. We can certainly improve but I would say we have done it in a successful way this time

by placing at the heart of this event issues like the fall of the USSR and national minorities. These topics are obviously central in the study of international relationship as such but they are also especially relevant for acting diplomats at this very historical and diplomatic moment.

Let me go quickly through the history of the editing of diplomatic documents in Italy.

The scientific publication of Italian diplomatic documents started in 1946, in a context which was still dominated by the Open Diplomacy, that is by the need – if not the urgency – to abandon the “secret diplomacy” that – it was believed – had led to two world wars in the turn of 30 years and introduce transparency in the decisions of governments on foreign policy.

Actually, the secret-public dialectic has origins even older than the debate that opened up after the First World War and was deeply investigated in all its complexity for the foreign relations of the US series in a volume published in 2015²²⁵.

Already in 1875 the Italian Council of State expressed the vision that in 1815 a “complete historical and political period” had come to an end, thus suggesting that it would be appropriate to publish the documents of foreign policy and general administration “to the great advantage” of scholars²²⁶. Therefore the documents became “public” until 1815.

As a matter of fact, the great turning point came only after the Second World War.

30 years ago, in 1992, at the second ICEDD Conference at The Hague²²⁷, Prof. Pietro Pastorelli summed up the history of the Italian diplomatic documents’ series by highlighting 3 key elements:

- 1) The historical moment when it started. It was in 1946, at a very difficult time in Italy’s history, when the draft peace treaty was being

²²⁵ WILLIAM B. MCALLISTER, JOSHUA BOTTS, PETER COZZENS AND AARON W. MARRS, *Toward “thorough, accurate, and reliable”: a History of the Foreign relations of the United States series*, [Washington, D.C.], U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, 2015, [History of the Foreign Relations Series - Office of the Historian](#)

²²⁶ STEFANIA RUGGERI, *Inventario della “Serie D” (Direzione dell’archivio storico)*, Roma 1988 (Indici dell’Archivio Storico, IX), p. 12: [Storia e fondi – Ministero degli Affari Esteri e della Cooperazione Internazionale](#)

²²⁷ PIETRO PASTORELLI, *Italian Diplomatic Documents*, in *The Optimum Formula for a Foreign Policy Document Series*, Proceedings of the Second Conference of Editors of Diplomatic Documents, The Hague 16 and 17 January 1992, ed. by BOB DE GRAAFF and JOOST JONKER, ‘s-Gravenhage, Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis - Institute of Netherlands History, 1992, pp. 127-131: [The Optimum Formula for a Foreign Policy Document Series](#)

drawn up by the four victorious powers, President De Gasperi, as Minister of Foreign Affairs ad interim, found the time to reflect on this and to decide that a vast collection of diplomatic documents should be published covering the period from the Risorgimento until the armistice on 8th of September 1943.

- 2) A second important element was the democratic factor. Italy was regaining freedom and therefore, Pastorelli recalled, “there could no longer be any place for diplomatic archives covered by a rule of perpetual secrecy, nor for historical research carried out on the basis of secondary sources and for historiographical debates based on manipulated assumptions that could not be verified”.
- 3) The third element was the scientific nature of the work. Italy would have to align itself to the practice followed by the other democratic countries in this field and by a Ministerial Decree of 20 September 1946 the Commission for the Reorganization and Publishing of Diplomatic Documents was established, “chaired by Ambassador Raffaele Guariglia with Prof. Mario Toscano, who had proposed and supported the idea, as vice-chairman. The appointed members of the Commission were Federico Chabod, Carlo Morandi, Walter Maturi and Augusto Torre, the four historians who were working on the History of Italian foreign policy planned by ISPI (Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale), Luigi Salvatorelli, author of a well-known history of the Triple Alliance, Rodolfo Mosca and Ruggero Moscati”.

In other words, since its origin, the Italian series of diplomatic documents fit exactly to the course taken by the series of the other Countries, that is the scientific nature of publications, combined with transparency, or, as it has been defined by colleagues of FRUS in their recent description of the history of the FRUS series²²⁸, to that of a “responsible historical transparency”.

If we move closer to current times, a few changes are worth stressing.

As mentioned at the beginning, the placing of the Historical Documentation Unit has changed after the last reform. The new rules introduce a new mission, that of enhancing the value of the cultural heritage of the Ministry, which is represented by the historical archives. The concept of valorisation traditionally applied to cultural goods is therefore extended to our

²²⁸ *Toward “thorough, accurate, and reliable”*, cit.: “By the end of World War II, the Foreign Relations series had evolved to become an instrument of responsible historical transparency”: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus-history/chapter-6>

historical diplomatic archives, creating an obligation for us to measure and demonstrate the work carried out by the Ministry in this respect.

The framing of the historical archives within a Public Diplomacy directorate establishes a direct link with a very extensive concept, that is not entirely clear and that is also relatively new for us. The debate is still open after decades about what “public” means: who is the public we address? Does that public carry on some diplomatic activity? Are we just supposed to make any document public or shall we disclose only documents that contribute to the public interest? Prof. Poggiolini who runs a course on public diplomacy could definitely explain better.

Generally speaking, what we intend as public diplomacy is the series of activities based on 3 factors: 1) the mission: political advocacy (building support for the state’s strategic objectives); 2) the target: foreign public opinion (and the domestic one, although in an indirect way); 4) the actors: other than diplomats or officials (scholars, experts and others).

Strictly speaking, therefore, the edition of diplomatic documents appears to adhere more to the formula of Open Diplomacy rather than to that of Public Diplomacy.

However, offering a positive, accountable image of one’s country through the transparency of the proceedings to a qualified international audience – such as that of academia and research, scholars and students – is Public Diplomacy, because it provides public opinion with a source of legitimacy and trust.

Creating a network with that qualified audience – as we are doing today – is the way to let others, non governmental, non institutional actors carry the message. Public diplomacy again.

Finally, not only do we publish, but we circulate publications as a way to build and export an image of diplomacy abroad, to reveal reliable info on the reasons why decisions were made and what the underlying principles and values were. It’s a way to support the country’s image, public diplomacy again.

So, the cornerstone was and remains transparency, correct preservation of public heritage, and a sort of “operation truth”, especially at a moment of rampant disinformation. But in the new context the historical-documentary activity acquires a political, strategic and cultural value as a memory, identity and image of the Administration and the country. And this is the role that the latest reform has assigned to history in this Ministry.

Digital means open of course endless opportunities for dissemination, for reaching out to a wider public through exhibitions, podcasts, social posts. In the digital age, what diplomats or scholars say in books that is the real policy is far less important than what the users of google or Facebook decide that it is. And our duty is to use any possible mean to provide the reliable info. It goes with political facts and analysis on the current reality and it goes with history, which is one of the many victims of weaponization.

I was glad to hear the name of Amb. Tom Fletcher mentioned yesterday because I consider his essay *The naked diplomat*²²⁹ as the true reference for public diplomacy. I think he explains better than anybody else the power of individuals in today's diplomacy, thanks to the access to information that allow them to disentangle the complexity of international problems, to form an unmediated view on the information they receive and to influence and shape the response to events.

I conclude with a state of work of what we have been working on since the last Conference in Warsaw in 2022.

In 2015, the project of the new thematic series *Documenti sulla Politica Internazionale dell'Italia* was launched; in 2016 the work began and in 2017 the first volumes were published. We have been blessed recently by the arrival of a new generations of archivists who have replaced the retired staff and taken up new tasks. To date, 5 volumes have been published, 1 is being printed, another 2 volumes will be delivered to the Printing Office shortly, and another 2 are in an advanced state of preparation: in 2025/2026 we hope to celebrate the first ten years of activity of the new thematic series with 10 volumes.

The decision to publish the thematic series was presented by Prof. Lefebvre at the 2017 Editors' Conference in London and therefore you are very much aware of it. The thematic series aim to cover the most important topics on the Italian foreign policy agenda after the Second World War. At the moment, the topics on which we have been working are the Alto Adige/South Tyrolean question, the question of the eastern border, the origin of European integration, transatlantic relations, multilateralism; we cover especially the 1950s and 1960s.

In particular, during the year 2022, the trilogy on the origins of the European integration from the failure of the EDC to the "European relaunch", from 1953 to 1957, was completed. The three volumes constitute one of the

²²⁹ TOM FLETCHER, *The Naked Diplomat: Understanding Power and Politics in the Digital Age*, London, William Collins, 2016.

most complete editions of archival sources to date produced by one of the founding countries of the EEC.

We are about to complete the South Tyrol question from the 1960 United Nations resolution to the Moro-Waldheim agreements of 1969: 2 volumes were published in 2019 and 2 others are about to be printed.

The volume on Italy in the UN Security Council (1959-1960) is now in the press. And let me say I expect it to be the possible start of a new line of work also touching upon non European and non transatlantic affairs.

Two volumes on the transatlantic relations during the NPT negotiations (1966-1969) are almost complete. Research on the Osimo Agreements, 1968-1975, has begun.

The volumes are freely available online. Our Portal recorded over 560.000 accesses in 2023. This is a global estimate relating to the entire historical-archival and bibliographic heritage displayed on the portal. In any case, for a small audience, these seem to me as significant figures.

Speaking of the traditional paper format, we have checked that our series are still in demand. For the first time in decades, a project to disseminate the heritage of the *Documenti Diplomatici Italiani* series has been successfully concluded: some Italian and international institutions and specialized libraries have responded positively to our offers and last year more than 800 volumes were sent. Since my job consists very often in searching for money to do even basic stuff, let me take some credit for this.

Finally, more space has been given to multimedia and communication through social channels. In addition to the posts and videos on YouTube, Facebook, Instagram and X, I would like to mention in particular a series of podcasts with the title *Diplomatic Stories*, which were also prepared with the help of our members of the Scientific Committee. The episodes of the series *When the weapons are silent. Diplomacy at the service of (re)construction*, focuses on the process of construction and reconstruction following major conflicts, from the birth of the Kingdom of Italy to the fall of the Berlin Wall. The podcast talks about the role of diplomacy in the history of Italian and international foreign policy, through interviews with scholars and experts, comments on documents published in our series and also unpublished documents. The short videos that accompany the podcasts detail the documents used in the podcast. In order to make all of this work more systemic, by the way we have recently reviewed the web pages of the unit and of diplomatic archives and you can find there.

I conclude with a short reference to a project of oral diplomacy carried out by colleagues dealing with diplomats' training but supported by us in the process of interviewing senior retired diplomats. And this links very well with the next intervention and therefore I will stop here and thank you for your attention.

Miruko Atsuta

Deputy Director, Editor, Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy,
Diplomatic Archives, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan

**Japanese Diplomatic Documents and Publications:
Relations with Italy and Vatican**

Abstract: A brief history of the project on the *Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy* (DJFP) publication, and an overview of the most recent volumes. With an introduction of how Japan's relations with Italy and the Vatican have been covered in the DJFP.

Keywords: Japan, Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy, Japan-Italy relations, Japan-Vatican relations

Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy (DJFP)

Since its establishment in 1869, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan had published documents on specific diplomatic issues on an ad hoc basis. After World War I, however, the Ministry became aware of the importance of a comprehensive series of documents, which encouraged it to begin the necessary preparatory work. As a factor pushing this work forward, many young Japanese diplomats had realized the importance of “public diplomacy” through their experience at the Paris Peace Conference, and they were also influenced by the national commitments of Western countries to publish diplomatic documents, which made remarkable progress during this period.

As a result, the editorial process began in 1934, and the first volume of *Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy* was published in 1936. In launching this project, the Ministry set two goals: to clarify the background of Japanese diplomacy since the Meiji Restoration of 1868 and to provide basic historical documents that could serve as precedents for diplomatic negotiations. Since then, one or two volumes of *Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy* have been published every year, although publication was suspended during World War II. Up to now, 228 volumes have been made available.

Since the publication of the first volume, the editorial work has been carried out under two different approaches; one is a chronological approach

by compiling important diplomatic documents of each year after 1868, and the other is a thematic approach on particularly important diplomatic topics.

Recent Publications

As for our most recent publications, we are still working on the series to show various aspects of Japan's efforts to rejoin the international community in the 1950s and 1960s, especially two topics related to the postwar process, starting with the San Francisco Peace Treaty concluded in 1951. In 2023, we published the first volume of the *Reversion of Okinawa* series, and in March 2024, we released the first volume of the *Reparations Negotiations Following the Conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty* series.

Reversion of Okinawa Series

First, as part of our thematic series, we have published the first volume of the *Reversion of Okinawa* series, which traces the negotiations between Japan and the U.S. that led to the reversion of Okinawa in 1972, compiling related documents dating back to 1951.

The advantage of compiling a thematic series over an extended period is that it enables a comprehensive examination of the impact on the negotiations of changes in the international environment, domestic politics, and bilateral relations surrounding a specific issue, as well as the personalities of the leaders during each period.

The reversion of Okinawa is a special issue for the Japanese. It has been the subject of various scholars and the mass media, but they have focused most of their attention on the negotiations surrounding the Joint Statement by Prime Minister Eisaku Sato and President Nixon, released in November 1969.

In this series, however, we try to make clear that the reversion of Okinawa was not achieved by the special negotiations of 1969 alone, but by a series of diplomatic negotiations that had been going on since 1951.

In Volume 1, we have selected key documents from 1951 to 1964 on various issues related to Okinawa and the other islands and the negotiations with the United States by the five successive cabinets that would eventually lead to the return of these islands.

As you know, at that time, Okinawa and the other islands of the *Nansei Shoto* were under the administration of the United States based on Article 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which was signed in 1951. The Japanese

Government gave priority to resolving issues related to the legal status of Okinawa and the other islands, confirming that although the United States had administrative authority, sovereignty rested with Japan.

What is more, the growing movement of the residents of Okinawa and other islands to return to their homes, changes in the international situation due to the Cold War, and negotiations for the conclusion of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, all contributed to the gradual development of a road map for the return of Okinawa to Japan.

The series is expected to consist of six volumes.

Reparations Negotiations Following the Conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty

The San Francisco Peace Treaty, signed in 1951, included a clause on reparations, but it did not specify the exact amount and time frame for payment, and the matter was to be resolved through individual negotiations. The Philippines, Indonesia, and Vietnam wanted to negotiate reparations with Japan, and after an extended period of negotiations beginning in 1951, they signed agreements with Japan in 1956, 1958, and 1959, respectively. Burma, which refused to sign the peace treaty because it was dissatisfied with the reparation clause, negotiated separately with Japan, and signed an agreement on reparations and economic cooperation as well as peace treaty in 1954. Although the negotiations were protracted because the four countries and Japan had different views on the scale and distribution of reparations, it was an extremely important process for Japan to strengthen its relations with Southeast Asia against the backdrop of the international situation during the Cold War.

In March, we published the volume on negotiations with Indonesia and Burma. A volume on negotiations with the Philippines and Vietnam will be followed in August. And the first chapter of the first volume contains not only documents on the four countries, but also documents which show Japan's basic policy. Since our collection does not include explanatory texts, the international and domestic circumstances that should be understood as the background of these negotiations are described by relevant documents in the opening chapter of the book.

Japan-Italy Relations

Next, I would like to discuss how relations between Italy and Japan have been covered in previous DJFP series.

The Diplomatic Archives collection contains more than 2,300 files on relations with Italy, and a large number of related documents are included in both the chronological and thematic series of the DJFP. Diplomatic relations between Japan and Italy began with the signing of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce on August 25, 1866, which allowed the stationing of a diplomat in Tokyo. The first volume of the DJFP contains a letter dated June 1, 1867, announcing that Count Vittorio Sallier de La Tour had been appointed Italian Minister Plenipotentiary to Japan and had arrived in Yokohama²³⁰.

In 1868, the Tokugawa shogunate, which had been in power since 1603, was abolished and a new Japanese Government was established. In this new government, the emperor was legally recognized as the sovereign authority over foreign affairs. And the main diplomatic challenge was to revise the unequal treaties that had been concluded with Western countries during the shogunate period. In 1871, the *Iwakura* mission which included many senior leaders of the new government visited Western countries, marking the beginning of negotiations to revise these treaties²³¹.

The mission visited 12 countries and stayed in Italy from May 8 to June 3, 1873. At that time, the Japanese Government was focusing on national modernization as one of the measures to advance the negotiations. It was considered essential to show the West that Japan was a “civilized” country by adopting the institutions, technology, and culture of Western countries.

Japan recognized Italy as a particularly superior country in terms of technology and culture. The delegation visited cities such as Florence, Rome, Naples, and Venice, participated in numerous official events, such as an audience with Victor Emmanuel II, and energetically visited various facilities and institutions.

In 1873 and 1879, Prince Tommaso, Duke of Genoa, came to Japan. The prince’s visit to Japan was unofficial and for educational purposes, and although most of Italy’s interest in Japan at that time was focused on silkworm eggs, the Japanese Government interpreted it as a sign of Italy’s goodwill toward building closer political and economic relations between the two countries. In fact, the prince actively interacted with the emperor and other influential figures in the Japanese Government and succeeded in establishing good relations with them²³².

²³⁰ DJFP, Vol. 1, Part 2, Appendix 3, pp. 28-30.

²³¹ DJFP, Vol. 6, pp. 45-48.

²³² DJFP, Vol. 12, pp. 127-132.

As for subsequent interactions with the imperial family, in 1921 Prince Hirohito of Japan visited Italy, ignoring domestic concerns about political unrest in Italy²³³.

Japan's subsequent relations with Italy are covered in the thematic series of the DJFP, including the *Paris Peace Conference of 1919*, the *Washington Conference of 1921-22*, the *London Naval Disarmament Conference of 1930*, the *Tripartite Pact of 1940*, and the *World War II*. The chronological series of the DJFP also contains documents on more general relations, such as the exchange of collections between museums and art galleries. The chronological series also includes documents on Italy's assistance in the selection of the site for the 1940 Olympic Games, for which Tokyo was chosen as the host city, but it did not take place due to the Sino-Japanese War²³⁴.

And in the 1950s, Italy was a little ahead of Japan in terms of reintegration into the international community after the war, but it seems that they had relatively close concerns within the Cold War structure. For example, in October 1954, Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida made his first postwar visit to Italy and met Italian Prime Minister Mario Scelba and Foreign Minister Gaetano Martino to discuss "the common policy of Italy and Japan for strengthening the unity of free nations and for dealing with the threat from the communist camp", specifically the need for measures to separate China and the Soviet Union²³⁵.

Japan-Vatican Relations

Now, let me talk about the relationship between the Vatican and Japan, or Christian issues in the DJFP.

The first appearance of Christianity in Japan was the arrival of the Portuguese missionary in 1549. However, as missionary activities in Japan became more active and the number of Christians increased, the Tokugawa shogunate, perceiving this as a threat, issued an official ban in 1612.

Nevertheless, when Japan signed treaties with the United States, Great Britain, France, Russia, and the Netherlands in 1858, granting religious freedom to foreigners residing in the settlements, this led to an influx of missionaries. But because Japan had officially banned Christianity to

²³³ DJFP, 1921, Vol. 1, Part 1, pp. 508-651.

²³⁴ DJFP, *Showa Era, Series II, Part 2*, Vol. 4 (1935), pp. 717-722.

²³⁵ Telegram from Rome to Tokyo, No. 286, October 22, 1954, A¹.1.5.0.3 (Vol. 4), Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan (hereafter cited as DA-MOFAJ).

Japanese people, foreign missionaries were not permitted to conduct their work outside the settlements. After the dissolution of the Tokugawa shogunate, the nascent Meiji Government maintained the prohibition on Christianity, which prompted diplomatic protests from foreign envoys and a series of diplomatic disputes²³⁶.

The Iwakura mission, which set out in 1871 to revise the treaties, was requested to lift the ban on Christianity in every place they visited. The pressure prompted Iwakura to telegraph the Japanese Government in February 1873, with a request to withdraw the posted notice which prohibited Christianity. And while the Meiji Constitution of 1889 recognized religious freedom as a prerequisite for establishing a modern state, it did so on the premise that the emperor was “sacred and inviolable”.

In the 1930s, as the military came to power, this issue resurfaced. In 1934, military personnel stationed on the island of Amami Oshima attempted to evict Catholic missionaries from the island, denouncing the adherents for acting against the nationalist concept, and attempting to force them to convert. In response, the Holy See asked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to resolve the situation.

The Foreign Ministry lodged a protest with the military, stating that these actions were detrimental to Japan’s national interests. During this period, the Foreign Ministry was concerned about Japan’s potential for international isolation and was eager to maintain cordial relations with the Holy See, which was perceived to have considerable influence over European and South American countries and was seen as more understanding of Japan’s anti-communist stance.

Although the military agreed to calm the situation, they tried to justify their actions by saying that they were simply educating people who lacked a sense of patriotism and that they did not intend to interfere with religious freedom²³⁷.

After the outbreak of the Pacific War, the Vatican maintained diplomatic relations with Japan to serve as an intermediary in matters such as the treatment of prisoners of war, and in 1945 it attempted to mediate between Japan and the United States for the sake of peace, although it did not succeed²³⁸.

²³⁶ DJFP, Vol. 1, Part 2, pp. 802-809.

²³⁷ DJFP, *Showa Era, Series II, Part 2*, Vol. 3 (1934), pp. 936-955.

²³⁸ DJFP, *Pacific War*, Vol. 2, pp. 1022-1049.

In 1954, Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida visited the Vatican and expressed his gratitude for the Holy See's efforts in the postwar period regarding issues such as prisoners of war and war criminals²³⁹.

Digital Archives on the Web

Finally, I would like to introduce our web-based projects. The digital images of some diplomatic documents from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are accessible on the website of the Japan Center for Asian Historical Records²⁴⁰. A keyword search in English is available on the site. In addition, a web search engine for all of our records is available to the public on the Diplomatic Archives' website²⁴¹.

In terms of web publishing, our website offers the Digital Collection of the *Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy*, which features digital images of each volume. To date, 216 volumes, excluding the most recent 12, have been made available online²⁴².

²³⁹ Telegram from Vatican to Tokyo, No. 29, October 21, 1954, A'1.5.0.3 (Vol. 4), DA-MOFAJ.

²⁴⁰ The Digital Archives of the Japan Center for Asian Historical Record, <https://www.jacar.go.jp>

²⁴¹ Online Catalog for Diplomatic Archives' holdings, <https://www.da.mofa.go.jp/DAS/meta/default>

²⁴² The Digital Collection of the Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/annai/honsho/shiryo/archives/index.html>

Cees Heere

Historical Advisor, Netherland Ministry of Foreign Affairs

**Listening to the Past.
Observations from the Dutch Diplomatic Oral History Project**

Abstract: This paper summarizes a presentation delivered at the 2024 ICEDD Conference in Rome. It describes a major oral history project on Dutch diplomacy, undertaken by the Huygens Institute for the History of the Netherlands. It reviews the project's structure, method, and results, and offers some reflections the potential relationship of oral history to the writing and documentation of diplomatic history.

Keywords: Netherlands, diplomacy, oral history

In December 2023, the Huygens Institute for the History of the Netherlands concluded *Diplomatieke Getuigenissen*, or 'diplomatic testimonials', a major oral history project on the Dutch diplomacy²⁴³. It comprises interviews with forty Dutch diplomats and policy-makers, many of which were recorded over multiple sessions – in total, these oral histories run to over 160 hours of audiovisual material, or the equivalent of over a million words in text. I would like to take the opportunity here to outline our approach to the project, discuss its results, and outline some (potential) uses of oral history as a supplement and companion to more traditional forms of publication of diplomatic sources.

Project overview

Diplomatieke Getuigenissen ran from September 2021 to December 2023, during which time it was housed at the Huygens Institute of the History of the Netherlands, itself part of the Royal Dutch Academy of Sciences. The project was established through the generous support of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, specifically its directorates for documentation and digital infrastructure; research and policy planning; and communication. This departmental 'troika' corresponded to the project's three stated aims: to

²⁴³ See *Diplomatieke Getuigenissen*, <https://diplomatieke-getuigenissen.huygens.knaw.nl> accessed 10 January 2025.

preserve and document the memories of key figures in the making of Dutch foreign policy, to make these accessible for historical study, and provide a window into the inner workings of the Dutch diplomacy for the public at large.

Within this limited timespan, we sought to establish a collection that could be employed for a broad range of research purposes. We selected participants for their proximity to key decision-making moments. The interviews cover practically every major episode in Dutch foreign policy since the late 1970s, stretching from the 1975 Helsinki Summit and the independence of Surinam, through the Euromissiles crisis, German reunification, the Maastricht Treaty, the dissolutions of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, the end of apartheid, the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, EU and NATO enlargement, to the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis and the downing of MH-17. In addition, we sought to create a collection with a broad regional and thematic coverage, taking in development cooperation, European integration, and trade policy as well as geopolitical and security issues. Finally, we strove to ensure that our interviews reflected a variety of personal perspectives; specifically, we sought to counteract the fact that, right up to the first decades of the twenty-first century, the overwhelming majority of senior Dutch diplomats were men (in the final tally, one quarter of our interviewees were women).

How did we conduct the interviews? The people we approached had, on the whole, enjoyed distinguished careers in diplomacy and public policy. Many were used to being interviewed. Some had written their memoirs, or had written works of history or travelogue about the countries in which they had served. Many were, furthermore, attuned to the fact that they had borne witness to – or played a part in – events of world-historical importance, and often had strong views on the manner in which they wanted these to be recorded for posterity. This inevitably had an impact in the way that we prepared and structured the interviews. At the outset, we were careful to stress the historical nature of our project, making clear that we sought to conduct a more extensive, more detailed interview than they might be accustomed to, and stressing the responsibility that we felt, as historians, to produce a truthful representation of the past. We also emphasized the essentially collaborative nature of the exercise, in which both interviewee and interviewer act together in dialogue as co-creators of a historical source.

We met every interviewee for a preparatory meeting, often several hours long. These meetings helped to establish a personal rapport, and invited our interviewees to discuss the outlines of their careers and possible topics for

conversation: were there any subjects that they thought warranted more detailed discussion? These contributions were often vital: as researchers, we had access to materials in the public record, but we often had to rely on our interviewees for insight into episodes that remain in the classified domain. We then compiled a written list of subjects for discussion. This approach might have come at the expense of spontaneity, but it did allow our interviewees to jog their memories, consult private archives, and prepare themselves for the interview.

Early on in the project, we made the (perhaps somewhat audacious) choice to record the interviews on video. We were ultimately glad we did. Video allowed us to capture an additional layer of non-verbal communication, and it serves as a much more accurate record of speech than a transcript that has to be inevitably edited for clarity (we suspected, also that our subjects would have objected to the publication of non-edited transcripts). Still, our use of video also placed additional weight on the preparatory phase. Everyone who has ever been interviewed, especially on video, will recognize the pressure to present themselves cogently ‘for the record’. But these pressures are perhaps especially strong for those, like diplomats, whose careers are tied up with the command of their subject matter. Our use of video also impacted the interview in other respects. It effectively required us to have another person in the room to manage the equipment, and changes to the lighting environment (e.g. the sun passing behind cloud cover) occasionally demand that we pause the interview in order to adjust the image to new conditions. These inconveniences were ultimately minor – provided the interviewee was forewarned – but I would invite anyone thinking of conducting a similar project to carefully think through the implications of their chosen format, be it text, audio, or video.

Technical processing

Most comparable diplomatic oral history collections present their results in the form of digital text²⁴⁴. Besides being more familiar to diplomatic historians, whose source base is overwhelmingly text-based, textual sources

²⁴⁴ For representative examples, see ‘Frontline Diplomacy’, the oral history project of the Academy for Diplomatic Studies and Training (ADST), <https://adst.org/oral-history/>; the British Diplomatic Oral History Programme, <https://bdohp.chu.cam.ac.uk/>; the Commonwealth Oral History Project, <https://commonwealthoralhistories.org/>; and the Oral History of European Integration at the University of Luxembourg, <https://www.cvce.eu/en/web/guest/oral-history/>. See also the Associates of the American Foreign Service Worldwide’s collection of interviews with diplomatic spouses, <https://www.aafsw.org/fs-clips>. All accessed 10 January 2025.

also come with certain forms of accessibility built in, insofar as they can easily be searched, copied, and saved. Our use of video, by contrast, represented a significant set of accessibility challenges. We emphatically did not want to create a collection that would force our users to spend hours painstakingly scrolling through hour-length videos to see whether they contained anything of interest. Indexing – marking which subjects were discussed in which section of the video – provided a partial solution. But what we really wanted was to make our collection as easily searchable and navigable as if it were comprised of ‘flat text’.

After some experimentation with various digital tools, we developed the following workflow. First, we used an automatic voice recognition and transcription program to provide a rough draft of the transcript. We then reviewed the transcript manually, removing transcription errors, checking the spelling of proper names, and editing out repetitions and hesitations (the ‘eh’s’ and ‘uh’s’). The resulting text was much more easily readable, but still a faithful record of the original conversation. We then ran the transcript through the transcription program again, but this time we asked it to compare it to the original audio file and produce a so-called VTT, or ‘video timed transcript’-file. Fed into the appropriate video player, it can produce a fully interactive transcript, in which the user can easily navigate between text and video²⁴⁵. By extension, we were also able to make the entire collection word-searchable: from a search page, users can easily navigate across the entire database.

Reflections

I would like to conclude with a few reflections on the insights the project provided. Of course, the obvious caveats on the uses of oral history apply here. Human memory is an imperfect device for recalling the past. It is (1) fallible, (2) necessarily relayed selectively, and (3) prone to retrospective revision in light of later events. To give just one example, I found that a number of different diplomats who had served in the Soviet Union told me a version of the same anecdote. They would be engaged in conversation with a Soviet official, who would confess to them that they didn’t believe that the system could survive for very much longer. I wondered: was it only the knowledge of subsequent events, of the fact that the Soviet Union *did* in fact implode, these made this story stand out in their memories? Indeed, how sure can we be that such a conversation happened at all, or that it was not a composite picture of

²⁴⁵ We used Able Player, an open source video player designed for accessibility. See <https://ableplayer.github.io/ableplayer>.

multiple conversations? Such processes are innate to the way that humans use memory to make sense of their world, and may, indeed, be said to have aided the project in some respects. The fact that we started our first interviews shortly after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, for instance, clearly sharpened some of our interviewees' memories of the debates on European security and NATO expansion in the 1990s. The label 'use with caution' applies, but it is not unique to the practice of oral history. Nor does it invalidate it.

Looking back on the interviews we conducted over the course of the project, I would broadly identify four ways in which oral history can meaningfully supplement the documentary record. First, by making explicit some of the unwritten dynamics that influenced the making of policy. These range from personal and political dynamics – how closely were the minister or senior officials involved with a certain subject – to intellectual assumptions that may have not have been made explicit at the time, but which appear clearer in retrospect. How likely, for example, did Dutch officials regard the prospect that apartheid would end peacefully or violently? To what extent did Fukuyama's 'end of history'-thesis influence official thinking during the 1990s? Oral history allows to ask these kind of 'meta-textual' questions that interrogate the historical record as a whole, rather than specific sources within it.

Second, oral history can provide considerable insight into the practice of *diplomacy*, where the documentary record tends to favor the paper-intensive business of framing *policy*. We broadly know, for instance, why the Netherlands, acting on behalf of Israel, supported and facilitated the emigration of Soviet Jews in the 1980s, following the severing of Soviet-Israeli relations. We know much less about how it did so. Here, oral history fills in crucial details on the practices that Dutch diplomats developed to facilitate Jewish emigration, and the obstacles that they encountered when trying to do so²⁴⁶. It also provides insight into some of the contacts and interactions that are often only summarily described in diplomatic reporting, but which stood out all the more clearly in the memories of our interviewees.

Third, the practice of oral history reminds us that foreign policy is a human enterprise, conducted by people working under particular social, physical, cultural, political and bureaucratic conditions, many of which are

²⁴⁶ See, for instance, interview with R. Serry, conducted 29 March 2023, *Diplomatieke Getuigenissen*, <https://zoeken.diplomatieke-getuigenissen.huuygens.knaw.nl/interview/111>.

rarely made explicit in the documentary record. One of my particular interests here was the practice of surveillance by foreign intelligence agencies: how did diplomats working in Eastern Europe (or in other surveillance-heavy states) experience the practice of being watched or listened to? How did it affect their work? To what extent did the experience of surveillance influence their perspective on their host country? Here, perspectives varied widely. One diplomat, serving in Cuba during the 1970s, recalled his shock at the realization that his family was being spied on, and marked it as a sharp turning turning-point in his view of the Castro regime. An ambassador in Budapest in the 1980s for his part found himself surprised at the relative freedom he enjoyed to travel around the country – and chalked it up as a sign of Hungary’s growing openness towards the West²⁴⁷.

Fourth, and finally, our interviews also provide a window into the historical evolution of Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs as an institution, with its own peculiar culture and practices. One aspect of this is the position of women in Dutch diplomacy, a subject that remains under-researched despite being the subject of considerable coverage in the media. Of the women diplomats that we interviewed, some had played leading roles in the ministry’s internal ‘emancipation campaigns’ during the 1980s and the 1990s²⁴⁸. Others had worked, alongside male colleagues, on the incorporation of women’s rights into development and human rights policy. Still others had broken glass ceilings themselves, as the first woman to be appointed director-general or secretary-general, or to be posted as ambassador to certain capitals²⁴⁹. Cumulatively, these testimonials paint a composite, pointillist image of expanding role of women in the making of Dutch diplomacy, though more work needs to be done. In a few years’ time, a similar exercise would yield a much greater harvest of women’s experiences in the Dutch diplomatic service (the Netherlands is fast approaching gender parity at the ambassadorial level).

In conclusion, speaking to this particular assembly, I would conclude with a call to consider exploring the possibilities of oral history as a supplement to the documentary collections that we make it our business of

²⁴⁷ Interview with G. de Vos van Steenwijk, conducted 25 May 2022, *Diplomatieke Getuigenissen*, <https://zoeken.diplomatieke-getuigenissen.huylgens.knaw.nl/interview/20>.

²⁴⁸ Interview with M. Kappeyne van de Coppello, conducted 20 February 2023, *Diplomatieke Getuigenissen*, <https://zoeken.diplomatieke-getuigenissen.huylgens.knaw.nl/interview/91>.

²⁴⁹ Interview with R. Jones-Bos, conducted 3 March 2023, *Diplomatieke Getuigenissen*, <https://zoeken.diplomatieke-getuigenissen.huylgens.knaw.nl/interview/77>.

publishing. This could be done in a variety of forms – through the inclusion of oral history in documentary volumes, either as sources or as commentary; or by pairing public launches of new documentary volumes with a ‘witness seminar’ of former participants, the transcript of which could then also be made publicly available. The possibilities are certainly there.

Kathleen Rasmussen

General Editor, Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State

**Taking Back Control: Recent Innovations in FRUS Production
Talking Points for ICEDD Conference**

Abstract: Report on efforts by the Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State, to streamline FRUS production without sacrificing quality

Keywords: *Foreign Relations of the United States*, FRUS, government transparency, declassification, publication

Let me begin by thanking our hosts for their generosity in arranging a truly wonderful and informative conference.

Today I will talk about the status of the [*Foreign Relations of the United States*](#) (FRUS) series, with a particular emphasis on what we at the U.S. State Department's [Office of the Historian](#) (OH) are doing to publish FRUS in a timelier manner.

As Minister Plenary De Pedys said in his opening remarks, among the many merits of our documentary projects is that they support government transparency.

But there can be no transparency until these histories are made available to the public through publication.

Today, the biggest challenge for FRUS is its rate of publication.

From 2011 through 2018, OH published an average of 7.6 FRUS volumes per year.

Since 2019, we have struggled to maintain that rate of publication: for example, in the last three and a half years, from January 2021 to May 2024, OH has published an average of only 1.5 FRUS volumes per year.

The primary cause of this dramatic slowdown in publication has been a successive series of challenges associated with the U.S. Government interagency declassification process through which each FRUS volume must pass before it can be published.

Here the numbers tell the tale. In 2014, there were only 18 FRUS volumes undergoing declassification review; as of May 2024, there are 45

FRUS volumes undergoing declassification review, or 2.5 times the number from a decade ago.

Given that OH has little direct influence over the timeliness and quality of the declassification reviews conducted by U.S. Government stakeholders with equities in the documents we select for publication in FRUS, we in OH have been devoting a lot of time to rethinking our own processes – particularly those portions of the production process over which we can exert direct influence – and coming up with ways to make them more efficient without sacrificing quality.

Today I'd like to talk about some of the innovations that we either have adopted or will be piloting to exercise greater control over our FRUS workflow, including those aspects over which we seemingly have little to no control.

In particular, I will highlight three areas:

- rethinking FRUS processes in the digital age;
- controlling what we can, when we can; and
- publishing what we can, when we can.

Before I begin, I should note that the FRUS production process involves three stages:

- research, selection, annotation, internal reviews, and revision;
- declassification reviews; and
- editing and publication.

Today I will focus on the first and third of these stages.

First, we are rethinking FRUS processes in the digital age:

- We are revisiting FRUS annotation and stylistic norms, dispensing with outdated and overly burdensome requirements. This saves time in all stages of FRUS production.

- We have embraced chapter-by-chapter internal reviews of volume manuscripts and the use of tracked changes when reviewing. This allows us to identify stylistic errors and substantive disconnects earlier and more efficiently, providing the historians who produce the volumes with better feedback faster. Using tracked changes also preserves current editorial decisions for future reference by technical editors.

- We are exploring ways to modernize our internal database and tracking systems and to streamline annotation and editing processes. These promise to give us better intellectual control over our documents and volumes and save time in all stages of FRUS production.

Second, we are seeking to control what we can, when we can:

- We are frontloading research for multiple FRUS volumes in response to records access issues.

- We are planning the George W. Bush FRUS subseries, including researching and scanning high-level records of use to the entire FRUS compiling team. This takes advantage of the presence of the Bush presidential records in Washington, D.C., as well as our recently acquired ability to access records 20 years and older.

- We are rethinking how we interact with the interagency declassification review process at all stages of FRUS production.

Third, we will increasingly publish what we can, when we can:

- We will begin frontloading the editing of volumes so that once a volume is declassified it can be published more quickly.

- We will be piloting a new process that takes advantage of our digital-first publishing format to release intellectually cohesive chapters of volumes as they are declassified. This helps us avoid situations in which a handful of still-classified documents holds up publication of the other 300+ documents in a volume.

- In this last initiative, we are building on our previous experience with select FRUS volumes. For example, in 2014 we published a [first edition](#) of the Western Europe, 1973-1976, volume that included every chapter except the one on Italy, which was still undergoing declassification review. Seven years later, in 2021, we published a [second, revised edition](#) of the volume that incorporated the now declassified chapter on Italy.

Taken together, we hope that initiatives such as the above will help us publish FRUS in a timelier manner while continuing to meet our “thorough, accurate, and reliable” mandate.

Thank you!

SESSION 5

NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FIELD OF DIGITAL
EDITING

Chair: Piotr Długolecki

Michal Saft and Louise Fischer

Israel State Archives

**The Many Lives of a Digital Publication:
Challenges in the Long-term Maintenance of Online Publications**

Abstract: The paper discusses the advantages and disadvantages of digital publications in general, and especially the challenge of maintaining them on a website over a long period. We focus on the example of the Israel State Archives' publication on the Yom Kippur War of October 1973, a publication which has undergone many changes since its original publication in 2010. The publication is presented on the ISA website, which is about to undergo a major upgrade.

Keywords: digital publications, electronic publishing, National Archives, Yom Kippur War

The Israel State Archives digital online publications reach a wider public and enjoy other advantages not found in the printed volumes in the first series of *Documents on the Foreign Policy of Israel*. However, they have not achieved the same prestige as the books, which were seen by many scholars as an essential introduction to the study of foreign policy in Israel in the 1950s²⁵⁰. In this paper, we will trace the various versions of one of the ISA's «flagship» digital publications, on the Yom Kippur War of 1973 and the diplomacy which accompanied it, in order to try to illustrate the advantages and pitfalls of digital publications.

Every year in the fall, with the approach of the fast of Yom Kippur, one of the holiest days in the Jewish calendar, the Israeli public returns to the difficult questions about the war that broke out on Yom Kippur, 6th October 1973. Historical research, novels, memoirs, newspaper articles, movies and TV programs have related to this event, a traumatic one for Israeli society, perhaps more than any other in its history until now²⁵¹.

²⁵⁰ The books, covering the 1947-1961 period, have been scanned and can be seen online using the link below: <https://journaliststudio.google.com/pinpoint/search?collection=5c240460d6671547>

²⁵¹ Since October 2023, the anniversary has been overtaken by the events of 7 October and the war which followed, and the two events are constantly being compared.

In September 2023 we marked the fiftieth anniversary of the war, and public interest was greater than ever. According to the Israeli Archives Law, sensitive security materials should be declassified after 50 years. The Israel State Archives decided to declassify, scan and upload thousands of pages of documents which had not previously been shown to the public.

At the same time, the archives' publications department decided to update the Yom Kippur War digital publication, which was already available on the website. This publication started its life in 2010, on the Archives' very basic first website, and, in the course of 14 years, has undergone many changes. We present it here as an example of the ISA's experiments with digital publications, which have been ongoing for many years.

At a previous conference, we presented to this group an ambitious plan to replace the printed books on Israel's foreign relations with a series of digital publications. It was to be geographical and thematic rather than chronological, and to cover the 1960s. This vision has not been realized. Several publications were prepared and uploaded, but not all were transferred to the Archives' second website in 2015. In fact, the series in its previous form is no longer active. However, in recent years we have issued publications based on diplomatic documents from later periods, on a variety of subjects such as the peace processes with Egypt, the Palestinians and Jordan, immigration of Jews from Ethiopia to Israel, relations with the Vatican and more.

The long-term management of these publications has confronted us with a number of issues and challenges²⁵². These included:

- Technological changes, which require us to change platform and influence how the publication is displayed and the links to it;
- Policy changes, for example in defining the target audience;
- New content, based on newly declassified material or newly published memoirs
- Protection from outside attack;
- Ensuring the authenticity and credibility of documents

We will illustrate these issues by tracing the different stages in the life of the Archives' Yom Kippur War publication. This publication focuses on the

²⁵² For a general discussion of the «promise and perils of the digital edition», see the Handbook on Best Practices for Digital Diplomatic Documentary Editions on the website of the ICEDD, <https://diplomatic-documents.org/best-practices/digital-editions/>

decision making by Israel's leaders during the war and the diplomatic moves that followed, resulting in the signing of agreements with Egypt and Syria.

We will see how changes of the type indicated here influence the character of a publication, sometimes giving us a new perspective. We may even ask the question whether the opportunity to update a publication is a blessing or a curse.

The Israel State Archives and changes in the character of digital publications

For historical reasons, Israel's national archives is responsible for its foreign policy publications²⁵³. As a result, there is a close link between the work of the Archives, especially that of the Declassification Department, and the work of the diplomatic editors. This has advantages and disadvantages. One advantage is access to a wide variety of sources, not only from the Foreign Ministry but also from the Prime Minister's Office, which plays a central role in directing foreign policy in Israel, and from other ministries. Another advantage is the ability to initiate and speed up the declassification of material needed for our publications, and to produce publications to accompany major declassification projects.

The Archives website is the platform for our publications. However, our dependence on the website has been problematic. The current website, which came online in 2015, is based on the vision of the former Chief Archivist, Dr. Yaacov Lozowick. His ambition was to transform the Archives into a completely digital body. Resources were concentrated on the mass scanning, declassification and uploading of files, as requested by the public. Systematic declassification of Foreign Ministry files was halted.

Becoming completely digital was not difficult for the publications department, because by 2013, it had already moved to publications based entirely on scanned documents. This saved us time and money spent on typing and proofreading. However, although scanned documents may be seen as more authentic, they are sometimes difficult to read. It is also difficult to add footnotes, which led us to prepare longer introductions.

²⁵³ YEMIMA ROSENTHAL, *Publishing Foreign Policy Documents from the Israel State Archives Collections*, in *When Past Encounters Future: A Tribute to The Legacy of Paul Avraham Alsberg Through the Lens of the 21st Century: An Anthology of his Writings and Contemporary Responses*, pp. 510-520, (Hebrew), Israel Archives Association, 2025.

The Chief Archivist demanded that the documents in these publications be linked to, and accompanied by, full scanned files. This benefits the readers, giving them wider access to the material, on which the publication was based. However, it has led to long delays in the declassification process.

Other changes in the Archives have led to the diversion of staff of the publications department to other projects, such as operating a Visitors' Center and taking part in a pilot AI project. They are also responsible for the Archives' presence in social media.

The Yom Kippur War publication

A war is always a political event as well as a military one, and the Yom Kippur war was no exception. The documents show how, despite warnings from several sources, Israel was surprised by the combined attack in October 1973. After initial failures Israel recovered and conquered territory on the west bank of the Suez Canal and inside Syria. Great Power involvement on both sides led to a Soviet airlift of arms, followed by an American one.

After the ceasefire, a stand-off with the Soviets even resulted in a US nuclear alert. The war ended with substantial military gains for Israel, but neither side achieved a clear victory. This helped US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to open a peace process with the Arab states²⁵⁴.

In 2010, Dr. Hagai Tsoref, a member of our staff, and later the head of the department, decided to initiate a short publication on the Yom Kippur War²⁵⁵. Dr. Tsoref also edited the volume on Golda Meir²⁵⁶ in the Archives' parallel series, based on collections of letters and speeches by Israel's presidents and prime ministers, and he was instrumental in pressing for the declassification and publication of the sources on the war.

The 2010 publication is based on records of government meetings, consultations and exchanges of telegrams during the first four days of the war. It was published on the Archives' first website.

²⁵⁴ HENRY KISSINGER, *Crisis: The Anatomy of Two Major Foreign Policy Crises*, New York, Simon and Schuster, 2003; CRAIG DAIGLE, *The Limits of Détente: The United States, the Soviet Union and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1969-1973*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2012.

²⁵⁵ Dr Tsoref fought in the war as a junior officer, and, as for many of his generation, the experience shaped his life. He later published a book together with Dr. Meir Boumfeld, *A Day Will Come and the Archives Will be Opened: Golda Meir's Government and the Yom Kippur War* (Hebrew), Jerusalem, Carmel Publishing, 2022.

²⁵⁶ HAGAI TSOREF (Ed.), *Golda Meir, The Fourth Prime Minister, Selected Documents (1898-1978)*, Jerusalem, Israel State Archives, 2016. In Hebrew with English introduction.

In 2013, the department planned an extended publication to cover the whole period of the war, in response to requests from a group of veteran officers. In addition to records of meetings and exchanges of telegrams, mainly with the Israeli Embassy in Washington, we also planned to present the diary of Eli Mizrahi, who was the chief of staff of the Prime Minister. This source describes events inside Golda Meir's office in real time, hour by hour, sometimes minute by minute. The planned publication would involve early declassification of 900 documents²⁵⁷ and introductory chapters for each day of the war.

But at the last minute the request to present the core documents from the Prime Minister's Office was rejected. The Office is the depositing body, which by law has the authority to decide on the early opening of the documents. Thus, only the Foreign Ministry telegrams and other documents, which are declassified after a shorter period, could be included on a projected mini site. The mini site was set up, but never made available to the public and was later erased.

At that time, the Archives made other unsuccessful experiments with mini sites and electronic books. These included a publication on the peace process with Egypt, which was available as an app for Tablet for a limited time. Despite the failure of these formats, the raw materials from these publications were later preserved by transferring them to the new ISA website²⁵⁸.

The next website came online in 2015. It was based on the vision of the digital archives and was focused on the search function, which would allow the public to search independently for scanned digital files and download them. Publications were seen as secondary. Most of them were transferred individually to the new website.

Another development was the publication of the volume of the papers of Golda Meir, in 2016. Two chapters of the book cover the Yom Kippur war period.

The next stage in the life of the publication was the version published in 2018. 45 years after the war, we presented the declassified material available at that time, including the collection of telegrams prepared in 2013. This included the fateful telegram from Zvi Zamir, the head of the Mossad, Israel's intelligence agency, sent after a meeting with Egyptian spy Ashraf

²⁵⁷ Security material is generally classified for 50 years. Since only 40 years had passed, early declassification was possible, but special permission was needed.

²⁵⁸ For example, several chapters on the peace process with Egypt at <https://catalog.archives.gov.il/site/en/publication/israeli-egyptian-relations-en/>

Marwan in London, on the eve of the war. Marwan warned of the impending attack, and Golda Meir considered a pre-emptive strike against Egypt, but decided against it, because of the need for American support.

In 2020, the association of Yom Kippur war veterans petitioned the Supreme Court, demanding full disclosure of the material on the war. Before the petition was heard, the Archives and the Prime Minister's Office decided to accept the main argument that the material was of great public interest, and to publish the core documents on the government's management of the war. In October 2021 the Archives published an expanded version of the publication, including almost all the material prepared in 2013, Eli Mizrahi's Journal and a series of introductory chapters telling the Story of the Yom Kippur War.

The 2023 publication consists of an expanded collection of over 3,000 files, including almost all the material available. Since the 50 year restricted period had ended, the Archives was required by law to declassify all the remaining material. There were also unconnected changes in declassification policy. For example, new material on Israel's contacts with Jordan was released.

The collection, prepared mainly by the staff of the Declassification Department, includes files from other government ministries reflecting the social and economic effects of the war, video and audiotapes. All the material was tagged to make the search easier. A digital exhibition of press photographs was also prepared, since the copyright on them had expired²⁵⁹.

At the same time, our department republished the publication on the Story of the War, and updated the links to the original files. The Hebrew version was given a new name: *The Story of the War, Day by Day*, in order to differentiate it from the collection²⁶⁰.

The following Google Analytics diagram shows the jump in views of the Archives' website in September 2023.



²⁵⁹ <https://catalog.archives.gov.il/site/en/publication/ykw-en/>

²⁶⁰ <https://catalog.archives.gov.il/site/en/publication/the-yom-kippur-war-october-1973/>

In addition to the republication of the earlier chapters, a new chapter on the aftermath of the war was prepared. Since little important new diplomatic material from the war itself was declassified in 2023, we decided to focus on the period after it, ending with the agreement on disengagement of forces with Syria in May 1974.

On 31 May, exactly fifty years before this conference, Israel and Syria signed the agreement in Geneva, which finally brought the Yom Kippur war to an end. Israel withdrew from captured territory inside Syria, and also from some territory, captured in 1967. A few days later an exchange of Israeli and Syrian prisoners allowed those held since October, to return to their homes. The agreement, which also served the interests of Egypt, was mediated by Kissinger in a series of «shuttles». The chapter is based on records of meetings with Kissinger and newly declassified government meetings²⁶¹.

Challenges in digital publications

The changes in digital publications which are surveyed here give the public and researchers access to new material. However, they raise the question of the credibility of digital publications as compared to traditional books and articles.

Will updating publications and republishing of documents, after changes in declassification, affect their authenticity? How can permanent references be given, when the website changes every few years? At the moment, these changes mean that the links to the publications on the previous website are no longer valid. Researchers who quote them find that the link is obsolete. The Archives is working on a useful method of creating permanent links.

Furthermore, in the future, most documents will be «born-digital» and many archives are coping with the challenge of ensuring their authenticity. In fact, the Archives already receives born digital material, and is holding discussions on how to integrate it into its internal systems and make it accessible, including in future publications.

In order to be able to display the publications effectively and to produce a natural link between them and the collections, the department has taken an active part in planning the next website, which will go online in 2025. Some

²⁶¹ <https://catalog.archives.gov.il/site/en/publication/end-of-a-war-and-of-an-era-the-golda-meir-government-and-negotiations-with-syria-on-separation-of-forces-january-may-1974/>

improvements are planned, such as easier navigation among the publications, the ability to print a PDF version and other possibilities. One of the most interesting changes will be massive tagging of files and documents in the Archives internal system, which will enable us to link the publications to new items and update them automatically and continuously. The department plans to present a new kind of publication: a wide selection of short articles directed towards the general public, describing archival collections and people and events which are documented in the Archives. There will be a link to them on the homepage, and they too will be updated automatically.

Cyberattack, recovery and the new website

On 16th November 2023 the company hosting the Archives website suffered a cyberattack that put the search engine out of action and blocked access to the database. Our publications are still online, but the links to the files do not work. On the other hand, since in more recent publications, the documents themselves were uploaded, using editing software, and they are not linked to the files, they can still be seen.

As the ISA was already planning a new website, the Archives decided not to restore the old one, but to push ahead with the new one and to use temporary solutions like Pinpoint – a Google tool based on AI. All the files from the Yom Kippur war collection were uploaded to Pinpoint and appear on a temporary website, in Hebrew only. This site is available through the Hebrew homepage and also allows the user to search for files²⁶². We plan to upload the files for our latest publication on the peace treaty with Jordan to Pinpoint as well²⁶³.

The new website will be hosted on a secure government website.

Conclusions and future plans

As stated above, the ISA's digital publications have not found the same recognition as the printed volumes of *Documents on the Foreign Policy of Israel*. The constant changes in the themes of the publications and in their format, and the attempt to serve both an academic audience and the general public have led to many difficulties.

²⁶² <https://catalog.archives.gov.il/site/en/>

²⁶³ <https://catalog.archives.gov.il/site/en/publication/a-collection-of-documents-to-mark-the-30th-anniversary-of-peace-between-israel-and-jordan>

The Archives is dependent on the media to reach the public, who will not read huge collections of documents. On the other hand, researchers are often unaware of our work. In recent years, the Archives has not held seminars and public events which would publicize it. However, the period of the Covid epidemic showed that researchers do appreciate the ability to access the Archives and the publications online.

The future of our publications may lie in so-called «hybrid» projects, based both on Internet access to the files and an independent database of documents. These projects will also include a PDF version of the publication and hopefully printed books.

Another challenge is that of the use of AI in the Archives and in our publications. The Archives has made a pilot study on using AI to speed up tagging and declassifying files. The next pilot study includes using AI to prepare summaries of documents and even files in Hebrew, and tagging of persons and places in the publications. However, programs and other solutions available in other countries are often not yet useful for Hebrew-language databases and websites.

The work on this paper showed us that in the past changes and previous versions of publications were not documented sufficiently. We plan to improve our procedures and to apply this lesson in our next project on Israel's relations with the USSR and Russia in the 1980s and 1990s. It will be published in several parts, and this will be an opportunity to re-examine our original assumptions about the processes involved.

Joseph C. Wicentowski

Digital History Advisor, Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State

FRUS AI: Exploring applications of “artificial intelligence” for editing and enriching the *Foreign Relations of the United States* series

Abstract: An assessment of the present state of generative artificial intelligence tools and their utility for digital scholarly editions and historical inquiry.

Keywords: digital scholarly editions, artificial intelligence, machine learning, large language models, context window limit, retrieval augmented generation, optical character recognition, multimodal models

Preface: history.state.gov turns 15

Good afternoon, everyone! I always look forward to these meetings as a chance to share my office’s latest research and development and learn from you about yours. My deepest thanks to the organizers of this year’s conference. I have learned so much, and I look forward to continuing our dialog this afternoon and, since the conference is almost already over, after we return home.

First, I’d like to briefly note a meaningful anniversary. This year, my office’s website – history.state.gov – turned 15 years old. I recall presenting the website shortly after its birth at the 10th ICEDD conference in The Hague in 2009. As I said then in introducing the website, our goal in creating history.state.gov was to uphold the best traditions of diplomatic documentary editing while leveraging the flexibility and power of the internet to give readers new tools for researching with FRUS that were impossible or impractical with print.

The key to achieving that vision was adopting a new electronic format for our volumes that could capture the content, structure, and semantics of our volumes. The new format couldn’t be too rigid, or it wouldn’t have been able to accommodate the natural variations that marked FRUS over its 150 years – now 160 years. Among the various choices for digital formats, we adapted the Text Encoding Initiative – or TEI – the de facto standard for digital text projects in the humanities.

Having selected TEI as our format, we turned to digitizing our volumes. Thanks to cooperation from the University of Wisconsin Madison, who had already scanned 100 years' worth of our publications – 1861 through 1960 – we were able to create TEI editions of our volumes without needing to scan these books. Month by month, year by year, our digitization vendor gradually converted all our printed publications to the new format, which we reviewed for accuracy.

Our website now offers all 550 printed volumes in the FRUS series, as well as all our legacy electronic only publications and 5 of 13 legacy microfiche supplements. Each volume, encoded in TEI, can be browsed like a book, or searched like a database. Together, readers can search across the entire corpus – now over 310,000 documents – using keywords and date ranges. Each year we receive over 20 million visitors, and we are among the Department of State's top 5 public engagement websites. We are especially pleased that about 40% of our visitors – a growing percentage – come from outside the United States.

Introduction

Today, I am presenting on an area of great promise and great uncertainty: artificial intelligence (AI). To be precise, I am discussing the so-called “generative AI” tools made popular by OpenAI's ChatGPT, not the larger field of machine learning (ML).

Initial skepticism about generative AI for historical inquiry

ChatGPT was released in November 2022, but for a full year, possibly because I suffer from a lack of imagination, I could not see a direct application of this technology to our work. When you ask these tools a question, they present a confident answer. But where did this answer come from? How were these tools trained? As Kathy Rasmussen asked a group of AI engineers we were meeting with, “Where did this AI go to school?” Curious to find out, I did some research into how these tools work. ChatGPT and similar generative AI tools were trained on a vast swath of the Internet – at the cost of tens of millions of dollars per tool. But the companies that produce these tools don't list the precise sources they consulted. When you ask the tool to provide citations for an answer, they will. But as with any factual questions you may put to these tools, the answers may well be made up or hallucinated. Obtaining

a reliable provenance of information about the training inputs and generated outputs is a major question for generative AI tools.

It’s easy to fall under the illusion that the tool producing words on the screen is a thinking sentient being containing the sum of all human knowledge. But despite their impressive abilities, these generative AI tools don’t actually think at all. They merely use a statistical model to generate an answer – one word at a time – that the tool judges to have the highest statistical likelihood of being used in the context of your conversation with it and its vast training set of data from the internet. This is why the tools are called “large language models” – or LLMs. They are remarkable, but they are models of linguistic probability, produced by training on large amounts of text.

To address the training and provenance problems, we could theoretically train our own model on our own documents, but the costs for training models make this option prohibitive, not to mention that truly vast amounts of data are required to train a model from scratch – far larger than, say, the corpus of the FRUS series.

What, then, could we use these generative AI tools for? Many reports praised ChatGPT’s ability to write prose in the style of Shakespeare or a pirate. Perhaps we could instruct ChatGPT to compose a sonnet in the style of Henry Kissinger? This was hardly a compelling idea, and I haven’t tried. These are the reasons why I initially dismissed tools like ChatGPT as an impressive technical feat, but ultimately a parlor trick without direct applications for historical inquiry. Of what utility is a tool whose output is an hallucination that on occasion might be accurate?

Discovering uses for generative AI

My thinking changed one year later, this past November 2023, when four developments came to my attention in rapid succession. These discoveries led me and several colleagues to dedicate time during the last 6 months to investigate the potential uses of AI for historical inquiry in general and documentary editing specifically. What capabilities grabbed our attention?

1. Interrogating documents (and the input and output limits of large language models)

First, ChatGPT began to allow its paid users to upload a PDF, such as a document or an article, and ask it questions about the PDF. What is this article about? What does the author argue? Finally, we could focus the tool on

our own data – on data of interest to us. Instead of relying on the tool’s undisclosed training materials for answers of dubious origin, we could do something never possible before – interrogate our own documents using plain language, thanks to the LLM’s ability to process language. This was starting to get interesting to me. If you haven’t done it before, I would encourage you to go to ChatGPT or Claude, upload an article (this feature is no longer limited to paid users), and ask the tool for a summary of the article or ask a question about some of the content in the article.

Still, this technique has some limits. ChatGPT can only keep a certain amount of information in its “head” during your conversation. These tools have a limited number of words they can keep in their short-term memory. This limit is called the “context window limit”. The longer you talk to the tool, the more likely it is that it will forget the beginning of your conversation. ChatGPT’s limit is approximately 25,000 words – or 80 pages. The practical effect of this “context window limit”, is that you might upload an article or document that is so long that the tool can’t keep the whole thing in its memory or quickly exhausts the limit after a few questions. As a result, it won’t be able to provide a comprehensive answer. Competing tools offer markedly higher limits than ChatGPT. Anthropic’s Claude 3 Opus boasts a context window limit 6 times higher than ChatGPT’s – 150,000 words, or 500 pages. Google’s Gemini 1.5 Pro, offers a limit 3 times higher still – 750,000 words, or 2,500 pages. That is finally enough to encompass even the largest FRUS volume – and is probably enough room for 2 average sized FRUS volumes.

Besides limiting the amount of data that the tools can accept as input, the tools also limit the number of words they can produce as output. ChatGPT is capped at 1,500 words – or about 5 pages. Claude doubles that – 3,000 words – or about 10 pages. Gemini doubles that again – 6,000 words – or about 20 pages. No matter which you use, the length of the answers to your questions is finite.

Still, the possibilities are intriguing. Can you think of any uses for asking questions about your articles or documents? One scholar uploaded all his published papers to Google’s Gemini, and he was impressed at the quality of its answers and confirmed that they reflected the conclusions he had reached in his works.

For my office, with our collection of over 550 books, even the largest models do not have a sufficiently large “context window limit” to be able to answer arbitrary questions about our corpus. Or to ask questions over larger collections of data, such as the archives we do our own research in. So for now

we have to limit our use of this technique to interrogating one article or some small number of articles.

We are hardly the only profession that would benefit from the ability to ask questions of a large corpus of data. These companies have a massive commercial incentive to address these markets. I expect these limits to be periodically lifted over time.

2. Searching documents (and the capabilities and limits of “retrieval augmented generation”)

In the meantime, though, I learned about a technique that could overcome these barriers for some questions. This was the second development I learned about that caused me to get excited about the possibilities.

The technique is called “retrieval augmented generation”, or RAG. The idea is to pair a large language model with a database containing your corpus articles or documents. When you ask a question, the tool first searches the database for the portions of the documents that were semantically most relevant to your question. Then it presents these excerpts of the matching documents to the AI tool, and the LLM uses these excerpts to compose an answer. The idea has the potential to be able to select the right information to answer your question.

After experimenting with many tools, which couldn’t handle a corpus the size of FRUS, I met an engineer from Google who introduced me to a tool that they produce that was able to index all of FRUS. It’s called Google Vertex AI Search Agent. I set it up, pointed it at history.state.gov, and after several hours during which the tool indexed every FRUS document, I was able to begin submitting questions. It limits its answers to the top 10 most relevant document segments, and composes answers 4-5 paragraphs long, with citations to each document it used for its claims. This means that questions that require more than 10 document fragments will be unavoidably incomplete. In other words, to use it effectively, you must first ask, “Could the question I’m asking be answered with 10 fragments or fewer? Or am I asking a question that’s much broader and would require consulting a larger corpus of documents?”

Besides its multi-paragraph answers, it also presents a list of all documents it thinks are relevant, with representative snippets of text that address the question.

In my preliminary testing, this tool has been quite impressive. I wouldn't advise copying and pasting an AI answer directly into an email or paper, but I think that with training in the tool's limitations, my colleagues could already use this tool to help them with their own research into our series. I wouldn't make this tool available to our readers without extensive testing and refinement.

3. Reviewing annotations against an in-house style guide

The third development emerged from a fortuitous meeting with an Amazon engineer. I explained that we have a complex style guide for our FRUS annotations and that we would benefit from a tool that could review our draft annotations against the rules in the style guide. The Amazon engineer told me that he had just created a demonstration tool that did this for another part of the State Department, and he offered to adapt it to our style guide. We provided the engineers with an excerpt of our guide, and several samples of FRUS annotations – in the form of Microsoft Word files containing a chapter's worth of document headings, datelines, and footnotes. The tool produced a list of problems in our annotations.

Some observations correctly identified missing required components of archival citations. In other cases, it flagged some issues that were not really problems, but our editors found them worth checking. Reviewing this list with my colleagues was interesting, because we realized that the tool revealed some internal inconsistencies in our style guide that we had not detected. As a result, we have resolved to review our style guide to address these issues and produce an updated style guide that works better for human historians and AI tools.

4. Document transcription

The fourth and final development that piqued my interest was the appearance of tools that could transcribe historical documents. For decades, we've enjoyed the use of digital scanning technologies and optical character recognition or OCR technology for recognizing the letters and words in typed and printed documents and allowing us to search and mine them. As good as OCR technology is, it still produces output that can be riddled with errors, and such levels of error may be unacceptable for certain use cases. But for others, we must laboriously proofread OCR output to achieve a reasonable level of quality.

If traditional OCR still has room for improvement on typed or printed documents, the situation is much worse for handwritten texts. Traditional OCR struggles or completely fails to recognize and extract handwritten text. Although many documents produced over the last century have been typed, we still have enormous quantities of handwritten documents and continue to produce them. If text can't be extracted, we can't search its contents and readers with visual disabilities are hindered from accessing the information. Being able to effectively digitize paper records and make them accessible and ready for research is a challenge not just for historians, but for any organization seeking to take advantage of the power of digital tools for searching and analyzing text.

There are two ways in which generative AI tools are improving on traditional OCR. First, you can present a generative AI tool with error-laden OCR text and instruct it to fix obvious errors in the text. While the results can fix spelling and punctuation errors, it has the potential to introduce new errors, so careful proofreading is still necessary. After experimenting with this approach, I wished for a tool that could perform its own OCR – that wouldn't be limited to cleaning up bad OCR.

In the last month or so, ChatGPT and its peers began releasing models with this capability. These models are called “multimodal” – meaning that they can take as their input not only text, but also images, audio, and even video. To trigger the OCR capabilities, you can't upload a PDF – you must upload an image of a document – a JPEG or PNG file, for example. Once you upload an image, you can ask for a transcription. But how good are the results?

As a test, I chose a particularly challenging set of documents: a collection of 6,500 handwritten index cards that we had scanned a decade ago but could not efficiently access because OCR tools could not decipher the handwriting. The index cards contain listings of consular officials at all U.S. diplomatic and consular posts from 1789-1960. The cards are nearly all handwritten in ornate cursive. Each card contains a mix of tables and marginal notes.

After experimenting with ChatGPT and Claude with mixed results, I finally experienced very impressive results from the Google Gemini 1.5 Pro model. It transcribed many cards perfectly – a feat that no other model matched. For some cards, it merged the contents of adjoining cells or omitted certain columns. For about 5% of cards it produced scrambled results, for reasons we've not yet had the chance to investigate.

But in most cases, it correctly or nearly correctly transcribed the names of the officials listed on the cards. The tool took 15-20 seconds per card and completed all 8,600 scanned images in 48 hours. We were astounded that after such a short time we could search the cards in ways that we had been unable to for a full decade, or ever before in their original paper form. The cards will need to be reviewed, but this review will be starting from a respectable first draft.

Looking ahead

In conclusion, the results of these experiments – using natural language to query individual documents and large corpuses of data, automating the review of our annotations, and producing usable draft transcriptions – show that AI tools have great potential for some portions of the work of transcribing, annotating, and querying our historical documents. The tools exhibit clear shortcomings, making them inappropriate for some tasks. But for other tasks, we were able to mitigate these shortcomings and derive utility through persistent and careful experimentation and close review.

In addition, we noticed the tools improving during our experiments. If you begin experimenting and hit some disappointing results, you might put your experiments down for a few weeks or months. By that time, a new model may have emerged that addresses the flaws of the previous generation.

Given the massive and growing scale of commercial investment, we can anticipate that many of the limitations we see today will dissipate, and new paradigms will quickly replace today's offerings. New capabilities are sure to come to these tools, and we should be ready to evaluate them.

In the meantime, we are finding valid uses for these tools in certain limited scenarios, when paired with a healthy dose of caution and skepticism.

CLOSING REMARKS

Francesco Lefebvre D'Ovidio
President of the Scientific Committee
for the Publication of Italian Diplomatic Documents

Closing Remarks

Friends,
Colleagues,
Members of ICEDD,
Minister Giuliana Del Papa,

I would like to thank you all for attending the conference, many of you making a very long trip to come to Roma – I hope that our beautiful city may have partially compensated you for the traveling stress, after all it is still the Eternal City!

As a participant to the conference I would like to thank, also on your behalf, first and foremost Minister Plenipotentiary Giuliana Del Papa and all the valuable officers and employees of the Policy Planning, Statistics and Historical documentation Unit for organising the conference and for taking care of every detail to perfection, beginning with making available to us such a wonderful and prestigious venue as this *Sala delle Conferenze Internazionali* of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Also, the collateral events have turned out very interesting and quite extraordinary, such as, above all, the final visit to the Galleria Borghese, closed to visitors and reserved all for ourselves, for which I know that Minister Del Papa has taken care of personally.

Participants to the conference have come from twenty-two countries and from four continents. This is very satisfactory. I strongly believe that the international character of ICEDD is particularly important, because, after all, our production consists of documents on international affairs, which have a purpose and a meaning only if they come from multiple countries: indeed, it is only through the analysis of sources from diverse areas that documents can allow a historical appraisal of international events. I hope that this international character will be further enhanced in the future, increasing the number of nations that contribute documents on the history of international relations and that participate to ICEDD.

I also would like to express my deep thanks and appreciation, on behalf of the organisers of the conference, to all of you who have delivered a presentation during these proceedings. All the presentations have been very interesting and will be included in the proceedings of the conference which the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs plans to publish. Among the numerous presentations I would like to mention especially the Swiss presentation on AI applied to Dodis and the Japanese on *Japanese Diplomatic Documents*. I have also noted with particular interest the presentation for the *Documents on Canadian External Relations* series, delivered by Dr. Brendan Kelly, from which I could see that we have shared many problems and solutions for the publication of diplomatic documents. Finally, I was particularly impressed by the presentations delivered by the United States delegation on the new technical developments on AI and their application to the editing of diplomatic documents. On afterthought, I regret not having placed this subject as the main topic for the conference.

A special thanks is due to Ambassador Umberto Vattani for his deep, insightful key-note speech on the dissolution of the USSR, the topic for our collective volume. Ambassador Vattani not only gave us his personal thoughts and comments on those eventful months, but also provided important and valuable personal recollections on how those events were viewed on the Italian side, and on Giulio Andreotti's attempts to change the international reaction to Gorbachev's final attempts to contain the disruption of the international system as a consequence of the precipitous events that caused and forged the dissolution of the USSR.

